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THE SOURCES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW
David  Kennedy*
I.  DOCTRINES  ABOUT  THE SOURCES  OF
INTERNATIONAL  LAW
International  law  devotes  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  its  sources.
Scholars  have produced  a large body of work about both the conditions
under  which treaties,  custom, or general  principles  of law  bind  actors
and  the  hierarchy  among the  various doctrinal  forms  which might ap-
ply  in a given  instance.'  Indeed,  doctrine and  commentary  about what
* Assistant  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  I  would  like  to  thank  Clare
Dalton,  Josh  Floum,  Kim  Goslant,  Reinhard  Hermes,  Duncan  Kennedy,  and  Dan
Tarullo  for their research assistance,  readings,  and comments. This  article is one  part
of a larger study of public international  legal  doctrine being published  in  1987 by No-
mos Verlag  under the title International Legal Structures.
1.  Most standard treatises and casebooks  devote a section to  the sources of interna-
tional law. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY,  THE  LAW  OF NATIONS  (5th ed.  1955);  1.  BROWNUE,
PRINCIPLES  OF PUBLIC  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (3d ed.  1979);  L.  OPPENIEIt.I,  I'rNERNA-
TIONAL  LAW  (8th  ed.  H.  Lauterpacht  1955);  1 M.  WHITEMAN,  DIGEST  OF  INTERNA-
TIONAL  LAW  (1963).
For information devoted  to sources  in general, see Waldock, General Course on Pub-
lic International  Law,  106  RECUEIL  DES  COURS,  1, 39-103  (1962)  (classic  British ap-
proach  focusing  on  practice  and  the  I.C.J.  jurisprudence);  McDougal  & Reismann,
The Prescribing  Function in  World Constitutive Process: How International  Law  is
Made, 6 YALE STUD.  IN  WORLD  PUB.  ORDER 249  (1980)  (a sociological approach); A.
VERDROSS,  DIE  QUELLEN  DES  UNIVERSELLEN  VOLKERRECHTS  (1973)  (a  natural  law
approach);  G.  Tunkin,  Soviet Theory of Sources of International Law,  in  VOLKER-
RECHT UND  RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE: INTERNATIONALE  FESTSCHRIFT  FOR STEFAN  VEROSTA
67  (1980)  (summarizing  the  extremely  positivist  Soviet  approach);  Vitally,  The
Sources of International  Law, in  MANUAL  OF  PUBLIC  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  116  (M.
Sorenson  ed.  1968)  (a  classic  treatise  summary);  Baxter,  Treaties and Custom,  129
RECUEIL  DES  Couns  44  (1970)  (discussing  mutual  reciprocal  influence  of treaty  and
custom upon each other's formation); de Visscher, Cours gnbral  du drolt international
public, 136  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  9  (1972).  For information concerning  treaties, see T.
ELIAs,  THE  MODERN  LAW  OF  TREATIES  (1974)  (based  on  the Vienna  Convention  on
The Law of Treaties);  A.  MCNAIR,  THE  LAW  OF TREATIES  (1961)  (a practice-oriented
handbook  drawing  upon  British  practice;  concerned  primarily  with  clarifying  rules
about  specific  doctrines such  as treaty  conclusion  rather  than with  general  considera-
tions of validity);  P. REUTER,  INTRODUCTION  AU  DROIT DES  TRAITtS  (1972);  B.  Sip&MIA,
DAS  REZIPROZITXTSELEMENT  IM  ZUSTANDEKOMMEN  VOLKERRECHTLICHER  VERTRAGE
(1972);  I. SINCLAIR,  THE  VIENNA  CONVENTION  ON  THE  LAW  OF TREATiES  (1973).AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
are and what are  not the sources of international  law are so well devel-
oped that further  commentary  seems  unnecessary. The  discussion  usu-
ally  revolves  around the  four classic sources  contained  in  Article  38  of
the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of Justice.'  Article  38  is  ad-
dressed  to  I.C.J. justices  and  enumerates  the  various  sources  they are
to examine  in  finding  the law  necessary  to resolve  a case.3  It has been
taken  as  a convenient  catalog  of international  legal  sources  generally,
and  as  such,  has  been  the  starting  point  for  most  discussion  in  this
area.  Article  38  reads:
1. The  Court,  whose  function  it  is  to  decide  in  accordance  with  international
law  such disputes  as  are submitted  to  it,  shall  apply:
a.  international conventions, whether  general  or particular,  establishing
rules expressly  recognized  by  the contesting  states;
b.  international  custom, as  evidence of  a  general  practice  accepted  as
law;
c.  the general principles of law  recognized  by civilized  nations;
d.  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  59,  judicial decisions and  the
For  information  on  customary  law,  see  Akehurst,  Custom as a Source of Interna-
tional Law,  47  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  1 (1974-1975)  (a  good  survey  of  contemporary
doctrine);  A.  D'AMATO,  THE CONCEPT  OF CUSTOM  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (1971)  (a
balanced  and  comprehensive  treatment);  Guggenheim,  Les  deux  l~ments de la cou-
tume en droit international,  in  I LA  TECHNIQUE  ET  LES  PRINCIPES  DU  DROIT  PUBLIC,
tTUDES  EN  L'HONNEUR  DE  GEORGES  SCELLE  275  (1950);  H.  GONTHER,  ZUR  ENT-
STEHUNG  VON  VOLKERGEWOHNHEITSRECHT  (1970)  (emphasizes  estoppel,  or  "Ver-
trauensgrundsatz"  as  a  basis  for  customary  law).
For  information  on general  principles,  see  Tunkin,  "General Principles of Law"  in
International Law,  in  INTERNATIONALE  FESTSCHRIFT  FOR  ALFRED  VERDROSS  523
(1971);  Verdross,  Les principes gkn~raux de droit dans le systme du droit interna-
tional public, in  RECUEIL  D'tTUDES  DE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  EN  HOMMAGE  A  PAUL
GUGGENHEIM  521  (1968).
For additional sources,  see C.  DE  VISSCHER,  DE L'tQUITt  DANS  LE  RtGLEMENT  ARBI-
TRAL  OU  JUDICIAIRE  DES  LITIGES  DE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  (1972);  Falk,  On
the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly,  60  Am.  J.  INT'L  L.  782
(1966);  R.  HIGGINS,  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  THROUGH  THE  PO-
LITICAL  ORGANS  OF THE  UNITED  NATIONS  (1963);  Skubiszewski, A  New Source of the
Law of Nations: Resolutions of International  Organizations,  in  RECUEIL  D'tTUDES  DE
DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  EN  HOMMAGE  A PAUL  GUGGENHEIM  508  (1968);  E.  SuY,  LES
ACTES  JURIDIQUES  UNILATfRAUX  EN  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  (1962).
2.  Most  textbooks  make this  reliance  explicit. See 1. BROWNLIE,  supra note  I, at 3
passim; NGUYEN  QUOC-DINH,  P.  DAILLER  & A.  PELLET,  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUB-
LIC  105,  108  (2d  ed.  1980);  E.  MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN,  VOLKERRECHT  75  (2d  ed.  1979);
A.  VERDROSS,  supra note  1, at  38 passim. For a  critical  analysis  of this reliance,  see
McDougal  & Reisman, supra note  1, at  259-60 ("It has  become almost a ritual presen-
tation among  commentators  to make  Article  38  . . . the central focus  of exposition.").
3.  I.C.J.  CHARTER  art. 38.  Article 38 replicates  a similar provision  in the statute of
its predecessor,  the  Permanent Court of International  Justice. The  I.C.J.  provision  sug-
gests  a  stronger  intention  that  the enumerated  sources  are  general sources  of  interna-
tional  law  by adding  after "the  Court" the words  "whose  function  it is  to decide."  See
NGUYEN  QUoc-DINH,  P.  DAILLER  & A.  PELLET,  supra note  2,  at  108-09;  A.  VER-
DROSS,  supra note 1, at  98.
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teachings of the most  highly qualified  publicists of  the various  nations,
as subsidiary  means  for  the determination  of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice  the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the  parties agree thereto.
Contemporary  analyses  of source  doctrine  generally  begin  with  an
abstract definition of each  of the sources  enumerated  in Article 38,  de-
veloping  the boundaries of these categories.4
Treaty  law,  for example, considers  the theoretical  prerequisites  for in-
4.  Treatments of treaty  law differ  only in  the level of abstraction at  which  treaties
are defined.  The most abstract definition  is perhaps Kelsen's: "A  treaty is an agreement
normally entered  into by  two or more states  under general  international  law."  H.  KEL-
SEN,  PRINCIPLES  OF INTERNATIONAL  LAW  454  (2d  rev.  ed.  R. Tucker  1966):  see J.
STARKE,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  457  (8th  ed.  1977).
A treaty  may be  defined,  in accordance  with  the definition  adopted  in Article 2
of the  [Vienna]  Convention, as an agreement  whereby two or more States estab-
lish or seek  to establish  a relationship between  themselves  governed  by  interna-
tional  law.  So long as an  agreement  between  States  is attested,  any kind of in-
strument  or  document  or  any  oral  exchange  between  States  involving
undertakings may  constitute  a treaty, irrespective  of the form  or circumstances
of its conclusion.
Id. at 454 (coupled  with a  system  for categorizing  treaties  by the  form of their crea-
tion, id. at 458); see also NGUYEN  QUOC-DINH,  P. DAILLER  & A.  PELLET, supra note
2, at  I11.
Le trait6 d6signe tout accord  couclu entre deux ou plusicurs sujets  du droit inter-
national,  destin6 i  produire  des effets  de droit  ct r~gi  par  le droit international.
A still  more concrete  definition is:
Unter einem  [v6lkerrechtlichen]  Vertrag  verstehen  wir  eine ausdrflckliche  oder
durch  konkludente  Handlungen  zustandegekommene,  yom VR  fV6lkerrecht]
bestimmte  Willenseinigung  zwischen  zwei  oder  mehreren  Staaten  oder anderen
V6lkerrechtssubjekten,  in  denen  sich  diese  zu  bestimmten  einseitigen  oder kor-
respondierenden,  gleichen  oder  verschiedenen,  cinmaligen  oder  wiederholten
Leistungen,  Unterlassungen  oder Duldungen  verpflichten.
A.  VERDROSS  & B. SIMMA,  UNIVERSELLES  VOLKERRECHT 270 (1976).  For an  interest-
ing "programization"  of this abstract  approach,  see  1.  V.  MONCH,  VOLKERRECHT  IN
PROGRAMMIERTER  FORM  53-82  (1982).  These  abstract definitions  are usually coupled
with abstract  limitations  in  the  form of categorizations  of permissible  treaties  defined
by the  form of their  conclusion.  See,  e.g.,  J.  STARKE,  supra, at 400-05.  Treaties  are
limited,  for  example,  by contrast  to  private agreements  or declarations  of political  in-
tention.  Minch,  Non-Binding Agreements,  29  ZEITSCHRIFT  FOR  AUSLXNDISCHES  OF-
FENTLICHES  RkEcHT  UND  VOLKERRECHT  [ZAORV]  1 (1969);  see  Dehaussy,  Le
problhme de la classification des traitbs et le projet de convention &tabli  par  la Com-
mission du  Droit international  des Nations Unies, in  RECUEIL D'TUDES  DE  DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL  EN  HOMMAGE  k PAUL  GUGGENHEIM  305  (1968)  (describing  the classifi-
cation  of treaties).  Custom  is similarly  defined  and  limited  at an  abstract  level. See,
e.g.,  Hudson,  Article 24 of the Statute of the International  Law Commission, U.N.
Doe.  A/CN.4/16, reprinted  in [19501  2 Y.B.  INT'L  L.  COMin'N  24,  26,  U.N.  Doe. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. I:
Seeking  with  Brierly  [The  Law  of Nations  (4th  ed.  1949)]  (p.  62)  "a  general
recognition among States of a certain practice as obligatory."  the emergence of a
principle or rule of customary international  law  would  seem to require presence
of the following  elements:AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
cluding  some  form of words under  the heading  "treaty."  Thus,  people
who  discuss  treaties  feel  that  such  issues  as  "capacity,"  executive
(a)  concordant  practice by a number of States  with reference  to a  type of situa-
tion  falling  within the domain  of international  relations;
(b)  continuation  or repetition of the  practice over a  considerable  period  of time;
(c)  conception  that  the practice is required  by,  or consistent  with, prevailing  in-
ternational  law;  and
(d)  general  acquiescence  in the practice  by other States. Of course  the presence
of each  of these elements  is  to be established  (droit 6tre constat6)  as a  fact  by a
competent international  authority.
id.
"International  jurists  speak  of a  custom  when  a  clear  and  continuous  habit  of doing
certain  actions  has  grown  up  under the aegis  of the conviction  that  these  actions  are,
according  to  International  Law,  obligatory  or right."  L.  OPPENHEIM,  supra  note 1, at
26.  Most modern  treatises refer to  Article 38 of the Statute of the  International  Court
of Justice in lieu  of developing their own definition:  "international  custom, as evidence
of a  general  practice  accepted  as  law."  Custom  is  then  limited  by abstract  considera-
tion  of issues such as the degree of "evidence"  required. See,  e.g., I.  BROWNLIE,  supra
note  1, at  4-6.  For  discussions of related  topics  such as  the meaning  of "practice"  as
acts or  verbal statements,  see infra note  72;  the duration of  the practice  required,  see
infra, note  12;  the  number  of states  who  must  participate,  see infra  note  12; the  re-
quirement  of  "opinio juris," see  infra note  41.  For  a  discussion  of  the  opinio juris
requirement,  compare  A.  VERDROSS,  supra note  1, at 104-09  (favoring)  with  Vitally,
supra note  1, at  134-35  (against)  and  H.  GONTHER,  supra note  1, at  149  (against).
5.  Although  capacity seems unproblematic  for sovereign  states (Vienna  Convention
on  the Law of Treaties,  opened for signature May 23,  1969,  U.N.  Doe. A/CONF.39/
27, art. 6,  reprinted  in 8  I.L.M.  679  (1969),  63 Am.  J.  INT'L  L.  875 (1969)  [hereinaf-
ter Vienna  Convention];  J.  STARKE,  supra note 4,  at 466;  A.  VERDROSS  &  B.  SINIMA,
supra note 4, at 348),  the discussion  of the capacity  of international  organizations  and
federal  states  reveals  the  abstract  structure  of  assumptions  underlying  capacity  doc-
trine. There is a  basic tension between  the aim of registering  pre-existing capacity  and
creating reliable  or reasonable limits to capacity.  The notions of "pre-existing"  or "rea-
sonable"  capacity which  are in turn relied upon reflect  either the intention of some pre-
existing sovereign  capacity  or  reasonable external  values  or  definitions of sovereignty.
Thus, the treaty-making capacity of institutions  is deduced either "by  implication  from
their constituent instruments"  (Virally, supra note  1, at  183)  in the so-called  "implied
powers"  approach  (A.  VERDROSS  &  B.  SIMMA,  supra note  4, at  350)  or  "is  to be de-
duced,  if at all  . . . , from the evidence  pointing  to  its having  that  sort of  personality
which  involves  capacity  to  make  treaties"  (Parry,  The  Treaty Making Power of the
United Nations, 26  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  110  (1949)).  For the view  that  treaty-making
power  must  be expressly  conferred  by  constituents,  see  H.  KELSEN,  supra note  4,  at
330;  J.  SCHNEIDER,  TREATY  MAKING  POWER  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS
(1959);  see  also L.  WILDHABER,  TREATY-MAKING  POWER  AND  CONsrITUTION  (1971)
(describing  the capacity  of federal  states).  International  law capacity  of federal  states
depends  upon  the  constitution  of  the  federation.  See,  e.g.,  Grundgesetz  for  die
Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  (Basic  Law of the Federal  Republic  of Germany),  art. 32
Ill; Bundesverfassung  der  Schweizerischen  Eidgenossenschaft,  art. 8, 9  (Federal  Con-
stitution of Switzerland)  (establishing  a  limited treaty-making  capacity,  although such
provisions cannot be relied  upon to deceive other sovereigns).  For a comprehensive  sur-
vey  of the  treaty-making capacity  of and performance  of treaties  by constituent  mem-
ber  states  in  Federal  systems,  see  L.  WILDHABER,  supra, at 278-343.  In  particular,
compare  the  situation  where  member  states  have  no power  to  conclude  international
agreements:  Australia,  id. at 297-302; USSR,  id. at  283-84,  with  the situation  where
member  states  may  have  a  limited  treaty-making  power;  Canada,  id. at  286-89,  and
the situation  where  member  states  have  a constitutional  power  to  make  treaties:  West
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"competence,"  the  "full  powers"  of  plenipotentiaries,7  the  require-
Germany, id. at 306-7;  Switzerland,  id. at 315-19.
6.  This doctrine considers which organs of the state may legitimately conclude trea-
ties. Although  the domestic  legal  order is normally  considered  controlling,  I C. Rous-
SEAU,  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  (1970);  A.  VERDROSS  & B. SIMtMIA,  supra note 4,
at 352,  the  discourse  attempts  abstractly  and  vainly  to  resolve  the  international  law
consequences  of derogation  from  these  domestic  provisions.  The  effect  of an  internal
limitation of authority upon  other states  is seen  to depend  either upon  a vision  of the
true, pre-existing  power of the state concluding  the treaty or upon the systematic  neces-
sity of establishing reasonable  limits of state authority. Each of these views depends in
some way upon  the other.  For example,  if the doctrine  is to register  the true power  of
the concluding state, it must  be based upon  either an external  vision of state power  or
recognition  of acceptable  international  rules.  Most  commentators  alternatively  distin-
guish and then blend  these approaches.  See, e.g., Geck,  The Conclusion of Treaties in
Violation of the Internal Law of a Party. Comments on Arts. 6 and 43 of the ILC's
1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,  27  ZAORV  429  (1967).  Geck maintains
that the dependence of treaties  on internal law is particularly dangerous from  the view-
point of the security  of international  treaty  relations.  He  concludes  that:
On  the  basis of almost  universally  uniform  constitutional  law,  and  indeed  per-
haps even on the basis  of a  rule of international law,  a Head of State is empow-
ered to  express  binding consent  to  a treaty..
It  is,  however,  at present  both  necessary  and sensible  to  refer  to constitutional
law for the answer as to whether other representatives  of State are authorised  to
express consent  independently of any  authorization  by the  Head of State.
Id. at 442.  For the view that derogation  from  municipal  provisions of authority is  not
relevant  at  international  law,  see  H.  BLIX,  TREATY  MAKING  POWER  392  (1960).
"[T]he  evidence of a practice  treating  constitutional  provisions  as not directly  relevant
in  international  law is both quantitatively  and qualitatively  more significant than that
pointing  to  the  direct relevance  of municipal  provisions."  Id. Blix suggests  that what
practice  does support is a "criterion  of apparent ability."  Id. For the view that deroga-
tion  from  municipal  authority  is internationally  relevant,  because  the  pre-existing
power  had simply not  been exercised,  see TRIEPEL,  VOLKERRECHT  UND  LANDESRECHT
236  (1899).  For the mixed  view that such derogation  is sometimes relevant,  see Vienna
Convention  on  the  Law  of Treaties,  supra note  5, at art. 46  (holding  a  violation  of
internal law relevant if the violation  is manifest,  the provision is of fundamental impor-
tance and concerns competence  to conclude treaties).  The  International  Law Commis-
sion,  which drafted  the Convention,  was  "extremely  cautious"  in  formulating  Article
46. Nahlik,  The Ground of Invalidity and Termination  of Treaties,  65 A.  J.  IWtL L.
736, 740  (1971);  see also Cahier, La violation du droit interne relatif  h la competbnce
pour conclure des traitbs comme cause de nullit'  des traitbs,  54  RIVISTA  DI  DjRITro
INTERNAZIONALE  226  (1974);  Kearney,  Internal Limitations on  External Commit-
ments: Article 46 of the Treaties Convention, 4  INT'L  LAW.  1 (1969).  Kearney  ana-
lyzes Article  46  (originally  I.L.C.  draft Article  43)  as  a:
middle ground between opposing schools of thought classically grouped  under the
convenient  umbrellas of monism and dualism. The monists,  holding the view that
internal law and  international  commitments  are one,  deduced  from this concept
of unity that international  commitments  which  did not  meet internal  limitations
on  making  treaties  are  unlawful  because  of a  failure of consent.  The  dualists,
holding the distinctness of internal and international  law, concluded  that while a
treaty obligation  may be invalid internally because of failure to comply with con-
stitutional requirements,  the international  obligation  is unimpaired  if it measures
up to international  law requirements,  because these requirements do not compre-
hend any reference  to the  internal law.  There is  an essential  bootstraps  element
in each  position  because  the conclusion  depends  upon  acceptance of a semantic
assumption.AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
ments  and  effects  of signature  or  ratification,8  or the  requirements  of
Id. at 3. Nevertheless,  Kearney appears to rely on a dualist  interpretation  of Article 46
in his  attempt  to  elaborate  its coherent  meaning.
Is the solution  that  has been  finally  worked out  the best available  solution?  It  is
certainly  not  the  rule  that  would  have  the  greatest  appeal  to  either  the  fervid
nationalist  or  the  perfervid  internationalist.  But the  all-or-nothing  approach  of
true  believers  rarely supplies a  workable  formula  for  a  work-a-day  world.  When
the desirable  aim  of upholding  the stability of the  international treaty  structure
collides  with  the  laudable  end  of  placing  some  domestic  checks  and  balances
upon the making of international commitments,  the reasonable  solution should  be
a  compromise  that  protects  both sets  of interests  to  the  maximum extent.
The essential  decision  in  reaching  such a  compromise  is allocation of the burden
of proceeding ...
The decision  underlying  [article 46]  . . . is to  accord prima  facie validity  to  the
appearance  of authority subject  to the limitation  of an objectively  evident viola-
tion  of a  fundamentally  important  internal  law.  The  review of the  problem  has
demonstrated  above  that  this solution  is amply  supported,  not only  by legal  the-
ory,  but  by  consideration  of practical  consequences.
id. at  21.
7.  "Full  powers"  is defined:
a  document  emanating  from  the  competent  authority  of a  state  designating  a
person  or persons  to represent  the state for negotiating,  adopting or authenticat-
ing  the  text of  a  treaty,  for  expressing  consent  of  the state  to  be  bound  by  a
treaty, or  for  accomplishing  any  other act  with  respect  to  a  treaty ...
The  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law of Treaties,  supra note  5, at art. 2(l)(c):
The  extremely  formal  nature  of this  doctrine  exists  in some  tension  with  its  reliance
upon a substantive  view of "competent"  municipal authority and  of the impact of inter-
national  law of  failure to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  full  powers.  Article  7(i)  provides
that:
A  person is considered  as representing  a State  for the purpose of.  . . expressing
the consent  of the State  . . . if:
(a)  he produces  full  powers; or
(b)  it appears  from  the practice of the States concerned  or from other circum-
stances  that  their  intention  was  to  consider  that  person  as  representing  the
State  ....
Moreover,  under  Article 47,
if the authority of a representative  to  express the consent  of a State to be bound
by  a particular treaty has  been made subject to a specific restriction,  his omission
to  observe  that  restriction  may  not  be  invoked  as  invalidating  the consent  ex-
pressed  by him  unless the restriction was  notified to  the other negotiating States
prior  to  his  expressing  such consent.
See  J.  STARKE,  supra note  4,  at  401;  J.  JONES,  FULL  POWERS  AND  RATIFICATION
(1946).  For examples  of the doctrine's  invocation, see  I C.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note 6, at
80.
8.  Signature and ratification  doctrine defines  in a  formal  way the abstract  end steps
in  treaty  creation.  These  formal  acts  separate  binding  and  non-binding  instruments.
See Bolintineanu,  Expression of Consent to be Bound by  a Treaty in the Light of the
1969 Vienna Convention, 68  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  672 (1974);  1. BROWNLIE,  supra note  1,
at  603-04  (a  good  doctrinal  summary);  SMETS,  LA  CONCLUSION  DES  ACCORDS  EN
FORME SIMPLIFfE  (1969).  Ratification,  like  full powers,  is discussed  as a municipal and
international  law  event. Article  2(1)(b) of the Vienna  Convention, supra note 5 defines
ratification  as  "the  international  act  . . . whereby  a  state  establishes  on  the  interna-
tional plane  its consent to be bound  by a treaty." Cf "capacity"  doctrine, supra note 5;
see also infra notes  59  & 65 and accompanying  text. On  the  hierarchical  relation  be-
tween  signature and  ratification,  see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 603-04; J.  STARKE,
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registry  and  deposit9  need  abstract  explanation.  Mitigating  circum-
stances such as duress, or force majeure0  complete the affirmative pre-
supra note 4, at 479-81.
9.  Designed  to  prevent secret agreements  or  make  a determinative  text  available,
these  doctrines  provide  for  the  registry and  deposit  of reservations,  ratifications,  and
treaty texts with  one or more states or international organizations.  I. BROWNLIE, supra
note  1, at 590-91.  The discourse about  these doctrines contrasts a view of registry  as a
nonsubstantive  recognition  of the  underlying  instrument  and  as  in some  way  the act
which  gives  the instrument  international  force.  These  strands structure  discussion  of
the role of the repository and of the requirement  that  "[elvery  treaty  . . . entered  into
by any member  of the  United  Nations  . . .shall  . . . be registered  with  the Secreta-
riat."  U.N.  CHARTER  art.  102.  In one view, for example,  the repository is an  impartial
communicator  of reservations,  in  another,  the  decisive  acceptor  of reservations.  See
Rosenne,  More on the Depository of International Treaties, 64  Ati. J.  INT'L  L.  838
(1970)  (updating  Rosenne,  The Depository of International  Treaties, 61  Aii.  J.  INT'L
L.  923  (1967)).  After  a  general  discussion  of the  function of deposit,  the author con-
cludes "that  a depository  notified of reservations  incompatible with  the object and pur-
pose of a treaty must  communicate the text of the reservation  to the other states  con-
cerned  and  leave  it  to  them  to  decide  the  question  of  compatibility."  Id. at  852.
Similarly, under one view of U.N.  Charter article  102,  the provision  that "[n]o  party to
any such  treaty  or international  engagement  which  has  not  been  registered  in  accor-
dance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraph  I of this  Article  may  invoke  that  treaty  or
engagement  before any organ of the United Nations"  imposes a condition  on the valid-
ity  of  the  underlying  instrument.  In another,  this  merely  adds  an  international  law
sanction to  failure  to  register.  See I. BROWNLIE,  supra  note  1,  at 609-10;  Geck,  Die
Registrierung und  Veriffentlichung  vblkerrechtlicher  Vertriige,  22  ZAORV  173
(1962).
10.  Instances  of invalidity  on  the grounds  of error,  fraud,  or  the threat  or  use of
force against  the person  of a  representative  are  little  known  in  international  practice.
See Nahlik, supra note 6,  at 741;  Waldock,  Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
[1963]  2  INT'L  L.  COMM'N  Y.B.  36  (1963).  Nevertheless  there  is  hardly  a  treatise
which does  not deal  abstractly  and often  at length  with  these mitigating  factors.  See,
e.g.,  E.  MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN, supra note  2,  at 327;  1 C.  RoussEAu, supra note 6, at
143; Virally,  supra  note  1,  at 201-04. Coercion  of a state  by use of force  is uniformly
viewed  to mitigate  consent.  See  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of Treaties,  art.  52,
supra  note 5, at 891,  providing: "a  treaty is void  if its conclusion  has been procured  by
the threat or use of force  in violation of the principles of international  law embodied  in
the Charter of the United  Nations." Id. The discourse concerns  the extent to which all
treaties  can  be understood  to  be coerced  by  the  underlying  positions  of  power.  This
arises in abstract discussions of the binding force of peace treaties and the mitigation of
economic  coercion. See Parry,  The Law of Treaties, in  MANUAL  OF  PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL  LAW  175,  202  (M.  Sorenson  ed.  1968)  (on  peace  treaties);  Stone,  De
Victoribus Victis: The International  Law Coninission and Imposed Treaties of Peace,
8 VA. J.  INT'L L. 356 (1967).  Some claim to  have resolved this by requiring that duress
be legitimized  by international  law.
Durch  Art.  2 Abs.  4 SVN  wurde  (jedoch)  jede  zwischenstaatliche  gewaltsame
Selbsthilfe mit Ausnahme von  Notwehr und  Nothilfe gem.iss Art.  51  SVN...
verboten.  Somit  ist  seither  jeder  Vertrag  nichtig,  der  durch  einen  unter
Verletzung  der  Grundsitze  der  USVNO  gegen  einen  Stoat  ausgeulbten  Zwang
herbeigeffihrt  wurde.
A. VERDROSS,  supra note  1, at 62-63.  For  a  discussion on  economic  duress, see id. at
62 (economic  and political duress not mitigating factors); cf. INSTITUT  FOR INTERNATI-
ONALE  BEZEIHUNGEN  DER  AKADEMIE  FOR  STAATS  UND  RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT  DER
D.D.R.,  I  VOLKERRECHT  251  (H.  Kr6ger  ed.  1973)  [hereinafter  DDR  LEHRaUCH].
"Unter  'Gewalt'  [muss]  auch  jede  Art  politischer  und  insbesondere  okonomischer
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conditions  for  treaty  making.11  Those  who  consider  custom  elaborate
the  psychological  and  physical  prerequisites  to treating  mere habit  as
"custom."  They  talk about  how  frequently  a  norm must  be  respected,
and  by  whom,  before  it becomes  a  customary  norm. 2
Those  who  consider  both major  sources  likewise  elaborate  the  condi-
Zwangsanwendung  . . . [verstanden  werden]."  Id.
11.  One of the most important doctrines abstractly  limiting  the ambit of treaty law
concerns  the possibility of reservations.  As  enshrined  by the Vienna  Convention,  supra
note  5,  (Articles  19-23),  reservation  doctrine  blends a  "contractual  conception  of  the
absolute  integrity  of the  treaty  as  adopted"  (I.  BROWNLIE,  supra note  1, at  605-06)
with  a deference  to  the "purpose  and raison d'Otre of the convention"  (Reservations  to
the  Convention  on  Genocide,  1951  I.C.J.  21  (Advisory  Opinion  of  May  28)).  For  an
analysis of three modes of discourse  about reservations  to multilateral treaties, see  Koh,
Reservations to  Multilateral Treaties: How  International Legal  Doctrine Reflects
World Vision, 23  HARV.  INT'L L.J. 71  (1982);  see also Mendelson,  Reservations to the
Constitution of International  Organizations,  45  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  137  (1971);  Sin-
clair,  Vienna  Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19  INT'L  &  COMP.  L.Q.  47,  53-60
(1970);  Reports  of  the  Commission  to  the  General  Assembly,  U.N.  Doc.  A/6309/
Rev.1,  reprinted in  [1966]  2 Y.B.  INT'L LAW  COMM'N  169,  205,  U.N.  Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1966/Add.l  [hereinafter  Reports  of the Commission].
12.  Formerly,  for  example,  it was  maintained  that only  an  "immemorial"  practice
could  give  rise  to  a  customary  rule.  Virally,  supra note  1, at  131.  This  was  slowly
eroded.  A  classic  statement of the prerequisite  practice  required  only "practice  over a
considerable  period  of time."  Hudson,  supra note 4,  at  26.  Modern  discourse prefers
other factors,  as indicated  in the now  famous statement of the  I.C.J.  in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases; "[a]n  indispensable  requirement  would  be  that  within  the
period  in  question,  short  though  it  might  be,  State  practice,  including  that  of States
whose  interests  are  specially  affected,  should  have  been  both  extensive  and  virtually
uniform."  North Sea  Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v.  Den., Ger.  v. Neth.)  1969  I.C.J.
2,  43  (Judgment  of Feb. 20).  Some  authors suggest that the time element  has  become
fully  irrelevant.  See, e.g.,  Cheng,  United Nations Resolutions on  Outer Space:  "In-
stant" International Customary Law?, 5  INDIAN  J.  INT'L.  L.  23,  35  (1965)  (coining
term  "instant  customary  law");  see also Baxter,  Treaties and Custom, 129  RECUEIL
DES  COURs  25,  44  (1970).  "If all  States were  today to declare  that the State  of law  is
that  foreign  States  are not  entitled  to  immunity  in  national  courts,  that  would  be  the
law,  even  though it  had theretofore  been  acknowledged  that  the  law  is just the  oppo-
site."  Id. The progressive  abandonment  of the time element  has  led  to a  focus  on  how
many  states, or,  more  accurately,  which states  must  participate  to  create custom.  See
infra note  72;  E.  MENZEL  &  K.  IPSEN,  supra note 2,  at  81  ("derjenigen Staaten...
die  ein  besonderes  Interesse  . . . [an  der betreffenden  Norm]  haben.")  Each  of  these
attempts  at abstract  delimitation  contained  an  element  of deference  to  the  consent  of
underlying  sovereigns  or registry  of already  binding  norms  and one  of norm  creation.
This  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the discourse about  the states  which  must  participate.  It
relies  upon  a  vision  either of the  relative importance  of various states  or of the nature
of the norm  being created. That  each  strand  depended  upon  the other  has  been  recog-
nized by  those who  suggest that  this discourse  has failed  in its attempt  to  delimit cus-
tom  independently  of the content  of the  norms themselves  on  the basis  either of prac-
tice  or sovereign  intention.  See, e.g.,  A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1, at  92.
A  more difficult question,  insisted upon  by many  writers,  relates to  the  number
of acts  (or restraints)  necessary  to satisfy the material  element  of custom forma-
tion.  However,  such an inquiry  is misleading.  There  is  no metaphysically  precise
(such  as "seventeen  repetitions")  or  vague  (such as  "in  the  Court's discretion")
answer  possible.  States  simply  do  not  organize  their  behavior  along  absolute
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tions under  which treaties  and  customs  cease  to be  sources  of interna-
tional law,  due to abrogation,13  denunciation,"'  changed  circumstances
(rebus  sic  stantibus), 15  or  subsequent  custom.1 6  When  discussing
lines. There is no international  "constitution"  specifying  when  acts become  law.
Rather, states  resort to  international  law  in claim-conflict situations.  In such in-
stances,  counsel  for either side  will  attempt  to  cite as many acts as possible.
Id. (emphasis  in  original).
13.  The abstract discourse  about  the replacement  of the old custom with  new  per-
enially oscillates  between an  approach which  would imagine practice and sovereign au-
thority  to create  and merely  to  recognize  norms.  A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1,  at 97.
Unquestionably customary  law has changed over  the years, and thus any  theory
must incorporate the possibility of change into its concept of custom.  In particu-
lar, an "illegal"  act by a state contains the seeds of a new legality.  When a state
violates  an  existing  rule  of  customary  international  law,  it  undoubtedly  is
"guilty"  of  an  illegal  act,  but  the  illegal  act  itself  becomes  a  disconfirmatory
instance  of the  underlying  rule.  The  next  state  will  find  it  somewhat  easier  to
disobey  the rule, until  eventually  a  new line of conduct  will  replace  the original
rule  by a  new  rule.
Id. Although  one writer has suggested  that "[t]he  Vienna  Convention  prescribes a cer-
tain presumption  as to the validity and continuance  in force of a treaty,"  I. BROWNUtE,
supra  note  1, at 496, abrogation  (termination  by all parties)  is possible  if the  treaty so
provides  (Vienna  Convention,  art.  54,  supra note  5) in  an  abstract  provision  about
validity of its own,  by consent of all  parties  (article 54)  or by  the conclusion  of a later
treaty (article 59).  Discourse about  these doctrines, while independent  of the substance
of the treaty  itself, blends a consensual theory,  which relies  upon a vision  of underlying
sovereign authority, with a justice-based "nature  of the obligation"  theory,  which relies
upon  a  vision  of the  limits of  consent. See  I C.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note  6,  at 206-07;
Simma, Reflections on Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
its Background in General International  Law, 20STERREICHISCHE  ZEITSCtRIFr FOR
OFFENTLICHES  RECHT  [OZOR]  5 (1970).
14.  The denunciation  doctrine  limits and justifies  unilateral  abrogation.  See supra
note  13.  Denunciation  is permitted if the treaty  expressly or impliedly so provides  (Vi-
enna Convention,  supra  note 5, at arts. 54,  56) or if another party materially  breaches.
The discourse  again  blends a consensual  strand,  relying  upon  a vision  of sovereignty,
with a "material"  breach of a provision  "essential  to the accomplishment  of the object
or purpose of the treaty"  (article 60),  relying  upon a vision of implied consent.  See A.
DAVID,  THE STRATEGY  OF TREATY  TERMINATION  (1975);  B.  SINtU,  UNILATERAL  DE-
NUNCIATION  OF  TREATY  BECAUSE  OF  PRIOR  VIOLATIONS  BY  OTHER  PARTY  (1966);
Briggs,  Unilateral  Denunciation of Treaties, 68  Aht.  J.  INT'L  L.  51  (1974):  see also
Nahlik, supra note 6, at 736-56  (examining  the development  of the relevant  provisions
of the Vienna  Convention).
15.  The doctrine of "fundamental  change of circumstances"  has  become embodied
in  Article  62  of  the Vienna  Convention.  Few  issues  were  as  strongly  debated  as  the
inclusion  of this cause  in the Convention.  Fervent supporters of the doctrine suggested
that it constituted  an implied restriction  to  the binding  force of any treaty which  could
contribute  to  the stability  of agreements.  Lyssitzyn, Stability and Change: Unilateral
Denunciation or Suspension of Treaties by Reason of Changed Circumstances,  61 AM.
Soc'Y  INT'L  L.  PROC.  186  (1967).  Opponents  of the  doctrine  argued  that  it  would
undermine  the  stability  of consensual  agreements.  Nahlik, supra  note  6,  at  748; see
also Poch de Caviedes, De la clause "rebus  sic stantibus"  h la clause de revision dans
les conventions internationales, 118  RECUEIL  DES  COUPS 109,  138-39  (1966)  (in  the
absence of an automatic decision  by an  impartial  organ  on all the  issues  involved,  the
clausula is open  to abuse as a  handy  means of avoiding compliance  with  burdensome
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sources  of law  not  included  in  the  Article  38  list,  such  as  the  acts  of
international  institutions,  what  seems  to  need  explaining  is  whether
they  fit within  the  classic  forms.'7
16.  See  supra note  12.  Commentators  agree that  custom can  overrule  itself. The
question  is  when.  Discourse  considers  the  relative  thresholds  which  abstract  compo-
nents  of custom creation  (duration,  frequency,  etc.)  must  overcome to  change  previous
custom.  See  E.  MENZEL  &  K.  IPSEN,  supra note  2,  at  83  (statement  of  the  classic
position);  see also Akehurst, supra note  1, at  19  (developing  "a  very  strong  presump-
tion  against change in the  law"  and  a weaker  presumption  against  formulation of new
custom).  "In  particular,  a great quantity of practice  is  needed  to overturn  existing  rules
of customary  law.  The better established  a  rule  is,  the greater  the quantity of practice
to  overturn  it."  Id. [footnotes  omitted].
17.  Some  commentators  suggest  that  the acts  of certain  international  institutions,
particularly  resolutions  of the U.N. General Assembly, are  binding. Their justifications
generally  assimilate  these  acts  to  more  traditional  sources  either  by  suggesting  that
similar thresholds of consent or intention  are met or by indicating that  while such reso-
lutions  may  not  themselves  be  authoritative,  they  are constitutive  of more  traditional
sources;  particularly of custom.  For support of the first sort,  see J.  CASTAt1EDA,  LEGAL
EFFECTS  OF UN  RESOLUTIONS  2-21  (1964)  (categorizing  diverse resolutions  to system-
atize  the "extraordinarily  complex"  law-creating  function  of the  UN; concluding  that
"internal"  resolutions,  "determinations"  concerning facts,  and  resolutions  relying  upon "external"  legal  foundations such as treaties  or "declarations"  are binding because  suf-
ficient  intention  is present);  see also  G.  TUNKIN,  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW
162-76  (W.  Butler  trans.  1974).  In  general,  the  Soviet  international  law  literature
views resolutions of international organizations as a source of international law. Tunkin
adds,  however:
[t]o say  ...that  the  resolutions  of  international  organizations  are  sources  of
international  law  if they  have  been  recognized  by  a state in  no  way  defines  the
place  of  these  resolutions  in  the  process  of  forming  norms  of  international
law.  . . .[A]  norm of international  law results  . . . only when  there is  a concor-
dance of the wills  of states  relating to  recognition  of a particular  rule  as a norm
of international  law.
Id. at  163-64;  see also Falk,  supra note  1, at  784  (suggesting that  there  is  a  "rather
indefinite  line  that  separates  binding from  non-binding norms  governing  international
behavior").  "Thus  the formal  limitations  of status,  often stressed  by international  law-
yers,  may  not prevent  resolutions  of the  General  Assembly,  or  certain  of them,  from
acquiring a  normative status in international  life." Id. Falk, supra,  justifies  this binding
force  by  asserting:
The degree of authoritativeness  that a particular  resolution  will  acquire depends
upon  a  number of  contextual  factors,  including  the  expectations  governing  the
extent of permissible  behavior,  the extent  and quality  of the  consensus,  and the
degree to which effective  power is  mobilized  to implement the claims posited  in a
resolution."
Id. at  786  (emphasis  added).  For  support  of the  second  sort,  maintaining  that  UN
resolutions  function  as  contributors  to  the  formation  of  conventional  sources,  see
Virally, supra note  I, at  162;  A.  VERDROSS  &  B.  SIMMA,  supra note 4,  at  329-32;  R.
HIGGINS,  supra note  1,  at  5 ("Resolutions  of  the  Assembly  are  not per se binding:
though those  rules of general  international law  which they may  embody are binding  on
member  states, with  or without  the  help of the resolution.  But the  body of resolutions
as a  whole, taken  as indications of a general customary  law, undoubtedly provide  a rich
source of evidence."  (footnote omitted));  Panel  Discussion,  The Effect of U.N. Resolu-
tions on Emerging Legal Norms,  1979  AM.  Soc.  INT'L  L.  PROC.  300 (an  informative
discussion  concluding  that  the legal  power  of  UN  resolutions  is not due  to  their being
binding per se, but  rather to their substantial  influence  upon  the development of inter-
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Such an inquiry might consider  the  sense in  which  U.N.  resolutions
are  constitutive  of custom  or  interpretively  derivative  of  the Charter
treaty. 8  There  seems  to  be  some  hesitation  about  simply  adding  an-
other  source to the  list.
The important  thing about these inquiries  into  the scope and  mean-
ing of the sources considered  is the pervasive attempt to delimit bound-
ary conditions  for the  category in an  abstract way,  independent  of the
particular  content of the  norms  whose  source  is  being considered.  The
sense that it is important to elaborate a theoretical boundary which has
an on-off quality reflects  the  shared  understanding among  those  doing
this  work  that the  abstract  categories  will  control  the  content  of the
norms,  rather  than  merely  register  them.  Some of  the  most  modem
treatises  acknowledge  this  explicitly  by  pairing  their  abstract  discus-
national  law via  more  traditional  and  acknowledged  sources  such  as  customary  law).
Those  who  oppose the  treatment  of resolutions  as sui generis sources of law do  so on
similar grounds. See, e.g.,  Virally, supra note  1, at  160-62;  A.  VERDROSS  & B. SIMMA,
supra note 4, at  329-33; see also J.  MOLLER,  VERTRAUENSSCHUTZ  IMt  VOLKERRECHT
250 (1971);  Sloan,  The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, 25  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  1 (1948):
There  are  circumstances  under  which  a  resolution  of  the General  Assembly
produces  important juridical  consequences  and  possesses  binding  legal  force. As
a general  rule,  however,  resolutions, for lack  of intention or of mandatory  power
in  the Assembly,  do  not create  binding  obligations  in  positive  law  ....
Although a  large majority supports the view that  mere recommendations  have
no  legal force,  the  opinion  also  prevails  that  [they]  possess  moral force and
should,  as such,  assert great  influence ...
The exact  nature  of this  moral  force  is  not easy  to  define  . . . [However],
the view that the expression  "moral  force"  has  no positive content and  is merely
a diplomatic  way  of indicating  that  there  is no  legal,  i.e.,  binding,  force cannot
be accepted.
Id. at 31-32;  see also Gross,  The International  Court of Justice and the United Na-
tions, 120  RECUEIL  DES  CouPs  313  (1967).
In regard to some resolutions members may record their view that they recognize
the  principles  contained  in  them  as  constituting  or  reflecting  international  law
...  . Some  resolutions  like  General  Assembly  resolution  1514(XV)  may  be
stepping  stones towards  a  principle of  international  law ...
A  resolution  or  declaration  of the General  Assembly,  putting  it at  its  highest,
could  be regarded  as opinio juris, but  . . . unless it results  in  uniform conduct
could  not be  regarded  as a  rule of law.
Id. at 375-76.  There is widespread  consensus  that such  resolutions  as  these admitting
states  to membership,  promulgating  rules of procedure,  or establishing subsidiary  bod-
ies are  legally  binding  on  all  members  because  of  the  degree of consent  which  they
represent. See, e.g.,  W.  FRIEDMANN,  THE  CHANGING  STRUCTURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL
LAW  139  (1964);  Fitzmaurice,  The Law and Procedure of the International  Court of
Justice, 1951-1954:  Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34  BRIT.
Y.B.  INT'L L. 1, 3-7  (1958);  Johnson,  The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L L. 97, 121-22  (1955-56);  Tammes, Deci-
sions of International Organs as a Source of Law, 94  RECUEIL  DES  CouRS 265,  316
(1958).
18.  See supra note  17 and  accompanying  text.
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sions of sources  with a distinct discussion of the "reality"  or "force  and
effect"  of the sources  which  they  have abstractly  elaborated." 9
In addition  to defining abstractly  the boundaries  of the sources under
consideration,  the  scholarly  literature  considers  limits of various  sorts
to the force of each source.  For example,  scholars  consider the munici-
pal  effects  of  international  norms, 2  the  force  of  treaties  upon  non-
signatories21
19.  See,  e.g.,  B. WESTON,  R.  FALK  &  A.  D'AMATO,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND
WORLD  ORDER  80-101,  116,  passim (1980)  (the  discussion  devoted  to  "sources"  is
followed  by a subchapter entitled  "The  Reality of International  Law"  which  considers
how and why  states obey  each  type of  international  legal  norm).  The term  "reality  of
international  law"  was  popularized  by  Jessup,  The Reality of International  Law,  18
FOREIGN  AFF.  244 (1940);  see also Friedmann, General Course in Public International
Law,  127  RECUEIL  DES  COORs  39,  76  (1969).
20.  One of the most  abstract of sources discourse concerns the general relationship
between  international  and  municipal  law.  This  is  done  both  generally,  as  an  inquiry
into their relative authority and separation,  and specifically, as an  inquiry into the  pro-
cess by which an  international norm  can be  imported  into municipal  law by, for exam-
ple,  transformation,  adoption,  or  execution.  Both  types  of  inquiry  proceed  indepen-
dently  of  the  norms  themselves.  Both  blend  reliance  upon  a vision  of pre-existing
national sovereignties  which  must be internationally registered or  recognized with reli-
ance  upon  a region  of pre-existing  international sovereignties  which  must  be  munici-
pally registered  or  constituted. See B. WESTON,  R.  FALK  & A.  D'AMATO,  supra note
19,  at  163-89  (1980)  (providing  examples of this discourse).  On  the  approach  of the
Vienna  Convention,  see  Hostert, Droit International  et Droit Interne dans la Conven-
tion de  Vienne sur le Droit des Trait~s du 23  Mai 1969,  1 ANNUAIRE  FRANI;AIS  DO
DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  92  (1969).  For  a  discussion on  monism  and dualism,  see  I C.
ROUSSEAU,  supra note 6,  at 37-48  (criticizing each doctrine by relying upon the other);
see also E.  MENZEL  &  K.  IPSEN,  supra note  2  (concluding  that  a  modified  endorse-
ment  of  both  theories  is  possible);  Virally, supra note  1,  at  165-71  (surveying  both
positions).  For  a discussion  on  municipal  incorporation  of  international  law,  see  I.
BROWNLIE,  supra note  1,  at  45-50.
21.  Conventional  doctrine provided  that  "[a]  treaty  does  not  create  either  obliga-
tions or rights for a third state without its consent."  (Vienna  Convention  on the Law of
Treaties,  supra note  5, at  art.  34).  While  assent  to  benefits  may  be  implied  if  "the
contrary  is not  indicated,"  burdens  must  be expressly accepted  in writing. Id. at art.
35.  The strands of reliance  upon a consensual  vision of pre-existing sovereign  authority
and  upon  a  justice  based  vision  of the  authority  of  the  community  are  displayed  in
discourse about  the treatment of multilateral treaties as constituting or expressing cus-
tomary international law.  Argument  approving  and disapproving the entry into custom
of such treaties relies alternatively upon  notions of internationalized consent and decen-
tralized justice. All these discussions proceed  independently of the content of either the
treaty  or  customary  regime.  See A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1, at  Ch.  5 (unqualifiedly
supporting the possibility  that such  treaties are  binding as custom either because  they
create  custom  or  because  they  reflect  it).  Baxter,  infra note  70,  illustrates  several
trends,  including  both  treaties as evidence of custom:  "My  thesis  is that  . . . 'general
practice' or international  custom  may be found  in treaties and that  treaties may  there-
fore exercise their effects, qua evidence of customary  international law,  upon  non-par-
ties."  Id. at  51.  Or later: "If  certain treaties both bind the parties and form  evidence of
customary  international law,  they will be the instruments of harmonization  of the  law
on  a widespread  basis.  . . .The simplicity  of the  use of  a  treaty  rule  and  its  wide-
spread  acceptance  by  others  makes  it a convenient  short-cut  for  non-parties,"  id. at
102, and treaties  as constitutive of custom: "The  rule of a treaty  becomes general inter-
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and  successor  states2 2  or  of custom upon  new states23 or those beyond
national  law  in the same way that a practice accompanied  by the necessary opiniojuris
may come to dominate customary international  law." Id. at  103.  Baxter concludes  that
there  is  an interplay  between  codification  and  progressive development.  Id. at 41:  cf.
Akehurst, supra  note  51,  at  42-49,  53  (requiring  intent to  transform  treaty  into cus-
tom).  "The  better  view  would  appear  to  be  that  treaties,  like  other  forms  of State
practice must be accompanied  by opinio juris in order  to create customary  law."  Id. at
44. Or later:  "Sometimes  a treaty which  is  not accompanied  by opinfojuris may never-
theless be imitated  in subsequent  practice; but  in such  cases it is  the subsequent prac-
tice  (accompanied  by opinio juris), and not  the treaty, which creates customary  law."
Id. at  53.  Denmark and  the Netherlands  sought  to  combine  these  elements  in  a  pro-
gressive  approach  requiring  all of them in  the North Sea  Continental Shelf Cases:.
"[T]he  process of the definition and consolidation of the emerging customary law
took place  through  the work of the  International  Law Commission,  the  reaction
of governments  to  that work  and  the  proceedings  of the  Geneva  Conference;"
and  this emerging  customary  law  became  "crystallized  in  the  adoption  of the
Continental  Shelf Convention  by the  Conference."
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W.  Ger. v.  Den.; W. Ger. v.  Neth.)  1969  I.C.J.  3,
38  (Judgment  of  Feb.  20).  For the  Soviet  viewpoint  emphasizing  consent,  see  North
Sea Continental  Shelf Cases,  supra, at  154  (diss. op.  Koretsky,  J.).  In Soviet  views of
international  law, treaties take paramount  precedence over customary international  law
as  they  rest  upon  the  express  agreement  of states.  The  dissenting  opinion  of Judge
Koretsky  is  particularly  important  for  the  weight  he  attaches  to  the  development  of
"the  general  principles  of the  law  of the  continental  shelf,"  which  he  found  to  have
taken shape even  before the Geneva  Conference of 1958. Id. at  158  (diss. op. Koretsky,
J.).  However,  this  position  stands  in  contrast  to Tunkin's  view  that  conventional  and
customary  rules of international  law are created  on  a basis  of agreement  and that  "to
become a norm  of international  law of universal application  [a customary norm of lim-
ited application]  should  be recognized by all the states."  See Tunkin, Coexistence  and
International  Law, 95  RECUEIL  DES  COUPS  1,  18  (1958);  cf. Rozakis,  Treaties  and
Third States: A Study in the Reinforcement of the Consensual Standards in Interna-
tional  Law, 35  ZAORV  1,  1-80  (1975).
[D]ue to the  increasing  emphasis  upon  individual  consent,  custom  is  becoming
more and  more identified  with treaties.  In fact  it is almost  becoming as volunta-
rist a process  as a treaty is; and  thus, easy  inferences  of customary law-creation
are replaced  by  rigid requirements  of proof. It  is  therefore evident  that  custom
and treaties are approaching each  other and  that the former  is losing its relative
advantage over the latter which lay  in its being a  less voluntarist  process of law-
creation.
At the same time,  however, consensualism  may rejuvenate custom and make  it
viable in the long run. In an  international  system where treaties  will  unquestion-
ably play the role of the most usual  tool  of international legislation,  custom may
prove very valuable  by  playing  the equally  important  role of assisting,  as a  uni-
versally  recognized  process,  changes  of law  in all  cases  where the inelasticity  of
written  law does  not allow rapid  modifications  to cope  with  new  needs.
Id. at 39-40;  see  also Cahier,  Le Problbne  des effets des traits hi lbgard des  tats
tiers,  143  RECEUIL DES  COUPS 589, 589, 604 (1974)  (discussing that, in principle, trea-
ties affect only the contracting  parties and doubting that  in the absence of conventional
mechanisms,  silence  of a state could  be considered  as  consent).
22.  The Vienna Convention  on the Law of Treaties leaves the question of the effect
of state succession on treaty obligations expressly open. Vienna  Convention,  supra note
5, at art. 73. There  are two opinions. Some believe that successor states are not bound.
See, e.g., Castren,  Obligations of  States Arising from the Dismemberment of Another
State, 73  ZAORV 753, 754 (1951)  ("To the succeeding states the treaties  concluded  by
the  former  state  are res  inter alios  acta");  McNAIR,  supra note  1,  at  601  ("NewlyAM.  U.J.  INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
established  states  which  cannot  fairly  be  said  to  involve  political  continuity  with  any
predecessor,  start  with  a  clean  slate  in  the matter  of treaty  obligations");  E.  MENZEL
&  K.  IPSEN,  supra note  2,  at  189.  These  writers  generally  emphasize  the consensual
nature of treaty obligations but  make an exception  for treaties  which must  remain reli-
able  as  a  matter  of  international  stability,  such  as  those  establishing  boundaries,  or
riparian  rights.  See  2  D.  O'CONNELL,  STATE  SUCCESSION  IN  MUNICIPAL  LAW  AND
INTERNATIONAL  LAW  12-23,  273-291  (1967);  0.  UDOKANG,  SUCCESSION  OF  NEW
STATES  TO  INTERNATIONAL  TREATIES  (1972);  Virally,  supra  note  I,  at  277.
Others  hold  that while  a  new  state may  have  a  qualified  right  to  repudiate "unequal"
provisions,  the  treaty  remains  binding  to take  into account  the legitimate  interests  of
the other state. These  authors, while  emphasizing the systemic importance of the relia-
bility of  treaties,  indicate  the  importance  of  an  exception  for  provisions  to which  the
new  state could  not consent consistent  with  its identity or its purpose  in the succession
struggle.  These  two  aspects of the  discourse blend reliance  upon  consent  and external
notions  of international justice differently.  See,  e.g.,  L.  CHEN,  STATE  SUCCESSION  RE-
LATING  TO  UNEQUAL  TREATIES  (1974).  Chen  agrees  with  the  general  position  of the
commentators  that  "there  is  no single answer  to  the general  questions of state succes-
sion to  treaties,"  id. at  232, but advocates  a substantive  investigation  of the "unequal-
ness"  of  each  treaty.  "In  an  unequal  treaty  the  disparity  of the  power  bases  of the
contracting  parties  is translated  into unequal  rights or  obligations  for the  contracting
parties."  Id. After  this determination,  "[a]ccording  to  contemporary  international  law
an unequal  treaty is  voidable,  and  thus it should  be a legitimate  reason  for  nonsucces-
sion."  Id. at 235. This approach,  in Chen's  view, ensures that "[p]roper  treaty relations
can thus be established  among the predecessor, successor, and other concerned states  to
redress  past grievances  and achieve  international equity  and justice."  Id. at  241.  For  a
contrasting  emphasis  on  the consent  element  in  the  unequal  treaty exception,  see  0.
UDOKANG,  supra at  487-508.  "While  a  new  state  may  be  reluctant  to  assume
those  treaty obligations  which are not in conformity with its basic interests, or with  the
essential  object of its independence,  subrogation  to certain  other rights and obligations
under treaties  concluded  on its behalf by the predecessor  may well  prove indispensable
not only to the progressive development of its domestic  economy, but  to its very partici-
pation  in  international  life."  Id.  at 492-93.  Udokang  thus supports  Chen's  position  re-
garding unequal  treaties,  on  the ground  that they  are regarded  by  new  states  as "void
ab initio, on the ground that  they are calculated  to enshrine and  protect the 'predatory
interests'  of the colonial  powers."  Id. at 220-21.  The extreme form of the neo-universal-
ist position  holds  that all  treaties  would devolve  ipso jure upon a  new state,  to  protect
systemic stability  while any new state  might  denounce  the treaty  if it  was contrary  to
its  basic  interests,  to  protect  its  consensual  authority.  See  C.  JENKS,  THE  COMMON
LAW  OF  MANKIND  94  (1958);  2  D.  O'CONNELL,  supra at 23-25.  The Soviet  position,
as expressed  by  Korovin,  advocates  devolution of all  treaties  to protect  the consensual
nature  of the obligations  with  an  exception  for  unequal  treaties  on grounds  of equity:
Every  international  agreement  is  the  expression  of an  established  social  order,
with a certain balance  of collective  interests.  So long as this social order endures,
such  treaties  as remain  in  force,  following  the principle  of pacta sunt servanda,
must  be scrupulously  observed.  But  if  in  the storm  of  a  social  cataclysm,  one
class  replaces the other at the helm of the state, for the purpose of reorganization
not  only  of  the  economic  ties,  but  the  governing  principles  of  internal  and  of
external  politics, the old  agreements  in so far as they reflect the preexisting order
of  things,  destroyed  by  the  revolution  became  null  and  void.  To  demand  of  a
people at last  freed of the yoke  of centuries  the payment  of debts  contracted  by
their  oppressors  for the purpose  of holding them  in slavery  would  be contrary  to
those  elementary  principles  of equity  which  are due  to  all  nations  in their  rela-
tions  with  each other.
U.S.  Dept.  of State,  in  2  M.  WHITEMAN,  supra note  1, at 777.  Many  modern  authors
have  abandoned  the  discourse  of  abstract  solution  to  this  controversy  in  favor  of  a
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the region  who  may  not  have participated  in  its  formulation."  Along
description  of the varied state  practice. See, e.g.,  Meron,  International  Practice as to
Succession of New States to Treaties of Their Predecessors,  10  INDIAN J.  INT'L L. 459
(1970):
International practice as to succession  to  treaties is not sufficiently abundant and
uniform to  permit an attempt at generalization  . . . .The  practice  is  more dic-
tated by  public policy of the respective  states than  by any legally accepted  prin-
ciple.  . . .That does  not mean that a state  may be safely and  freely allowed  to
avail itself of the advantages  of the treaty  when  it suits it to do so and  repudiate
it when its  performance  is  onerous.
Id. at  476.  Meron  proposes  that  "we  have  to  follow  a  pragmatic,  problem-oriented,
step-by-step  approach.  Each case has to  be scrutinized carefully  taking into account a
number  of factors."  Id. at 477.  Although  Meron  suggests  reference  to the "nature  of
the treaty"  among other factors,  he retains  the distanced and abstract discourse  which
would determine  a hierarchy of "natures"  before it would allow the treaty  to determine
its own  scope. The apparent  distance from substance  of this aspect  of sources doctrine
has almost been  overcome  as its reliance  either upon  a  vision  of interests  or of justice
has been  exposed.  For further  development  of this tendency,  see Keith, Succession to
Bilateral Treaties by  Seceding States, 61  Am.  J.  INT'L  L.  521,  546  (1967)  (holding
that the solution depends  upon  "(a)  the  nature and  function of the treaty  in question;
(b)  the  method  of secession;  and  (c)  the circumstances  of the conclusion of the treaty
.... The  first  factor  is  obviously  of great  importance.  . . ."); see also U.S.  State
Dept.,  in  2  M.  WHITEMAN,  supra note  1, at 993.
23.  See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying  text. The unanimous opinion of West-
ern commentators  is that new states are bound  by custom upon their coming into being
as states. A.  D'AMATO,  supra  note  1,  at 191-93;  E. MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN, supra note 2,
at 82. This position is usually  based on a vision of the communal nature of statehood.  It
is usually paired  with an  exception should  new states  not consent.  See, e.g.,  Akehurst,
supra note  I, at 28  ("[T]he opposition  of new  states  to old  customs  is bound  to cast
doubt  on the customs"). The Soviet  bloc theorists, by contrast,  argue that because cus-
tom  is  consensual,  new  states  are  not  bound  without  their  consent.  See,  e.g.,  G.
TUNKIN,  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 127-33 (W.  Butler trans.  1974).  This con-
sent-based  theory  is usually combined  with a  willingness  to  imply consent  when  the
new  state  begins  to  act  like  a  state  on  the  grounds  of  reciprocal  fairness.  See  H.
BOKORNt-SZEGO,  NEW  STATES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (1970).
24.  The  idea  of regional  or  bilateral  custom  is  generally  justified on  the  basis  of
consent,  or at  least  is  seen  as  more  directly connected  to  state  consent  than general
custom. See D'Amato,  The Concept of Special Custom in International  Law, 63  Ap.
J. INT'L L. 211  (1969).  D'Amato argues  that:
the  requirement  of  a  showing  of consent  is a  mistaken  view  . . . because  of a
widespread  failure  to  draw  a  basic  distinction  between  special  (or  "local"  or
"particular")  customary  international  law  and  general  customary  international
law.  . . .The stringent requirements of proof of consent  in [the  three cases  de-
cided by the World Court]  thus do not apply to the large body of general norms
of international  law binding upon all states, but rather apply only in similar cases
of "special"  custom.
Id. at  211-12.  Consequently,  unlike  general  customary  norms,  special  custom  seems
binding  only  upon  those  who  have  participated  in  its  creation. This  seems  to be  the
practice of the  I.C.J.
The  Party  which  relies on  a custom of this kind  must  prove that this custom  is
established  in such a manner that it has  become binding on  the other Party. The
•  ..Government  must  prove that  the rule invoked  by  it is  in accordance  with a
constant  and  uniform usage  practised  by the  states  in question ...
Asylum Case (Colom.  v.  Peru)  1950  I.C.J.  266, 276 (Judgment of Nov.  20). See Falk,
supra note  1, at 782  (discussing the  idea that "some  tangible  evidence of consent on
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this  vein,  the  literature  has  considered  the  hierarchical  relationship
among  the various  Article  38  sources. 5
the part  of the state that is  bound"  is  required).  Other commentators,  however, empha-
sizing the non-consensual  nature  of custom  as  opposed  to treaty,  argue  that  a custom
which  has  grown  up  among  some  of  the  states  belonging  to  a  well-defined  group  is
binding upon  all  members of that  group. Just  as the consensual  position was  willing to
imply consent  in some  cases,  so commentators  of this  persuasion  are  willing  to except
members  of the  group who  opposed  the  custom. See  H.  THIRLWAY,  INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOMARY  LAW  AND  CODIFICATION  136-37  (1972)  (admitting  that it  is  difficult  for
the non-consensual  approach  "to ascertain  exactly what are the boundaries  of the 'com-
munity'  to  which  the  custom  in  question  is  to  be  treated  as  applying,"  but charging
that  "[t]he  view  that  local  custom  is  binding  only  on  states  which  have  expressly
agreed  to it is  fundamentally an assertion of the view that custom is based upon accept-
ance."); see also Akehurst, supra note  1,  at 29-30  (discussing  this  view).
25.  The  relative authority of various sources  is most  often discussed  in contrasting
treaties and  custom. Advocates  of all logically  available  positions exist. For the proposi-
tion  that  there  is  no hierarchy,  see  NGUYEN  Quoc  DINH,  P.  DAILLER  & A.  PELLET,
supra note  2,  at  104  (source  equality reflects  social  equality):  "En  effet,  i  i'absence  de
hi6rarchie organique  dans  la soci~t6  internationale correspond  I'absence  de toute  hi6r-
archie entre les sources";  E.  MENZEL  &  K.  IPSEN,  supra note 2,  at 43  (source equality
flows  from  textual equality); see also Barile, La structure de l'ordre  juridique interna-
tional,  161  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  9  (1978).  "[L]e  rapport  entre  droit  international
spontan6  (ou  de  la conscience)  et  droit  international  6crit  (nous  nous  r6f6rions  juste-
ment aux  accords  dont  nous  discutons dans  ce chapitre)  ne devait pas  8tre  celui  d'une
subordination  du  second  au  premier  mais  celui  d'une interdependance  rfciproque."
Id. at  92.  For the  proposition  that  treaty  is  superior  to custom,  see  Right  of  Passage
over  Indian  Territory  (Port.  v.  India)  1960  I.C.J.  6,  90  (Judgment  of  Apr.  12)
(Quintana,  J.  dissenting);  Akehurst,  The  Hierarchy of the Sources of International
Law,  47  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  273  (1974-1975)  (summarizing  the  positions  of other
authorities  and  the differing  results  which  occur  when  a treaty  is more  or less specific
than a rule of custom, earlier  or later in time, intended  to overrule, or be overruled, and
other  similar  conflicts).  For  the  proposition  that  treaty  is  inferior  to  custom,  see C.
PARRY,  THE SOURCES  AND  EVIDENCES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  53  (1968).  "Treaties,
then,  are binding because  there is a rule of customary international  law to that effect."
Id.; see also Fitzmaurice,  Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of Interna-
tional Law, in  SYMBOLAE  VERZIJL:  PRESENTfES  AU  PROFESSEUR  J.H.W.  VERZIJL  153,
157  (1958)  (treaties are not a source of law,  but rather a source of obligation under the
law);  see also L.  OPPENHEIM,  supra note  I,  at 28:
But  it must  be emphasized  that,  whereas custom  is the original  source of  Inter-
national  Law,  treaties are a source  the power of which  derives from custom.  For
the  fact  that  treaties  can  stipulate rules  of international  conduct  at  all  is  based
on  the customary  rule of the  Law  of Nations that  treaties are  binding  upon  the
contracting  parties.
Id.; see also I P.  GUGGENHEIM,  TRAITt  DE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  57  (1953);
G.  SCELLE,  MANUEL  tLEMENTAIRE  DE DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC 577  (1948).  Be-
cause  Article  38  lists  "treaty"  before  "custom"  in  enumerating  the  sources  of  law,
some  commentators  have suggested  that if this  does  not create  a  hierarchy  it  suggests
at least a procedural  order in which sources are to be examined  to see whether they can
dispose of a case at hand.  In a given case, the judge should  begin by seeking applicable
rules of treaty  law,  turning  to  custom  or ultimately  to general  principles  when  treaty
does  not  "dispose"  of  the  case.  This  approach  is  said  to  combine  the  rules  of  lex
specialis (since treaties are usually  more specific)  and lex posterior (since treaties  are
often  more  recent).  There  are  also commentators  who  conclude  exactly  the opposite.
See  E.  MENZEL  &  K.  IPSEN,  supra note  2,  at  94:
Die Rechte und Pflichten der Staaten sind in  erster  Linie durch vertriigliche  Ver-
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In  addition to  considering  the  abstract  hierarchy  of treaty  and  cus-
tom at great length,26  the sources literature  devotes  a great deal  of en-
ergy to the idea that the power of states to make treaties runs out when
it confronts  a supercustomary  norm  of jus cogens.27  Likewise,  and  far
einbarungen  festgelegt....  Es steht den  Staaten  frei, untereinander  Regeln  zu
vereinbaren,  die  von  Normen  des  Gewohnheitsrechts  abweichen.  Vertr:age
schranken  insoweit  den  Geltungsbereich  des  V6lkergewohnheitsrechts  und  der
allgemeinen  Rechtsgrundsaitze  ein. Man  kann  folglich in dent dargestellten  sinne
von einem Vorrang der  Vertrige vor anderen Quellen des  Vtllkcrrechts sprechen.
Dadurch  ist  allerdings  nicht  ausgeschlossen,  dass  umgekchrt  vertr.agliche
Regelungen  durch Gewohnheitsrecht  beseitigt  werden.
Id.; see also  I H.  LAUTERPACHT,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  87  (1970).  "When  a  contro-
versy arises between two or more States with  regard  to a matter regulated  by a treaty,
it is  natural  that  the parties  should  invoke  and  that  the  adjudicating  agency  should
apply, in the first  instance, the provisions of the treaty  in question." Id.; cf. Jenks,  The
Conflict of Law Making Treaties, BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  401,  451-53  (1953)  (even  in the
situation  of  a  conflict  between  law-making  treaties,  the  first  approach  to  resolution
should  be based on an analysis of the provisions of the  treaties, aided  by  the presump-
tions and rules of construction  that have developed  about  treaty  interpretation).  Jenks
considers  that these presumptions  are similar  to those  that "exist  in  respect of statutes
and contracts, and the applicability of the same principles  to treaties was  recognized  at
an early stage in the development  of international  law."  Id. at 451.  In the final  analy-
sis,  Jenks  adopts  a  legalistic  stance,  seeing  the  avoidance  of controversy  lying in  the
domain  of  "considerable  improvement  in  the  technical  legal  equipment ..  ." Id. at
452. The perspective  which  is taken  to  the hierarchy  of treaty and custom depends  in
part upon  the  understanding  which  a writer  has of the  power of  consent  and  of the
extent  to which  each  source  enshrines consent.  MeDougal  and  Reisman  describe  this
phenomenon:
The  initial itemization  of "international  conventions"  prompts  some  commenta-
tors  to champion  agreements  as an important  "direct,  conscious,  and purposive"
modality  for  law  creation,  offering  the  closest  approach  to  the  deliberate  and
explicit  formulations  of legislative processes  in  national societies.  From this  per-
spective, agreements  may be both "formal"  for the parties  and others, and "ma-
terial"  or  "evidentiary"  sources  of the expectations  about  authority  and control
which  comprise customary  law.  Other commentators,  however, find  it difficult  to
understand  how  agreements,  which  in  some  versions  of inherited  international
myth are supposed  to "bind"  only the immediate parties,  can create "obligation"
for third  parties.  Posing the  problem  as  a quest  for  "consent"  rather  than  for
empirical  expectations about  the probable  course of future  decision,  such  com-
mentators  distinguish  between the creation of "law"  and the creation  of "obliga-
tions,"  and  insist that even  agreements  can  derive  their "binding"  quality  only
from  "a  rule  of customary  law  to that  effect."  This  would  appear  greatly  to
subordinate agreements  to  custom as  an exclusive  law creating  modality.
McDougal  & Reisman, supra note  1, at 261  [footnotes  omitted].  For a  general  treat-
ment of the  relative authority of other sources,  see Akehurst,  supra note  1, passim.
26.  See supra notes  6-8.
27.  The doctrine  of jus cogens or peremptory norm is defined  by the Vienna  Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties quite concretely as "a  norm accepted  and recognized by
the international  community  of states as a whole as  a  norm  from which  no derogation
is permitted and which can  be modified  only by a subsequent  norm of general  interna-
tional law having  the same character."  Vienna  Convention, supra note  5, at art. 53.  A
more general definition is provided  by A. VERDROSS  & B. SININA, supra note 4, at 264;
"Normen,  die  im gemeinsamen  Interesse aller  Staaten gelten  und  tief im allgemeinen
Rechtsbewusstsein  verankert  sind."  Id.; see also Verdross,  lus Dispositivum and Jus
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more often, custom  or treaty  norms run out when they  contravene  cer-
tain  other,  superior  norms  of jus dispositivum.28  These  doctrines  are
disconnected  from the content of the particular  norms of custom  which
overrule  treaty  and  vice  versa. Although  commentators  often  remark
that  no  one  has  ever  "found"  a  norm  of jus cogens,19 some  hierarchy seems  to need  to be  established in  order to develop  an internally coher-
Cogens in International Law, 60  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  55  (1966);  Lachs,  The Law of Trea-
ties. Some  General Reflections on the Report of the I.L.C.,  in  RECUEIL  D'tTUDES  DE
DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  EN  HOMMAGE  A  PAUL  GUGGENHEIM  391,  398  (1968).
28.  See supra note 25  for general  discourse about  the hierarchical  relations among
sources.  Jus dispositivum is  discussed  far less  often  than jus cogens in  contemporary
scholarship.  Because  it  is  thought  to  include  all  norms  which  are  not jus cogens, and
can  therefore  be changed by subsequent,  more authoritative  norms,  its abstract  dimen-
sions  are  negatively  implied  by  the  myriad  discussions  of jus cogens.  Most  norms  of
treaty law are considered  replaceable  by subsequent agreement.  Most customary norms
can  be  replaced  by  subsequent  custom.  These  possibilities  are justified  by more  basic
norms, such as "freedom  to conclude  treaties,"  which cannot  be so changed.  Paradoxi-
cally, the concentration  of the literature  upon jus cogens would  be replaced  by  a con-
centration  upon  jus dispositivum, if  the  number  of  norms  recognized  as jus cogens
increased.  Then  one would  need to ask,  in considering changing  a treaty, if the specific
norms  were,  in  fact, jus dispositivum. The  theoretical  concentration  upon  the  excep-
tional  category  thus  reflects  the  concern  of scholarship  to  delimit  the sources  of  law
abstractly. See, e.g.,  Verdross,  supra note 27,  at  55  (discussing jus dispositivum and
jus cogens in international  law).
29.  Some  writers have  tried  to  catalog  norms  of jus cogens. See,  e.g.,  Ago,  Droit
des trait~s  h la lumikre de la Convention de  Vienne,  132  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  297,  324
(1971)  (a  somewhat  less  comprehensive  survey  than  Whiteman);  A.  VERDROSS  &  B.
SIMMA,  supra note  4,  at  265-66;  Whiteman,  Jus Cogens in International  Law with a
Projected List,  7  GA.  J.  INT'L  & COMP.  L.  609  (1977)  (the  most  ambitious  list  to
date).  Most  authors  are  far  more  sceptical  that  an  example  of jus cogens might  be
found.  See, e.g.,  Mann,  The Doctrine of Jus Cogens, FESTSCHRIFr  ULRICH  SCHEUNER
399  (1973);  Schwarzenberger,  The Problem of International  Public Policy,  18  CUR-
RENT  LEGAL PROBS.  191  (1965);  1 C.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note 6, at  150; J.  SZTUCKI,  JUS
COGENS  AND  THE  VIENNA  CONVENTION  ON  THE  LAW  OF  TREATIES  93  (1974)  (con-
cluding that his survey of modern practice "seems  to justify the conclusion  that there is
not  a  single  application  of  the concept  of  peremptory  norms").  Sztucki  dramatically
separates  the doctrinal  discussion  from practice,  noting:
the  references  to jus cogens, or  to  other similiar  constructions,  in  . . . opinions
• . . belong  to the doctrine of international  law rather  than to practice, since the
inter-state  obligations  remain  unaffected  by  such  opinions.
All  the  known  cases  of recognition  of certain  norms  as  binding  independent  of
the  respective  conventional  obligations,  as  well as  all  the  known  cases  of avoid-
ance or nullification  of treaties, touch,  in fact,  upon  other matters  than the cate-
gory  of jus cogens, and  can  be explained  without  any  need  of  resorting  to  the
concept of peremptory  norms,  unless  one departs  from  a  preconceived  idea  that
peremptory  norms  should  be looked  for  and arrived  at at any  price.
Therefore,  in the light of international practice, the question  whether the concept
of jus cogens has  been  "codified"  or  "progressively  developed"  in  the  [Vienna]
Convention,  may  be  answered  only  in the  sense that  there  has  been  nothing  to
codify.
Id. at 94.
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ent  and sufficiently  independent  scheme  of authority.30  Otherwise,  the
scheme  might produce  equally  authoritative  norms  among  which  one
would  then  be  obliged  to choose  on  the  basis  of  their  content.  These
hierarchical  discussions  elaborate  the  relative  authority  of treaties  or
custom which  are general  or  specific, 3'  multilateral  or bilateral,3 2  uni-
versal  or  regional,33 and  earlier  or later.
34
The  sense  that  hierarchy  needs  explaining,  like  the  sense  that  the
abstract  boundaries  of enumerated  sources  need  elaboration,  reveals
30.  See generally supra note 25.  In  general,  regardless  of their  content,  conflicts
among the three major sources (treaty, custom, and general principles)  are discussed  in
terms  of such  abstractions  as  lex posterior derogat legi priori,  lex specialis derogat
legi generali, lex superior derogat legi inferiori, etc. Jus cogens comes  top of the heap
as the ultimate lex superior.  See supra notes 44-45.  Other sources  (judicial decisions or
the writings of publicists)  are regarded  as "subsidiary"  to the big three. See Akehurst,
supra note  25, at 280-81.
31.  A  specific  norm  is  generally  regarded  as superior  to  a  general  rule, of either
custom or treaty. It is unclear  whether  "specific"  refers to  the content of the norm,  or
to  the size of the group  whose  consensus  gave  it force. Some basic  principles overrule
specific  rules.  Sometimes  world custom  could  overrule  regional  custom,  and  multilat-
eral  obligations  override  bilateral.  But sometimes  the  reverse  is true. These issues  are
discussed  in  terms of the relative strength  of the intention  of those responsible  and  in
terms  of general  systemic  notions  of justice.  See Akehurst,  supra note  1, at  31  (re-
gional  custom  beats  universal  custom);  Barile, Structure de l'ordre  juridique interna-
tional, 161  RECUEIL  DES  COURS 9  (1978);  E. MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN,  supra note 2, at 95
(discussing  cases  in  which the lex specialis rule creates  no clear hierarchy).  But cf. I
A.  SERENI,  DIRaIro  INTERNAZIONALE  174  (1956)  (arguing that a later general  custom
overrides  a  special  earlier  custom).
But  in view of the strong  presumption  against changes  in  the law, see A.  D'A,IATO,
supra note  1, at 60-61;  Akehurst, supra note  1, at  19; Lauterpacht,  Sovereignty over
Submarine Areas, 27  BRIT.  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  376,  393  (1950),  this  result  would  follow
only if there was clear evidence that the parties to the special custom were applying the
new  general  custom inter se and no  longer applying  the old special custom.  But cf.  G.
TUNKIN,  TEORnA  MEZHDUNARODNOGO  PRAVA  504-05  (1970)  (applying the  principle
of lex specialis derogat generalis  to the relationship between  the norms of socialist and
general  international  law).
See also Osakwe, Socialist  International  Law Revisited, 66 Am. J.  INT'L L. 596, 599
(1972):  "Nothing  in  [the]  general  international  law  . . . precludes  the existence  of a
local  international legal order that would  regulate relations between  states belonging  to
the same regional  (ideological)  bloc."  Id. at  597. Specifically  on  the conflict of special
and general  treaty obligations, see A.  McNAIR,  supra  note  1, at 218-24 (regarding  this
as  a  rule of  interpretation,  not  authority,  he  emphasizes  the  parties'  intent which  he
recognizes  is  complicated when a hierarchy  among  treaties  with  different  parties must
be constructed).
32.  Bilateral  treaties are  often  viewed  as  more specific  than  multilateral  treaties.
The general  obligations of multilateral treaties,  partly because they  relate to  third par-
ties, and partly  because the intention in ratifying  them was to create fundamental obli-
gations, can  overrule  or aid  in  the interpretation  of bilateral  treaties. See supra notes
25  & 31.
33.  Usually universal  custom is considered  to be opposable  by regional custom. See
supra notes  25  & 31.
34.  Unless  the  earlier  norm  was  more  specific  (or  more  fundamental)  the  later
norm  controls. See supra notes  25  &  31.AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
the  shared  sense that  sources  discourse  is  meant  to  delimit  abstractly
and  authoritatively  the  norms  which  bind  states  in  such  a  way  that
they  might  remain  free  to establish  and disagree  about the  content  of
those  norms  as their  interests or a natural order  might dictate.  Discus-
sions  of  both  the  extent  and  hierarchy  of sources  produce  doctrines
which  do not  rely on  the  content  of the norms  whose source  they  iden-
tify.  Each of these  types of discussion  suggests  that the  problem  which
sources doctrine  addresses  is the abstract definition  of the  authoritative
set of norms  binding  states.
II.  ARGUMENT  ABOUT THE SOURCES  OF
INTERNATIONAL  LAW
International  law  about  sources  is  more  than  a  set  of  doctrinal
boundaries and hierarchies.  Sources doctrine  is also a quite well  worked
out argumentative  practice  about the  authority  or  "binding  nature"  of
various  legal  instruments. The arguments  which  people make about the
sources  of  international  law-in  treatises,  articles,  opinions,  and  so
forth-are like the various doctrines  which comprise the law  of sources
in  that they  define and limit what  various sources  mean  and  how  they
relate to one another  in an  abstract  fashion.  This abstract  detachment
from  the  content  of  the  norms  whose  authority  they  delimit  is  also
characteristic  of arguments  about the application  of particular  sources
doctrines  to particular  fact  situations.
In  sources  argument,  one  characteristically  seeks  to convince  some-
one that  a state which does not currently  believe it to be in its interests
to  follow  a given  norm  should  do so anyway.  Sources  rhetoric  provides
two  rhetorical  or  persuasive  styles  which  we  might  call  "hard"  and
"soft."  A "hard"  argument  will seek to ground compliance in the "con-
sent"  of the  state  to  be  bound.  A  "soft"  argument  relies  upon  some
extraconsensual  notion  of the  good  or the just. Of course  there  is  no a
priori reason  to  divide the  "sources"  of law,  or  the persuasive  reasons
for  compliance  into  these  two  categories.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to clas-
sify the various  classic  sources as  either  "hard"  or  "soft,"  and it seems
intuitively obvious  that fulfilling  promises  is  an important  dimension of
justice  and  vice versa. Nevertheless,  it turns  out that arguments  about
sources  doctrine  often  rhetorically  contrast  these  two  sets  of ideas.  It
will  be easier  to analyze exemplary  sources  argument  after considering
the ways  in  which  one  might argue  about sources  doctrine  in  a some-
what  stylized  fashion.  As  I  have  defined  them,  hard  and  soft  sources
are mutually  exclusive  categories  which together  account  for  all possi-
ble sources that might be imagined.  Hard sources are grounded  in  con-
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sent. Soft sources are grounded  not  in consent.  Moreover,  to be coher-
ently grounded, a source may not be both. The point of a consent-based
source is that it binds: that it is authoritative  even when other consider-
ations-including  notions of the good-push  an actor in  another direc-
tion. The point of soft sources  is that they are authoritative: that they
bind even  the state which  does not  imagine compliance  to be  in  its  in-
terest-which  does  not  consent.  In  a  schematic  and  preliminary  way,
we can imagine the arguments which might be  made on behalf of hard
and  soft  sources  in  a  world  of autonomous  states.  Suppose  that  one
sovereign  (State  1) when  invoking  a  norm  against  another  (State  2)
argues that the norm  invoked  is authoritative and binding  because  it is
"hard."  A  hard  source  is  binding  because  the  state  to  be  bound  has
agreed that it is binding, so that compliance  will not threaten its auton-
omy.  State  2 might  make  several  responses.  It might  make  a  factual
argument, claiming, for example,  that it had not  in fact  agreed, or had
agreed only subject to a condition which had  not been  fulfilled. Leaving
these arguments  aside  for the moment  (or imagining  that they are re-
solved  in  favor  of State  1),  State  2  might  attack  the  hard source  di-
rectly. It might argue that if its consent is the basis for its being bound,
it has  changed  its mind, or did not intend  to consent in  the  first place.
These classic responses  force State 1 to argue that such change is not
permissible. The reasons offered may  be many:  because if everyone did,
it would be a mess; because  State 1 would not  want its treaty partners
to  do  so;  because  you  just  have  to  keep  your  word,  etc.  One  might
invoke  a  doctrinal  expression  of these  conclusions  such  as pacta sunt
servanda.
State 2, against whom the norm  is being invoked,  might respond that
these  norms  or considerations  have  nothing  to do  with  its  consent.  If
they do,  State 2 might simply  reinvoke its initial objection  that it does
not now consent to this application or interpretation.  Perhaps State 2 is
willing in similar circumstances  to let its treaty partners  off as well,  or
finds  the state  of the  system  less important  than  its  own  release  from
this particular  norm.  In responding, State  2 has  forced State  1 to shift
gears and argue from some non-consensual  perspective. To State 2,  all
hard sources  have become  soft sources  in  disguise.
Imagine, however, that State 1 originally argues from a soft perspec-
tive; claiming,  for example, that the norm is binding on State 2 because
it is in some sense just. State 1 might admit  that it is  arguing  from a
soft  perspective,  suggesting  that  without  this  norm  the  international
system would  not be "equitable"  or "workable"  or whatever  soft code-
word seems appropriate.  State 2 might make a number of responses.  It
might argue about the meaning  or application  of this soft norm in this
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case,  arguing,  for  example,  that  the  system  would  be  "just"  or
whatever,  even if it  were not bound.  Leaving  this response aside for the
moment,  or assuming  that it  is  resolved  in  favor  of the  norm  invoking
state, State 2 might directly attack the soft source.  It might assert that
it has a different  idea of softness,  a different  image  of the system or  of
justice.  Although the  visions of softness  which might  proliferate  in  the
ensuing  argument might be patterned  in some  fashion,  if we  ignore  for
the  moment  the  content of State  2's  response,  it seems  predicated  on
the  notion  that  the  norm-invoker  cannot  convincingly  invoke  its  own
idea  of softness.  If State  2 is  to be  bound because  of the "justness"  of
the  norm,  State  1 must  have some way  of defending  the  norm  on  that
plane,  without  merely  asserting  power  against  State  2's  sovereignty.
Among  equal  sovereigns,  "justice"  must  be  negotiated,  or  voted  to
agreement.  To State  2,  all  the soft  arguments  seem  to have been  hard
arguments  in  disguise.
These  hypothetical  arguments  reflect  the  relationship  between  hard
and  soft  sources  as  well  as  their  incompatibility  and  exclusivity.  Al-
though  one cannot  make  both  sets  of arguments  together,  the  propo-
nent of a given  norm  must  continually  switch  from one  rhetoric  to the
other.  When  pressed,  the  hard  defender  of  a  norm  can  be  forced  to
concede  that  the norm  can  only  be  binding  if it  is  soft.  Likewise,  the
defender  of  a  soft  norm  can  be  forced  to  defend  his  norm  in  hard
terms. Because  neither set of arguments can  be convincing  by itself and
neither  can  trump  the  other,  argument  within  this  structure  could  go
on  endlessly  without  resolution.
This hypothetical  set of arguments  is similar to the way  people actu-
ally argue about  doctrines  concerning  the sources  of international  law.
They  argue  in  ways  which  contrast  norms  based  on  sovereign  consent
but which must be externally validated outside consent  (perhaps  by im-
plication  from "objective"  facts)  with externally  supplied  norms which
must  be  subjectively  justified  and  defined  by  sovereigns.  These  two
strands  of argument  are present  in  the  discourse  about all  such  tradi-
tional  sources  as treaties,  custom,  general  principles,  or the  writings of
judges  and  publicists.
Moreover,  arguments  about sources  are related  to each  other  as  the
hypothetical  structure  of hard and  soft suggests.  Arguments  about  the
authority  for an  international  norm  appeal  either to some  form of sov-
ereign  consent,  or  to  some  ideal  outside of consent.  In  the  rhetoric  of
sources  argument, these  are exclusive  possibilities,  and no coherent  sin-
gle  appeal  can  be  simultaneously  to  both.  In  the  world  of  equal  and
autonomous  sovereigns  imagined  by those who  engage  in  sources  argu-
ment,  a norm  is  authoritative either  because  states  say so, or  for some
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other  reason which overrides  consent.  By  definition,  to be authoritative,
consent  must  overrule  other  sources  of authority.  Likewise,  to  be au-
thoritative,  a  nonconsensual  source  must  be  able  to  overrule  consent.
Yet neither of these sources alone can justify a doctrinal choice.  On the
one  hand,  we  are  unable  to  explain  why  consent  should  be  binding
against  a dissenter (and in every contentious  case someone will  by defi-
nition  object)  without  reference  to  a  higher  norm.  On  the other,  we
cannot  explain  the content  of extraconsensual  norms  except  by  refer-
ence  back  to consensual  standards.
This  argumentative  pattern reflects  the  image  of inter-sovereign  life
characteristic  of sources  discourse  generally.  Sources  discourse  estab-
lishes  an abstract  basis  for authoritatively  binding states  within a  nor-
mative order  without  derogating  from  their separate  and  autonomous
sovereign authority. The autonomy of sovereigns ensures  the attractive-
ness  of hard  sources  while  their separation  requires  that they  be per-
mitted  to limit  their  own  consent  in  a  fashion  which  reveals  all hard
sources  to  be  soft.  The  possibility  of  an  external  normative  order
grounding  its  equality  and  mutual  respect  suggests  the appeal  of soft
sources,  while the independence  of a normative structure from any sin-
gle content  for that order  requires  that all  soft sources  rely  upon hard
sources  for their content.  The attempt to delimit an abstract system of
sources,  free of the content of either state interest or of external value,
is  reflected  in  the  hypothetical  rhetorical  patterns  which  I  have
outlined.
To  the extent  sources  argument pursues  these twin  rhetorics,  more-
over, it continues  the problematic  which motivates  it.  In order to  fulfill
the desire  for  an  autonomous  system  of normative  sources,  argument
about  the sources  of international  law,  like  sources  doctrine  itself, in-
cludes strands associated both with normative autonomy and normative
authority.  Sources  argument  is  interesting  both  because  it  pursues  a
rhetorical  strategy  of  inclusion  and  because  it  manages  the  relations
between  these  two  rhetorical  strands  so  as  to  "solve"  the problem  of
sources  discourse  as  a whole.  It seems that if the "hard"  can lie  down
with the  "soft"  in sources  argument,  sovereigns  will  be able to remain
autonomous  within a  binding  normative  order.
The  solution  furnished  by sources  doctrine  and  argument  is  not so
much  a  matter of logic  as  it is  a  practice  of continued  movement  be-
tween these two rhetorics  which creates an image or a feeling of resolu-
tion.  Doctrines  are not  defined  by  choosing  between  the hard  and the
soft.  In  fact, doctrines  can  only  be  produced  if the extremes  of  hard
and  soft  argumentation  can  be  avoided.  Neither  alone  could  sustain
doctrines  of normative authority.  Because these arguments may always
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be  elaborated  into  conflicting  and  exclusive  global  visions,  doctrines
must include them both by  limiting each so  as to render them compati-
ble.  Without this  careful  limitation  of extreme  visions  of hard and  soft
visions,  doctrines  are  in  constant  danger  of dissolution.
Various  rhetorical  devices  for including  these two  rhetorical  strands
in  sources  discourse can  be  identified  both  in  arguments  which  define,
limit,  and  order  various  sources  and  in  concrete  arguments  about  the
application  of various  source  doctrines.  In this  section, I consider argu-
ments of a  most general  sort about the meaning of various  sources,  the
relations among  sources,  and  the  assimilation  of new  sources  to  those
which  are  traditionally  accepted.  In  the  next  sections,  I take  up argu-
ment  about  the  application  of various  sources  doctrines  in  particular
exemplary  cases.
The  initial  embrace  of these  two  rhetorical  approaches  by  sources
discourse  as  well  as  one  technique  for  managing  any  tension  between
them-placing  them  in  a  rather  simple  hierarchical  relationship-can
be  seen  in  discussion  about  the  boundaries  between  and  within  doc-
trines about  the basic sources. It  is difficult  to categorize the sources of
Article  38  as  either  soft  or hard.  Treaties  seem  quintessentially  hard:
the ultimate  expression  of sovereign  consent. Custom,  by contrast,  and
certainly  "general  principles,"  seem  soft:  binding  because  it  is just  to
do things  as they  have been done,  to preserve  expectations  or  reinforce
a  natural  selection  of  wise  norms.35  In  general,  positivists,  who  es-
chewed soft sources,  preferred  treaties to  custom. 36 Naturalists,  by con-
35.  See, e.g.,  Kunz,  The Nature of Customary International  Law, 47 AM.  J.  INT'L
L.  662,  664  (1953)  (criticizing  the  idea  that  custom  is  the  discovery  of  pre-existing
natural  law).
36.  See supra notes  6-8  (concerning  hierarchy  of custom  and  treaty).  Nineteenth
century  positivists often  embraced  extreme versions of this position,  holding,  for  exam-
ple,  that  no norm  could  be  binding except  on  the parties  who  agreed  to  it,  and  for  as
long  as they  agreed  to  it.  This  led  to an  observational  style of scholarship.  See, e.g., J.
MOSER,  GRUNDSXTZE  DES  JETZT  OBLICHEN  EUROPXISCHEN  VOLKERRECHTS  IN
FRIEDENSZEITEN  (1750).  Usually,  conventions are  viewed  as  most  persuasive because,
in  the  words  of Article  38(l)(a)  of the Statute  of  the  International  Court of  Justice,
they "establish  rules especially  recognized  by the contesting states."  The preference  for
treaties  is  thus  usually  associated  with  a  preference  for consensual  rules.  See  Bishop,
General Course of Public International  Law,  115  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  147  (1965).
First  among  the  sources  of international  law  . . . [are]  "international  conven-
tions"  . . . . As  between  the  parties to  them, treaties  . . . lay  down  clearly  ex-
pressed,  deliberately  chosen  rules.  ...
[W]hen  one compares the position  of treaties  in  international law  with various
instruments  in  domestic  law,  we  find  treaties  having  to take  the  place,  interna-
tionally,  occupied  domestically  by  contracts,  legislation,  conveyances,  constitu-
tional documents,  and other instruments.  . . . Treaties may,  as between  the par-
ties, override  previously existing  rules of customary  international law,  modifying
the  law  as  parties  wish.
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trast, often  emphasized  custom  and general  principles  of justice. 37  But
the discourse  of naturalism and  positivism  corrupted  these pure  forms.
Positivists, defending the authoritativeness  of treaties,  raised the soft
norm pacta sunt servanda to  a  new  status,  extending  the validity  of
treaty-based  norms  to  those  who  had  not  explicitly  consented  on  the
grounds  that treaty  following  was just.3 8  They  also  reinterpreted  cus-
tom  and  general  principles  to  be binding  because  they  too  expressed
consent,  even  if by implication.3"  They  developed  doctrines of custom-
Id.; see also Baxter, supra note  1, at  36-74:
In the  first  place,  the treaty  is clear  evidence  of the  will  of States,  free  of  the
ambiguities  and inconsistencies  characteristic ...  of evidence of State practice.
Secondly, the convention...  constitutes  one common statement of the law by
virtually  all States, which does  not require the process of harmonization  and rec-
onciliation  that  normally  goes  into  the  extraction  of  a  rule  of law  from  the
hodge-podge of evidence presented  to a tribunal or other form of decision-maker.
Id. at 36-37. When  the commentator is  less concerned  with consent or, more probably,
sees the consensual  and nonconsensual element of both treaty and custom, the text will
tend to  treat them equally, resolving  conflicts  in terms of technical  and procedural  ab-
stractions. See, e.g., Akehurst,  supra note  25,  at 275:
It  is sometimes  said that  treaties  prevail over custom  by virtue of the  maxim of
lex  specialis derogat generali. It  often  happens  that  the  subject  matter of a
treaty  is  more specific  than  a  customary  rule,  or that  the  States  bound  by  a
treaty  are  fewer  than  the  States  bound  by  a customary  rule.  But  it  is  equally
possible  that  a  customary  rule  may  be  more  specific  than  a  treaty,  or that  a
special custom binding a small  number of States  may conflict with a multilateral
treaty  binding a large  number of States; in  such  cases  the maxim  lex specialis
derogat generali causes the  customary  rule to prevail  over the  treaty.
Where the maxim  lex specialis  derogat generali  provides  no clear guidance, or
where  it is shown  not to  reflect  the intentions of the States concerned,  it seems
that  treaties  and custom are  of equal authority.  The later  in time  prevails.
Id.
37.  See supra notes  6-8.
38.  Successor  and third  states are usually considered  bound  by at least  those trea-
ties which  have become  customary  law.  Opinion differs  as to  the additional  categories
of treaties  which  bind successor  states. See supra note 22; see also 2 D.  O'CONNELL,
supra note 22,  at 352 passim; 0. UDOKANG,  supra  note 22, at 327-402.
39.  See,  e.g.,  Baxter,  supra note  1, at  31  (customary  international  law  finds  its
origins in the will  of states);  DDR  LEHRBUCH,  supra note  10, at 259 ("Der Nachwcis
der Existenz einer gewohnheitsrechtlichen  Norm erfordert . . . den Nachweis des Wil-
lens der Staaten. . . . zu  der von  ihnen praktisch geibten Verhalensweise rechtlich
verpflichtet zu  sein.")  (emphasis  in  original).  So  pervasive  has this  positivizing  ten-
dency  been  that  no  contemporary  author  imagines  custom  to  be binding  solely as  an
expression of justice or of historical  wisdom.  Only  norms of jus cogens are now under-
stood in this  way. See supra  note 29.  Even modern naturalists concede that custom is a
matter of "will."  See, e.g.,  A.  VERDROSS  & B. SMMwA,  supra note 4,  at 282  n.17.
Wir ersehen daraus  [aus der Tatsache,  dass ein  persistent opposer  nicht an eine
neuentstandene  customary  norm  gebunden  wird],  dass  auch  eine  gewohnheit-
srechtliche  Bindung  durch  Konsens,  wenn  gleich  nicht  durch  einen
"stillschweigenden  Vertrag"  entsteht. Zwar beruht jeder Vertrag auf einem  Kon-
sens, aber nicht umgekehrt,  da ein  Vertrag  immer  eine durch  Erkkirungen  oder
konkludente  Handlungen  erzielte  Willenseinigung  (consent)  voraussetzt,26  AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y  [VOL.  2:1
ary law  which  reflected  this  sense of its reliance  upon  consent:  custom
was to be binding only upon those who participated  in  its formulation ,40
and  in  general  only  existed  when  the  repeated  practice  of states  was
coupled  with  a  psychological  intent to be  bound.41
Naturalists  likewise  corrupted  the  softness  of custom  and  the  hard-
ness of treaty. They sought  to extend  custom and general  principles  by
wihrend  ein Konsens  auch aus einem  passiven  Verhalten,  aus einer widerspruch-
slosen  Duldung  geschlossen  werden  kann.  Richtig sagt daher Tammes,  The Sta-
tus of Consent in International  Law, [2 NETHERLANDS  Y.B.  INT'L L.  11  (1971)]
ein  "tacit  consent"  sei  eine  "contradictio  in  terminis."
Id.
40.  See supra notes  21-23  (elaborating  on  consent to  be  bound).
41.  The "opiniojuris"  requirement was  classically formulated  by Judge Negulesco
to  be "the  mutual  conviction  that the  recurrence  is  the result  of a  compulsory  rule."
Jurisdiction of the European  Commission of the Danube,  1927 P.C.I.J.  (ser.  B)  No.  14,
at 105  (Advisory Opinion  of Dec. 8)  (Negulesco,  J., dissenting).  The importance of this
requirement to the formation of custom has been generally recognized  as positivism has
come  to dominate  international  legal  scholarship.  Guggenheim  relates that  the opinio
juris requirement  had appeared  in the positivist writings at the end of the  18th century.
Guggenheim,  Contribution  & l'histoire des sources du droit des gens, 94  RECUEIL  DES
COURS  1, 52-53,  53  n.1  (1958).  Some  contemporary  authors  who  rejected  it  early  in
their careers  have since changed their minds.  Compare 1 P.  GUGGENHEIM,  TRAIT9  DE
DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  46-48  (1953)  (disapproving  of opinio juris) with  P.
GUGGENHEM,  TRAITt  DE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  102-05  (2d  ed.  1967)  (ap-
proving  of opinio juris); see also Kelsen,  Thgorie du droit international  coutumier, I
REVUE  INTERNATIONALE  DE  LA  THtORIE  DU  DROIT,  253 passim (1939)  (strict  opinio
juris not required);  H.  KELSEN, supra note 4, at 307 passim (claiming that "the second
element  is  . . . that they  must be convinced  that  they fulfill, by their actions or absten-
tions, a  duty,  or  that  they  exercise  a  right").  For  a  discussion  of  this change  in  the
views of Guggenheim  and  Kelsen, see  G. TUNKIN,  supra note 23, at 120-21.  The recent
discourse  about  the opinio juris requirement  blends  a subjective  attempt  to  assess  the
true  motives  of compliers  and an  objective strand,  willing  to infer  intent from  certain
behavior  patterns. See Akehurst, supra note  1, at  31-42  (contrasting  modern  attempts
to define  opiniojuris);  Virally, supra note  1, at  133;  I.  BROWNLIE,  supra note  1, at 8
(opinio  juris "in  fact a necessary  ingredient"); Barberis, L'Opinio  juris comme ilTment
constitutif  de la coutume d'apr~s la Cour de la Haye, 50  R.D.I.  563  (1967).  Compare
1 H.  LAUTERPACHT,  supra note  25, at  63  (advocating  a  "flexible"  approach  requiring
some subjective  sense of  "obligation"  in order  "to  emphasize  the distinction  between
international custom  and  international courtesy")  with Skubiszewski,  Elements of Cus-
tom and the Hague Court, 31  ZAORV 810,  839-45,  853-54 (1971).  Skubiszewski  inter-
prets the  Hague  approach  to be  that  "the  Court reduces  the opinio juris to a  certain
aspect  of the practice and implicitly denies the subjective  nature of the second  element
of custom.  Further, the  Court  has  never  explained  the  nature  of this subjectiveness."
Id. at  854.  He concludes  that  opinio juris:
is  not  psychological  in  nature, and this  is  so  for the obvious  reason that  there  is
no  "State  Psychology"  as  only  a  human  being  possesses  mind  and  soul.  The
Court describes  the element  of opinio juris as "subjective,"  probably to  contrast
it with  the "objective"  nature  of material  facts  that  compose  the  practice.  But
the  belief  as  to  the  legal  nature  of the  rule  of  behavior  that  follows  from  the
practice  is  not  the  result  of  any  psychological  process.  This  belief-and  it  is
again  an inexact  term  in the circumstances-follows  from the acceptance  of the
legal  nature  of the rule  by  the States.
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arguing that these most accurately represented  the way in which  sover-
eigns  wanted  to be treated."2  They  also  reinterpreted  treaty  law  to be
binding  as  an  expression  of community judgment  about  the justice  of
the  norms  included. 3  This  led  them  to  give  a  special  status  to  some
general  treaties  like the original  Hague  protocols,  the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, or  the United  Nations  Charter and subsequent  human  rights re-
lated treaties. 4  Consequently, general  principles are valid when  "recog-
nized"  and  custom  when  "accepted"  as  law.45  Moreover,  the Interna-
tional  Court of Justice  may  decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono  "if  the
parties  agree thereto. 46
42.  See,  e.g.,  A.  D'AMATo,  supra note  1,  at 75.
The  articulation  of a  rule of international  law-whether  it be a  new  rule or  a
departure  from  and modification  of an  existing rule-in  advance of or currently
with  a  positive act (or omission)  of a state gives  a state notice  that its action  or
decision  will have legal  implications.  In other words, given such notice, statesmen
will  be able freely  to decide  whether  or not  to pursue  various policies,  knowing
that their acts may create or modify  international  law.  This voluntaristic aspect
of international  law is precisely what makes it acceptable to nation-state  deci-
sion-makers.
Id.  (emphasis  added).
43.  See supra note  25  (describing  the transformation  of multilateral  treaties into
norms  of  customary  law);  see  also Baxter,  supra note  1,  at  57  (concluding  that
"[tireaties  that  do not purport to  be declaratory of customary  international  law at the
time  that  they  enter  into  force  may  nevertheless  with  the  passage  of  time pass  into
customary  international  law").
44.  Some  provisions  of these  treaties (such  as  Article  2(4)  of the United  Nations
Charter precluding  international  interference with matters of domestic jurisdiction)  are
considered  by some to have become jus cogens. See Reports of the Commission,  supra
note  11,  at  247-49; see  also A.  MCNAIR,  supra note  1,  at  215-16  (considering  the
General  Treaty  for  the  Renunciation  of War  and  the  United  Nations Charter  to  be
binding upon  non-signatories).  The  Hague Protocols and the  Kcllogg-Briand  Pact, due
partly  to the sweep of their object,  have  often been given  special status  as constitutive
of custom. See  I THE  TRIAL  OF  GERMAN  MAJOR  WAR  CRIMINALS:  PROCEEDINGS  OF
THE  INTERNATIONAL  MILITARY  TRIBUNAL  SITTING AT  NUREMBERG,  GERMANY  41-42,
44  (1946);  JUDGEMENT  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  MILITARY  TRIBUNAL  FOR  THE  FAR
EAST  413-30 (1948).
45.  I.C.J.  CHARTER  art. 38(l)(c)-(l)(d).
46.  Article  38(2)  of the Statute  of the  International  Court of Justice  provides  for
"the  power  of  the  Court  to  decide  a  case  ex  aequo et  bono, if  the  parties  agree
thereto."  This provision,  in the otherwise  heavily  positivist  Statute has never  been the
basis  for the  Court's jurisdiction,  and  is  hardly  mentioned  in  most  treatments  of the
Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g.,  I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  I, at 27; A.  VERDROSS  & B.
SIMMA,  supra  note 4,  at 337-38.  Ex aequo et bono refers to  a decision  on the basis  of
equity, involving  elements of compromise, conciliation,  and friendly settlement in cases
where no norm of international  law seems able to provide a solution.  Several naturalist
authors have noted the role which equity plays  in the usual jurisprudence of the Court.
See, e.g., A.  VERDROSS  &  B. SIMMA,  supra note 4, at 337-38  (speaking of "ausserrech-
tliche Billigkeit");  de Visscher, supra note  I, at  13;  1. BROWNUE,  supra note  1, at 27
(equity  in  international  law may be  understood  in a  different sense,  as "an  important
factor  in the  process  of decision");  Pirotte, La notion d~'quitg. dans la jurisprudence
rcente de la Cour internationale  de justice, 77 REVUE  GtNtRALE DE  DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL  PUBLIC  92  (1973).  The  I.C.J.  has  expressed  this  role:AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  & POL'Y
Sources discourse as a whole embraces  the tension  between  hard and
soft  by  allocating  it as the  difference  between  custom  and  treaty.  Dis-
course about each source avoids the difficulties of singleminded  reliance
upon  either  hard or  soft  by  repeating  the  maneuver.  Because  each  of
the classic  sources  had this double nature, each  seemed  protected  from
the  inadequacy  of  either  hard  and  soft  tendency.  The  discourse  of
sources  as  a  whole  is  able  to appeal  both  to  sovereign  authority  and
sovereign  equality.  These  two  aspirations  can  be  embraced  by  sources
discourse  precisely  because they  can  be allocated  to different  doctrinal
boxes.
Despite  this  allocation,  commentators  have  sought  to  characterize
Article  38 as  either dominantly hard or soft, and continue to differenti-
ate  sources  from  one  another  by  their  relative  hardness  or  softness.
These  argumentative  practices  of differentiation  and  characterization
are  as  important  to the  overall  project  of sources  discourse  as  are  the
embracing  practices  of  inclusion  and  allocation.  Without  a  sense  of
both the distinctiveness  of consent and justice and of their inseparabil-
ity,  sources  discourse  could  not  reflect  both  sovereign  autonomy  and
equality.  At  this  preliminary  point we  might  think of argument  about
the  sources  of international  law  as  an endless  project of differentiation
and  recombination. The difficulty  is  to relate these two  practices to one
another.  One technique of accomodation,  which  is quite apparent  even
at this  preliminary  point,  is the  rhetorical  development  of hierarchical
relations among  dimensions of sources  doctrines  that  have  been differ-
entiated as relatively hard or soft. This practice characterizes argument
both about the relationship  among sources and about doctrines  defining
each  source  which might  be  thought  of as  either  hard  or soft. Tradi-
tional  commentators,  for example,  have  seen  Article  38  as  the  expres-
sion  of a positivist  vision of international  law. 7  By  this they  mean  that
Whatever the legal  reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions  must by definition
be  just,  and  therefore  in  that  sense  equitable.  Nevertheless,  when  mention  is
made of a court  dispensing justice or declaring the law, what  is meant is that the
decision  finds  its  objective  justification  in  considerations  lying  not  outside but
within the rules, and in  this  field  it is precisely a rule of law that calls for the
application of equitable principles.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases  (W. Ger.  v.  Den.; W. Ger. v.  Neth.),  1969  I.C.J.  3,
48  (Judgment  of Feb.  20)  (emphasis  added).
47.  See,  e.g.,  1 H.  LAUTERPACHT,  supra note  25,  at  86-87:
The order in which  the sources of international  law are enumerated  in the Stat-
ute of the International  Court of Justice is,  essentially,  in accordance  both  with
correct legal  principles  and with the character of international  law  as a  body of
rules based on consent to a  degree  higher than  is the law  within the State.  The
rights  and  duties  of States  are determined,  in  the  first  instance,  by  their agree-
ment  as  expressed  in  treaties.
Id.; see also E. MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN,  supra note 25, at 94;  1 C.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note
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Article  38  seems  to  weight  sources  based  in  consent  more than  those
based  elsewhere.  Of  course,  if  each  source  were  actually  equally
groundable  in  both  consent and justice,  such  a  characterization  would
not be  possible.  Commentators  who  characterize Article  38  positivisti-
cally  rely both  on the order  in  which the sources  are listed,  and  upon
the way  they  are described.  They  treat the  order as  a  hierarchy, from
the  most  to the  least  consensual  source:  treaties  before  custom  before
general  principles  before  judicial  decisions  before  publicists.4 8  More-
over, judicial  decisions  and  the writings  of publicists  are included  only
as  "subsidiary"  means  for the determination  of rules of law. They are
least  convincing  because  they  are  least consensual.  Both  custom  and
general  principles,  moreover,  are  described  in  such  a  way  as  to  be
grounded in consent rather than  in a vision of the justice of tradition.4
Those who would  loosen the positivism of international legal  theory ac-
cept this characterization,  avoiding the "extreme  positivism"  of Article
38  in  part  by  concentrating  on  custom  and  general  principles,  which
they  regard  as  midway  between  hard  treaties  and  soft  theories  of
justice.
5 0
Creating  a  hierarchy among sources  based  on a  frozen characteriza-
tion of each  source as more or less "consensual"  advances the project of
6, at  395-97.  The  traditional  socialist  view  is that  consent  is the  primary source  of
international legal  principles  which leads Tunkin  to conclude that "these  principles and
norms are created primarily  by.  . . treaties.  . . ... G. TUNKIN, supra note  17, at 441.
The  East  Germans  conclude  likewise  that, "Sie  [die  socialistische  Valkerrechtslitera-
ture]  betrachtet  den  v6lkerrechtlichen  Vertrag  einhellig  als  die  Hauptquelle  des
gegenwartigen  r6lkerrechts."  DDR  LEHRBUCH,  supra note  10,  at  215  (footnote
omitted).
48.  See supra note 47.
49.  See VIRALLY,  supra note 1, at  135 (stating that "[the]  obligatory character [of
customary  law]  follows from the general consent on  the part of states, and  this is what
Article 38 seeks  to convey when  it speaks  of 'a general  practice accepted as law'  "); see
also DDR  LEHRBUCH,  supra note  10,  at  210:  "'allgemeine  Rechtsgrundsatze'  . . .
sind valkerrechtliche  Grundsaitze,  die entweder  fiber v6lkerrechtliche  Vertrage oder im
Wege  des  V6lkergewohnheitsrechts  Bestandteil  des  V6lkerrechts  geworden  sind  und
deren allgemeine Anerkennung  die Folge allgemein  . . . cingegangener (ausdrilcklicher
oder stillschweigender)  Vereinbarungen  ist."
This approach  is particularly  evident in  those texts which emphasize  the importance
of multilateral  treaties  (traditionally  hard  sources)  as  evidence  of customary  norms.
See supra note 25; see also Baxter, supra note  1, at 38 (maintaining  that multilateral
treaties  are  declaratory  or  even  constitutive  for  new  customary  law  because  of "the
accuracy with which it reflects  the will of States, clarity, near universality, contempora-
neity, and  sense of  legal  obligation").
50.  See B. SIMMA,  supra note  I; see also D'Amato,  The Concept of Special Cus-
tom in International  Law, 63  AM.  J.  INT'L  L. 211  (1969)  (maintaining  that consent is
the basis  for special,  but  not general  custom);  D'Amato,  Manifest Intent and the Gen-
eration by  Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  892
(1970)  (remarking  that custom  requires proof of "manifest  intent," an  objective stan-
dard,  which  can  be especially  well met  by  certain  multilateral  treaties).
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domesticating  the  tension  between  authority  and  normative  criticism
within  sources doctrine  as  a  whole.  Although  both  tendencies  are  pre-
sent  they  do  not  seem  to  conflict  with  each  other  because  they  have
been  confined  to doctrinal  categories  which are  not  equivalent.  In  one
vision,  treaty  is the master  of custom because  it is more  consensual,  in
another  the  reverse.  Which  of the various  permutations  one  adopts is
less  important than the overall  project  of establishing  distinctions  and
hierarchies.  It protects the image  of a doctrinal  resolution  to the  social
problem  of conflicting  authority  centers.
Sometimes,  however,  the  instability  of  the  characterizations  upon
which  this argumentative  pattern  relies  becomes  apparent.  When  this
happens,  other  rhetorical  techniques  of  resolution  are  available.  Of
these, the  most  significant  is  probably  doctrinal  proliferation.  This  in-
stability and  the  proliferative  response  can  be  seen  in  discourse  about
new  sources  of international  law  and  in  discussion  of the  specific  doc-
trines  which  define  and limit each  source.
Commentators  often discuss  new sources of international  law  in ways
which  characterize  them  as either  hard  or soft."  When  these two  rhe-
torical strands  are  used  in  this  way, it  is  difficult to terminate  the  dis-
cussion  in  any  definitive way-not  so  much  because  new sources  each
entertain  both  hard  and  soft rhetorics  as  because  each  can  be  charac-
terized  as  either  hard or soft  and  neither characterization  alone seems
a  persuasive  basis  for  the  new  source's  authority.  Resolutions  of the
United  Nations  General  Assembly  have  been  treated  in  precisely  this
fashion. Since the General Assembly formally has no general  legislative
function in public international  law, Article  38  makes  no mention of its
various  textual  outputs.  Commentators  have  nevertheless  struggled  to
think about  United  Nations  resolutions  within the  rhetoric  of sources.
General Assembly resolutions are thought to be binding  to the extent
that  they  express  state consensus  or systemic justice.5 2  Those  who  ar-
51.  See supra notes  17-18.
52.  See supra notes  17-18.  Some  commentators  supporting  the  binding  nature  of
United  Nations  Resolutions  do so  on  the basis  of the form  of their  adoption  and em-
phasize their  consensual  nature. Others  rely  upon  their  content  and  emphasize  their
justness. Others  rely on both.  For the first type, see  G.  TUNKIN,  supra note  17,  at  176:
"[T]he  binding  force of the provisions  contained  in  the  resolution is  based  not  on  the
resolution itself . . . but on  the  agreement  of the States  who voted  for the  resolution
. . ."; see also Falk, supra note  1, at 782-83 ("[T]he jurisprudential basis  for attribut-
ing a limited  legislative  status  to  those  resolutions  of the  Assembly  is  that  they  are
supported  by a consensus of the membership");  Higgins, The United Nations and Law-
making: The Political  Organs, PROC. AM.  Soc'v  INT'L L. 37, 37-38  (1970)  (explaining
that the political organs of the United Nations engage in the development of customary
international  law);  E.  MCWHINNEY,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  WORLD  REVOLUTIONS
80  (1967);  C.  JENKS,  LAW,  FREEDOM  AND  WELFARE  83-100  (1963).
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gue that they  express  consent  are  opposed by  the argument  that Gen-
eral  Assembly  delegates  lack the  requisite capacity  or  intent. 5 3 Those
who  argue  that resolutions  embody  principles  of systemic justice  are
opposed  by  argument  that  resolutions  express  a  mere passing  consen-
sus-rule or tyranny  of the majority." 4
Commentators  of the second type are harder  to find, since  few defend the innovative
position that  Resolutions are  binding with  the non-positive and  hence innovative  argu-
ment that they express justice. See J. CASTAREDA,  supra note  17, at 5  ("the legal value
of these pronouncements  is not uniform:  it depends not only on the organ that approves
them and on their form, but also, and especially on their content"). A strong advocate
of this position  is M.  BEDJAOuI,  TOWARDS  A  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC ORDER
(1979).  Bedjaoui calls for a  law whose principles are derived  from its purpose, and "the
primary concern of the law today is the establishment  of a  new international economic
order."  Id. at  132.  Focusing  on  the "normative  actions"  of organizations,  he calls for
"ending  referral  to  the  traditional  sources  of  international  law"  because  they  do  not
serve  this purpose, whereas  "the development of resolutions as a means of formulating
international  law  is linked  with the very evolution of that  law, which has become  a law
of transformation  for a  purpose."  Id. at  140.  For  advocacy  of both  positions,  see  J.
BRIERLY,  THE  BASIS  OF OBLIGATION  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  1-67  (H.  Lauterpacht  &
C. Waldock  eds.  1958)  (all  obligations  in  international  law  can  be traced  directly  or
indirectly  to  the  consensus  of states  or  to some  universal  system of natural  rights  or
duties).
53.  Those who  rely on  the  formal  consensual  nature of resolutions  are opposed  by
arguments cast in the rhetoric of the inadequacy of form or of the absence of underly-
ing substantive authority which would  legitimize  the form.  Thus, commentators argue
either that  the  requisite intent  was  missing or  the  requisite  power  to forge  consensus
did not rest with  the United  Nations organ  in question. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note  17,
at  31  ("As  a general  rule,  however,  resolutions,  for  lack  of  intention  or  mandating
power  in  the  Assembly,  do  not create  binding  obligations  in  positive  law.");  Virally,
supra note  1, at  160  ("The Charter  contains  no general  provision  regarding  the legal
effects of General  Assembly resolutions.  Consequently, as a manifestation of the princi-
ple of sovereignty they generally have no binding force on members.");  A.  VERDROSS  &
B. SIMMA,  supra note 4, at 330-31  ("Deklarationen  kdnnen  nur dann  f~r die Mitglied-
staaten  verbindliche  Vblkerrechtsnormen  erzeugen,  wenn  dieses Organ dazu zust.  ndig
wire..  . . Eine Erweiterung der Zustandigkeit  ist jedoch bisher weder auf fiirmlichem
Weg  noch  durch  eine  Verfassungswandlung  . . . erfolgt").  Regarding  the lack  of in-
tent, see  Arangio-Ruiz,  The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, 137  RECUEIL  DES  CouPs  419  (1972):
As everybody  in  the United  Nations  is convinced  that  recommendations are per
se not  mandatory,  States  tend  to  embellish  their  image  by  putting  forth draft
resolutions.  Other states  tend naturally  to support  such drafts.  And  potential  or
natural  opponents  are  often  reluctant  to  face  the  risk of tarnishing  or  spoiling
their own  image  by opposing  the proposal  openly or by casting a  negative vote.
Id. at 457.
54.  Those  who justify  the binding  nature of resolutions  by reliance  upon their  ma-
terial  expression of right values  are opposed  by a rhetoric  which  challenges  the legiti-
macy of resolutions as substantive expressions of justice, seeing them instead  as expres-
sions  of formal  voting arrangements or power.  Even  those supporting the binding  force
of  resolutions  in  these  terms  consequently  rely  simultaneously  upon  a  consensual  ele-
ment, limiting  their  advocacy  to  generally  or nearly  unanimously  adopted  resolutions.
The problem of the dissenter remains. See Sohn, The Development of the Character  of
the United Nations, in THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  OTHER  Es-
SAYS  39,  50  (M.  Bos.  ed.  1973)  (noting that  when  an  interpretation  of the  Charter isAM.  U.J. INT'L L.  & POL'Y
It would not be possible  to argue both that General Assembly  resolu-
tions are binding as reflections of a passing consensus and that the dele-
gates  lacked capacity  to consent.  Likewise,  it would  not  be possible  to
argue both  that the  apparent  lack of consent  did  not matter  (because
the resolutions  were just) and that the undesirable  redistributive conse-
quences  had to be  accepted because  the resolutions  were expressions  of
consent.  The  incompatibility  of  these  rhetorical  strategies  can  most
clearly be seen in attempts to argue United Nations resolutions into the
box  of international  custom.  If custom  is  a  matter  of consent,  resolu-
tions  do  not  fit  because  the  practice  of the  very  states  who  voted  for
them indicates that consent  was not given. If custom is valid because  it
embodies  the  value  and  justice of tradition,  then  the  United  Nations
resolutions are too instant. They cannot, however,  be both too instant to
be traditional  and  too  implied  to be  consensual."
The  difficulty  posed  by  this  tension  within  argument  about  a  single
potential  source  of law  might  be  handled  in  a  number  of  ways.  We
might  imagine,  for example,  that although  United  Nations  resolutions
"reflect"  tradition,  their  textuality  keeps  them  somewhat  displaced
from custom and that although United  Nations resolutions are "indica-
tive"  of international  consensus,  their  institutional  form  distinguishes
them  from  treaties.  Approached  in  this  way,  United  Nations  resolu-
tions  occupy  a  sort  of  free  space  between  consent  and  jus-
tice-grounded  in  both, if in  a somewhat  ambiguous  fashion.  A  medi-
ating  rhetorical  strategy of this  sort  has  obvious  advantages,  but  it is
quite  unstable,  for  those  sceptical  about  the  binding  authority  of
United Nations  resolutions  can  attack  it  from  either  direction.
A  much  more  common  response  to  the  unstable  incompatibility  of
not generally accepted  it is without binding force);  Conforti,  Le r~le de l'accord  dans le
syst~me nations unies, 142  RECUEIL  DES  COURs  203,  253  (1974)  (objecter  not bound
despite justice of resolution);  D'Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAN.  Y.B.  INT'L L.  104,  121-
22 (1970)  (remarking  that a resolution  does not bind  a dissenting  state merely because
there is a  declaration  of consensus).
55.  Most  treatise  writers  feel  obliged  to  take  a  stand  on  the  binding  nature  of
United  Nations  resolutions.  Efforts  at  organizing  this  burgeoning  literature  have  at-
tempted  to develop  sophisticated  methods  of differentiating  the positions  and  develop-
ing  some theory  which could  unite a  fairly wide range of them.  No one has  focused  on
the deeper  structure  of these  various  argumentative  positions.  See Gross,  The United
Nations and  The  Role of Law,  19  INT'L  ORG.  537  (1965).  After  distinguishing  two
extreme  positions,  that resolutions  are not binding  and that  the General  Assembly  has
a  "legislative  or  quasi-legislative  function,"  Gross  deploys  the  rhetoric  of consent  to
demonstrate  that  resolutions  are  not  binding.  Id. at  555-58; cf  Arangio-Ruiz,  supra
note  53  (surveying  the  various  idiosyncratic  positions  which  have  been  developed  be-
tween  the  two  extremes  distinguished  by  Gross  and commenting  sceptically  upon  the
elaborate  distinctions  necessary  to maintain  "one  foot in one spot  and the other foot or
a  hand  in  another").
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the two  strands of sources  rhetoric  is  to  embrace  and  submerge  them
by  creating  further  doctrinal  distinctions  and  hierarchies.  This  tech-
nique  is  easiest  to  see by  returning  to  doctrines  limiting  and defining
various  traditional  sources.  At first,  doctrines governing  entry  into and
departure from treaty and custom follow the rhetorical lines established
by  argument  differentiating  one source  from another. Thus, for  exam-
ple,  treaty  and  custom  having  been  initially  distinguished  as  respec-
tively hard and soft, doctrines about entry into treaty seem more preoc-
cupied  with  consent than doctrines  about entry  into  custom.
Doctrines about the creation of custom and treaty reflect a sense that
what needs  explaining about a treaty is its hard basis in  consent, while
what needs explaining about custom is its soft basis in the natural order
of the system,  or, in  recent discourse,  the conditions under  which con-
sent  can be implied.  Thus, discussion  of the creation of treaties is pre-
occupied  with  the conditions  under which  a state which  will  be bound
by a treaty has indeed consented  to its terms. A treaty  is binding when
properly signed  and  when ratified  by  the appropriate internal  state or-
gans."  From  this  perspective,  executive  competence  to conclude  trea-
ties  depends  upon  the  extent  to  which,  under  constitutional  law,  the
executive  can speak for the state.57  Ratification  is viewed as a  substan-
tive  process  for  registering  consent. 0 8  In  this  view  reservations  are
thought  to  be  freely  possible  until  ratification,  although  they must  be
accepted  by other  signatories. 0 9  Duress  or force majeure mitigate  the
consent  of states.60
56.  See supra notes  5-9.
57.  See supra notes  5 & 7.
58.  See supra note  8; see also Virally, supra note  1,  at  192-93  (justifying treating
ratification  as final  act of consent  to  provide "breathing  space"  for subjective  national
reflection  after  signature). The  formal approach  to the subjective  consent  represented
by  requiring  ratification  is often  replaced  by  a direct  requirement  that the  subjective
intent  be present,  however  it is shown. See  Bolintineanu,  supra note  8, at  673.  "The
underlying principle of the provisions concerning the expression of consent to be bound
by  a  treaty  is the autonomy  of the  will  of  the  negotiating  states."  Id. Bolintineanu
further  adds: "[w]e  share, therefore  the opinion that the Vienna  Convention  has elimi-
nated  the distinction  between  formal  and  informal  treaties,  both being  placed  on  the
same  level and  thus reflecting  the  'decline of form'  in international law  and the proce-
dural  autonomy of the negotiating  states."  Id. at  678.
59.  See  I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  1,  at 605-06  (observing  that this  hard approach
to reservations  rests on a "contractual  conception of the absolute  integrity of the treaty
as  adopted").  Since the  Vienna  Convention  this  view  has  been  softened,  at  least  for
multilateral  treaties. See infra note 65 and accompanying  text;  Koh,  supra note  I1, at
95-105,  115-16.
60.  See supra note  10.  The Western  approach  to duress  is typically  hard,  focusing
only on the  elements of formal  consent.  Socialist and  third world  authors significantly
soften  this approach,  focusing  upon the "unequal"  substance of the treaty as  a conse-
quence  of political  or economic  pressures. See infra note 66.
19871AM.  U.J. INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y
The initial discussion  of the creation  of custom, by contrast, concerns
doctrines  for  measuring  the  pulse  of  the  international  system  as  a
whole.61  Doctrines  about  the  number  and  importance  of  states  who
must follow a practice for it to be binding upon all states suggest limits
on  the  ability  of  each  state  to  have  consented  to  its  being  bound. 6
Gone are doctrines  about  ratification,  or  subjective  internal  agreement
by  the  states  to  be  bound.
Argument  about these doctrines  of treaty  and  custom law  displays  a
more complex  weave of hard and  soft rhetoric. Each doctrine about  the
creation  of a  treaty norm  balances  hard and  soft considerations.  Often
this  balance  takes  the  form  of an  "objective  approach"  to  measuring
the consent of the state. Executive  competence  is discussed  in  terms of
what  is  reasonable  or just  for  other states  to expect  the  executive  to
have the  power to commit.63 Signature and ratification  act  as  limits  on
consent; binding  the state even  when not intended to bind,  and limiting
the  state's  ability  to  change  its  mind.64  The  acceptability  of reserva-
tions  is  thought  to  depend  upon  their  compatibility  with  the  "object
and  purpose"  of the treaty  rather  than  upon their  acceptance,  and the
power  to reserve  is  understood  to  be  limited. 6 5  Duress  either  does  not
61.  See supra notes  12-13.
62.  See supra note  12.
63.  This is easiest  to see  in  modern  doctrine  as enshrined  in Article  46  of  the  Vi-
enna  Convention  on the  Law of Treaties.  See Vienna  Convention, supra note 5, at art.
46.  In fact,  the expectations  of foreign  states seem  more strongly  protected  in modern
doctrine  than  municipal  constitutional  provisions,  since  a  violation  of internal  compe-
tence  provisions  is only  relevant  if the  provision  concerned  is one  expressly  regarding
competence  to  conclude  treaties,  is of "fundamental  importance"  and is "manifestly"
violated.  The effect  of this softening  has  been  to  make  the subjective  internal  lack  of
executive  capacity  irrelevant  at  international  law.
64.  Ratification,  the  last  act  of  consent,  is also  the  act  which  gives  the  treaty  a
presumptive  life of its own, independent  of consent. See I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  1, at
604;  E.  MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN,  supra note 25,  at  304; see also supra note  8.
65.  See supra  note  59.  This  modern  softer  approach  to  reservations  was  first
stressed  by  the  International  Court  of Justice  in  the  Reservations  to  Convention  on
Genocide:
[A]  State which  has  made and maintained  a reservation  which  has been objected
to  by  one  or more  of  the parties  to  the  Convention,  but  not  by  others,  can  be
regarded  as being a party to  the Convention  if the reservation is compatible with
the object  and  purpose of the  Convention  ....
1951  I.C.J.  15,  21  (Advisory Opinion of May 28).  The Vienna  Convention  incorporates
this approach  to  the  extent  that the  old  free  reservation-acceptance  approach  has  be-
come an exception.  Vienna  Convention, supra note 5, at art. 20(4),  (5). See I. BROWN-
LIE,  supra note  I, at 605-06  (the best  short  survey  of reservation  doctrine describing
this switch).  The meaning of "compatible"  or of the "object  and purpose" of the treaty
are often  given  a  hard  interpretation  even  in this soft approach,  although  this is by no
means  necessary.  See  id. at  590  (maintaining  that  "compatibility"  might  be  deter-
mined  "by  a  majority  rule,"  on  the basis  of the  "fundamental"  nature of some  provi-
sions, or that "each state  decides for itself whether reservations  are incompatible"); see
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mitigate when the state to be bound could  not have known  the relevant
consent  was  forced or mitigates consent  out of a sense of unfairness  in
the result rather than through  implying  a lack of subjective consent  in
"6unequal"  treaties.6"
Sometimes,  this rhetorical  balancing  proceeds  by reinterpreting  hard
doctrines  of treaty  creation  as  expressions  of justice rather  than  con-
sent. Thus,  for example,  doctrines about consent such  as signature  and
ratification  are justified  as  the embodiment  of justice,  protecting  the
ability of the consenting state to bind itself in  the interests of the com-
munity.67  Likewise,  the softer  doctrines  of treaty  creation,  like the ob-
also Waldock, supra note  I, at 65-66  (viewing the "compatibility"  doctrine as unsuita-
ble for adoption as the "general criterion  for determining the status or a reserving state
as a party"  because it cannot be objectively defined  without  violating sovereign auton-
omy and viewing  it instead  as a "valuable  concept  for consideration  by both the States
formulating  reservations  and  other signatories").  Some  "pragmatic"  authors  promote
avoiding  these contradictions  by adopting  a "sensible"  approach  to achieving  "the rule
calculated  to  promote the widest  possible  acceptance of whatever  measure of common
agreement can be achieved and expressed."  Reports of the Commission,  supra note I1,
at 206.
66.  See supra note 60.  In the third  world and socialist  view, treaties are  invalid  if
unequal,  regardless  of the subjective  consent  of the  relevant government,  which  may,
after all, have been suffering  from false consciousness. This approach has  been rejected
by  the West,  in most cases.  See, e.g.,  A.  VERDROSS, supra note  i, at 62.  For socialist
advocacy  of  this  view,  see  DDR  LEHRBUCH,  supra note  10,  at  251;  Lukashuk,  The
Soviet Union and International  Treaties, [1959]  SoviET Y.B.  INr'L L. 44, 45-50; Det-
ter,  The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15  INr'L  & Cobip.  L.Q.  1069,  1082-83,  1086
(1966)  (citing  examples  such  as  agreements  "forced"  on  a state as  the price of free-
dom,  perhaps  allowing  an  ex-colonial  power  to  maintain  economic  control  over  new
states, and concluding:  "We  submit here that the very contents of a treaty ought to be
examined  when the question of validity is discussed: the material contents of the instru-
ment ought to be accepted as a separate  ground of voidance,  irrespective of whether the
treaty  has  been  concluded  under  force or ought  to  be  revised/rescinded  according  to
the principle rebus sic stantibus."). For the third world expression of this approach, see
M.  BEDJAOUI,  supra note 52;  Abi-Saab,  The Newly Independent State and the Rules
of International  Law, An  Outline, 8 HOWARD  L.J.  95,  108 (1962);  Sinha, Perspective
of the Newly  Independent States on  the Binding Quality of International  Law,  14
INT'L & Comp.  L.Q.  121  (1965).
The newly independent States  believe that  political and economic privileges have
been  extorted  by  the colonial  powers  in  the past  from  the peoples  of Asia  and
Africa. On becoming  independent, these States increasingly rely on the argument
that "unequal"  or "inequitable"  treaties thus extracted,  and treaties  imposed  by
duress,  are invalid  ab initio. Accordingly,  they declare  that  it is  the right of the
State  which  was  obliged  to  enter  such  treaties  to  terminate  them  by
denunciation.
Rebus sic stantibus is frequently resorted  to by the  newly independent  states in
order to terminate their  inherited burdens.  The doctrine is invoked  by them  not
only  on  the  basis  of justice but also  because  a  treaty  fails  to  accord  with  the
present  position of power  in  the world.
Id. at  123-24.
67.  See Kearney  & Dalton,  The Treaty on Treaties, 64 Abs.  J. INT'L L. 495 (1970)
(the treaty as "the  mechanism without which international  intercourse could  not exist,
much  less  function  . . . the  cement  that holds  the  world  community  together");  M.
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jective  view  of consent,  are  seen  as  ways  of protecting  the  subjective
ability of the other state to  know the terms  upon which it binds itself. 8
Similarly,  doctrines  about  the  creation of custom  combine  hard and
soft approaches.  Often  this blending is  visible in the  subjective, consen-
sual  element  in  each  doctrine.  Custom  is created  not merely  by  habit-
ual  repetition,  for example,  but requires  also opinio juris: an intent  to
be  bound,  or a  recognition  that compliance  with the habitual norm  re-
sulted  from  a  sense  that it  was  binding.69  In  this  approach,  doctrines
McDOUGAL  & W.  REISMAN,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  CONTEMPORARY  PERSPECTIVE
1119  (1979)  (emphasizing  the  community-serving  functions  of treaties).
The special  importance of  agreements  among  the strategies  of states  resides  in
the  fact that,  in  the  absence  of  centralized  legislative  institutions  in  the  world
arena,  agreements  offer  one of the closest  approaches  to the considered  and de-
liberate  prescription of future policies  which  is  the characteristic  function of con-
stitutive  legislative  institutions  in  municipal  arenas.
Id; see also I H.  LAUTERPACHT,  supra note  25,  at 59.
68.  See A.  VERDROSS  & B. SIMMA,  supra note 4,  at  391-92:
Der  (subjektiven)  Konsenstheorie  wird  die  [objektive]  Vertrauenstheorie
gegeniibergestellt,  die nicht  danach fragt, welcher  Regelung die  Vertragsparteien
zugestimmt haben,  sondern  was sie verniinftigerweise  voneinander erwarten kn-
nen,  wenn  sie  bestimmte  ErklIrungen  abgeben  oder  ein  bestimmtes  Verhalten
beobachtet  haben.  An  die  Stelle  des  Konsenses  tritt  somit  die  rationale  Aus-
legung  des  Textes  durch den  Schiedsrichter  oder Richter.
Id.  This  approach  is  often  visible  in  discussions  of  interpretation.  See  Favre,
L'interprbtation  objectiviste des traitbs internationaux,  17  SCHWEIZER  JAHRBUCH  FOR
INTERNATIONALES  RECHT  75  (1960):
Donner  une  interpr6tation  raisonnable  d'un  texte,  c'est,  de  la  part  du juge,  in-
troduire  un  616ment  nouveau,  objectif, dans  i'accord  des  parties. C'est  op6rer  la
balance des int6rets  en  presence  . . . c'est arrter, ft  la  place des parties, cc qu'un
homme  juste et "raisonnable"  aurait  fait s'il  avait  eu  i  r6diger  I'accord.
Id. at  82;  see  also Falk,  On  Treaty Interpretation and the New  Haven Approach:
Achievements and Prospects, 8 VA.  J.  INT'L L. 323  (1968);  Gottlieb,  The Conceptual
World of the  Yale School of International  Law, 21  WORLD  POL.  108  (1968).
69.  On opiniojuris  generally,  see supra note 41.  Although most commentators  now
agree that a subjective  element is  necessary  for the consensual  creation of custom,  it is
unclear how  proof of that  element should  be provided.  This discourse reposes the oppo-
sition of hard and soft tendencies.  Opinio  juris was conceived  as the subjective,  motiva-
tional,  or intentional  element  of custom  which,  along  with objective  practice could  cre-
ate custom.  It seemed  required  to distinguish "mere  habit"  or "courtesy"  from  law. See
I.  BROWNLIE,  supra note  1, at 4-8  (explaining that  states differentiate  between  obliga-
tion  and  use).  But opinio juris must  be inferred  from practice  as  well.  This objective
approach  to opinio juris (itself the subjective element  in the hard, consensual  approach
to  custom,  a  soft source)  was  expressed  by  the  International  Court  of Justice  in  the
North Sea  Continental  Shelf Case:  "State  practice  should  have  been  both  extensive
and  virtually  uniform  in the sense of the provision invoked-and  should  moreover  have
occurred  in  such  a  way  as  to  show  a  general  recognition  that  a  rule of  law  or  legal
obligation  is  involved."  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  Cases  (Ger.  v.  Den.;  Ger.  v.
Neth.),  1969  I.C.J.  3, 43  (Judgment  of Feb.  20).  This approach  is  made  more explicit
by Judge  Lachs  in dissent:  "In  sum, the general  practice of States should  be recognized
as  prima  facie  evidence  that  it  is  accepted  as  law.  Such  evidence  may,  of  course,  be
controverted-even  on the test of practice itself, it shows  much  uncertainty  and contra-
diction."  Id. at 231-32; see also Sorensen, Principes de droit international  public, 101
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about  frequency  and  the importance  of those who  must  participate  in
custom  building  emphasize  the ability  to  register  consent. Thus,  rela-
tively more states  will need to participate,  or those who will be bound
will  need  to  participate  more  directly.70  In  this  view,  doctrine  should
downplay the  importance  of the states who  must consent in favor of a
more universal  approach, or should treat "important"  as meaning  those
affected  by  the norm  most  adversely  rather  than  those  whose impor-
RECUEIL  DES  COuRS  1 (1960).  Various  attempts  have  been  made  to  determine what
practice  is an  objective  measure  of this intent.  The  most successful  views  blend  hard
and soft tendencies  most elegantly.  Consider, for example,  the view that opinlojuris  is
an  objective warning  protecting  the power  freely  to consent,  which  can  therefore only
be satisfied  by  practice  following  an  articulated  norm:
The articulation  of a  rule of international  law  . . . in advance of or concurrently
with a positive act (or omission)  of a State gives  a State notice  that its action or
decision  will have legal implications.  In other words, given such notice, statesmen
will  be able  freely to decide  whether or  not  to pursue  various policies,  knowing
that  their  acts  may  create  or  modify  international  law.  . . . [T]he absence  of
prior  notification  that acts or abstentions  have  legal  consequences  is an effective
barrier  to  the  extrapolation  of legal  norms  from  patterns of conduct  that  are
noticed  ex post facto.
A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1, at  75.  Akehurst  expresses  the  subjective  view  of opinio
juris clearly:  "Practice  creates a rule of customary  law that particular conduct is obli-
gatory, if it is  accompanied  by statements  on  the  part of States that such conduct  is
obligatory,"  and  distinguishes  his  approaches  subjectively:  "The  traditional  view  im-
plies,  even if it does not state expressly, that opinlo juris consists of the genuine beliefs
of States. It is submitted,  however,  that  a statement  by  a State about  the  content of
customary  law should be taken  as opinio juris  even if the State does  not believe  in the
truth of its statement."  Akehurst,  supra note  1, at 36-37  (footnote omitted).  In prac-
tice, however,  these elements can hardly be distinguished or combined. Either there is a
continuous conduct  which is evidence of a legal duty which  will  finally be regarded  as
sufficient,  or the conduct  will  consist of expressions of opinio juris unaccompanied  by
"real  actions."  Kelsen suggested  that the opinio juris requirement served  no other pur-
pose than to conceal the role played  by the judge in the creation  of customary law. See
Kelsen,  Theorie du droit international  coutumier, supra note  41,  at 266.
70.  This heightened  sensitivity to the consensual  nature of customary  law  in  doc-
trines about creation of custom is expressed  in  Baxter, supra note  12, at 44; Akehurst,
supra note  1, at  16.
A rule of customary  law is established  if it is accepted  by the international com-
munity, and..  . the number of States taking part in a practice is a more impor-
tant  criterion  of  acceptance  than  the  number  of  acts  of  which  the  practice  is
composed,  and  a  much  more  important  criterion  than  the  duration  of  the
practice.
Id.; see also Virally, supra note  1, at  135:  "The  obligatory character  (of custom)  fol-
lows  from  the general  consent on  the  part of states  . . . . The  qualities of continuity
and generality,  requisite in  order that an international  practice may give rise to a  cus-
tom,  reflect the presence of this consent."  Id. The number of states  necessary to create
custom  is less  when  there is no  conflicting  practice  because  general  consent  is more
likely in such circumstances  and greater when a previous  rule of custom is to  be over-
ruled.  See Akehurst, supra note  I, at  18-19; cf. Fisheries  Jurisdiction  Case  (U.K.  v.
Nor.),  1951  I.C.J.  116,  151-52  (Judgment  of Dec. 18)  (sep. op. Alvarez,  J.); S.S. "Lo-
tus"  Case  (Fr. v.  Turk.),  1927  P.C.I.J. (ser.  A)  No.  10,  at 34  (Judgment  of Sept.  7)
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tance  can  be measured  in  terms  of some  external standard.7 1
Sometimes,  hard  rhetoric  in  doctrines  about  the  creation  of custom
recharacterizes  soft doctrinal  positions  as ways  of emphasizing  consent
rather than justice. Thus,  for example,  the physical  requirement  of ha-
bitual compliance  will  be seen  as a way  of ensuring subjective  consent,
on the  grounds  that actions  speak  louder  than  words.72  The soft  doc-
trine that universal  consent  is not  necessary  will  be  seen  as  a  way  of
permitting  states  to  develop  their  subjective  intentions  without  being
hindered  by  recalcitrant  or  uninterested  states.7 3 The  soft  sense  that
"important"  states  who understand  the system should  surely  consent to
ensure wise  rules  is understood  to reflect  not  the  wisdom of those  who
71.  Most  writers  follow  the  I.C.J.  on  this point:  "State  practice,  including  that of
States whose interests  are specially  affected  should  have been  both extensive  and virtu-
ally uniform."  North Sea  Continental Shelf Cases  (W Ger. v. Den.,  W.  Ger. v. Neth.),
1969  I.C.J.  3, 43 (Judgement  of  Feb. 20).  See, e.g.,  A.  VERDROSS & B. SIMMA,  supra
note 4, at 281;  Baxter, supra note  1, at 66 ("The practice  of those States  particularly
affected  by the  treaty must count  heavily"),  cf.  Akehurst, supra  note  1, at  22  ("Sug-
gestions  are  often  made  that  the practice  of  some  states is more  important  than  the
practice  of other states  . . . the author  has  already attacked  such suggestions ..  ").
72.  See supra note 69;  see also A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1, at  88  ("A claim  is not
an  act . . . [C]laims  . . . , although  they may articulate a  legal  norm  [i.e.,  they may
be evidence  of opinio juris] cannot  constitute  the  material  component  of  custom");
Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries  Case  (U.K.  v.  Nor.),  1951  I.C.J.  116,  191  (Judgment  of
Dec.  18):
Customary  international  law is the generalization  of the practice of States. This
cannot  be established  by  citing  cases  where  coastal  States  have  made  extensive
claims,  but have  not  maintained  their  claims  by  the  actual  assertion  of  sover-
eignty  over trespassing  foreign ships ...
The  only  convincing  evidence  of State  practice  is to  be  found  in  seizures,
where  the  coastal  State  asserts  its  sovereignty  over  the  waters  in  question  by
arresting  a  foreign  ship  and  by  maintaining  its  position  in  the course  of  diplo-
matic  negotiation  and  international  arbitration.
Id. at  191  (diss.  op.  Read,  J.).
73.  See I H.  LAUTERPACHT,  supra note 25,  at 62  ("It is clear that if absolute and
universal  uniformity  were to  be  required,  only  a very  few rules  could  rank  as general
customary  rules of international  law.").  The persistent objector doctrine  makes the cre-
ation of a new  customary  rule possible even  against outspoken and consistent opposition
of a  state.  This doctrine,  developed  by  the Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries  Case  (U.K.  v.
Nor.),  1951  I.C.J.  116  (Judgment  of Dec.  18), is adopted  by most writers.  See, e.g.,  I
H.  LAUTERPACHT,  supra note 25, at 66;  H. THIRLWAY,  supra note 24, at  110;  Virally,
supra note  1, at  137.  cf.  A.  D'AMATO,  supra note  1, at 261  (applying  the doctrine  to "special,"  but  not "general"  custom).  Although  one could  say  that  the consensual  na-
ture  of custom  is jeopardized  by  this  doctrine,  most  defenders  of "persistent  objector
doctrine"  argue  that  it  protects  the  ability  of  a  large  number  of  states  to  establish
norms  consensually  and not  be  frustrated  by  a  single  state. See  I H.  LAUTERPACHT,
supra note  25,  at  66.
The  fact  that  universal  consent  is  not  required  for the  creation  of custom  and
that  general  consent  is sufficient,  is  not  a  factor  pointing  to the  irrelevance  of
consent  in the creation of custom; it is merely a factor pointing to the irrelevance
of  the consent  of  every single state.
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have struggled to dominance, but the greater burden not to counter the
subjective  consent  of the important  states.74  Likewise,  the  hard  posi-
tions  emphasizing  consent  of the specially  affected  can  be reimagined
so  as  to  enshrine  the just  notion  that  the  specially  affected  are  also
most likely to produce  good  norms. 5
A similar  rhetorical  pattern  structures  doctrines about  the extent  of
the  force  of treaty  and  customary  international  law.  In  the  first  in-
stance, doctrines  about the ability of treaties  to bind  municipally  or to
bind  third and  successor  states seem  preoccupied  with  measuring  the
extent of consent. Treaties  are  binding internally if enacted as  munici-
pal  legislation, 6  if so  provided  by  internal  constitutional  law,7 7  or  if
"self-executing,"  a  characterization  that  depends  primarily  upon  the
intent  of  the  parties  to  create  a  self-executing  document.78  Treaties
bind  third  parties  and  successor states  if they  accept  the  obligation,0
and give third  parties  rights if such was  the intent of the signatories.8°
74.  See  Akehurst,  supra note  1, at  23  (it  is  harder  to  overlook  the state  whose
practice is more frequent or famous than that of other states); A. D'A?,tATO,  supra note
1,  at 96-97 (states with  highly sophisticated  international legal practice are more likely
to be given  more weight  in developing  customary  consensus).
75.  See,  e.g.,  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf Cases  (W.  Ger.  v.  Den.,  W.  Ger.  v.
Neth.),  1969 I.C.J. 3, 126 (Judgment of Feb. 20)  (diss. op. Lachs,  J.) (emphasizing the
participation in the Continental Shelf Convention  of interested  states "who  are actively
engaged  in  the exploration of continental  shelves").
76.  This is the approach  of the  United  Kingdom  and  the Scandanavian  countries.
See I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  1,  at 50  (describing  techniques of statutory  enactment);
Waldock, supra note  1, at  131  (describing  practice of British  courts  which "refuse  to
apply  treaties  modifying  legal  rights or obligations  within domestic  law  unless Parlia-
ment has  first enacted  a  law expressly  incorporating  the treaty  into domestic  law").
77.  A  number of  states  adhere  to  the principle  that  treaties made  in  accordance
with their respective constitutions bind  the courts without any specific act of incorpora-
tion. This practice  is described by  I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  1,  at 52; Mosler,  Applica-
tion du  droit international  public par les  tribuneaux nationaux, 91  RECUEIL  DES
CouRs  625  (1957);  Waldock, supra note  1,  at  130.
78.  This  is the  United  States  approach.  See  Fujii  v. California,  38  Cal. 2d  718,
721,  242  P.2d  617,  620  (1952)  ("In  determining  whether  a  treaty  is  self-executing
courts  look to the intent of the signatory parties  as manifested  by the language of the
instrument").  For a survey of United  States practice, see J.  RussoTTO,  L'APPtuCATrON
DES  TRAITtS  SELF-EXECUTING  EN  DROIT  AMtRICAN  (1969).  For  a  comprehensive  and
revealing  analysis of the hard and soft strands of argument  in the discourse about self-
executing  treaties,  see N.  Grabar,  Limit on  the Self-Execution  of Treaties  in  United
States Doctrine (1982)  (unpublished manuscript, on file  Harvard Law School  Library).
79.  See supra notes  21-22. This is codified  in Article 35  of the  Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties which allows  third parties to be bound if they "expressly  accept
that obligation  in  writing."  Vienna  Convention,  supra note  5, at art.  35.  In  practice,
separate  "devolution"  agreements  generally  govern  the  transfer  of obligations  to suc-
cessor  or third  parties.
80.  See supra notes 21-22. This doctrine  was formulated  by  the Permanent  Court
of  International  Justice  in  the  Free  Zones  of  Upper Savoy  and  the  District of Gex
Cases  (Fr. v.  Switz.),  1932  P.C.I.J.  (ser. A/B),  No. 46,  at  147  (Judgment  of June 7)
("It cannot  be lightly presumed  that stipulations  favorable  to a third State have  been
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Each  of these  doctrines,  however,  is  also  associable  with  softer  no-
tions  of justice. Sometimes  this takes  the form of an objective approach
to  consent.  Intent to  be  self-executing  can  be  implied  from the treaty
itself-perhaps  from its objective clarity.81 Successors  are  bound if it is
reasonable  to expect  them to  have intended  to be bound-if they  have
not abrogated or denounced  the treaty.82  Moreover, these characteristi-
cally  hard  positions  are  simply  reinterpreted  as  expressions  of justice
rather than  consent.  For  example,  treaties  are thought  to  be  self-exe-
cuting  when  that  appears  required  by  the nature  of the  provision  re-
gardless  of any  implication  about consent.8 3  Successors  are  not  bound
by unequal  treaties while successors  are bound and  third parties receive
rights when  it would be unjust to allow otherwise.84  These soft positions
can  also  be reinterpreted  as methods  of protecting  the subjective  inten-
tions  of the  other  contracting  parties  to  know  to what  it  is  they  have
agreed.
In  the  first  instance,  by  contrast,  doctrines  about  the  extent  of the
force of custom seem  governed  by custom's ability to register justice or
the  nature  and  requirements  of the  international  system.  Nonpartici-
pants in  the  process  of custom  formation such  as  new states  and  those
outside  the  region  in  which  the  custom  is  developed  are  bound  if the
rule seems justly to suit their situation as well, or if it is a wise norm or
one associated with other basic norms defining the nature of the system
like  "reciprocity"  or  "sovereignty"  or  "equity."  Successor  states  and
governments  are  bound  because  they partake  in  the  international  sys-
tem whose  nature  customary  norms  express.8
adopted  with  the  object  of creating  an  actual  right  in  its  favour.  There  is, however,
nothing  to  prevent  the  will  of  sovereign  States  from  having  this  object  and  this  ef-
fect.").  See  Jim6nez  de  Ar6chaga,  Treaty Stipulations in  Favor of Third States, 50
AM.  J.  INT'L L.  338  (1956).  The classic  examples  of such  treaties are the  United  Na-
tions Charter (particularly  Article 35(2)  permitting  non-members  to call  upon  the Se-
curity  Council  in  some  cases),  and  treaties  regulating  canals  or  international  straits.
See  1 C.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note 6, at  187-88.
81.  See supra note  78.
82.  See supra notes  12  and  14.  This  is the approach  of  the classic  neo-universal
succession theory  which  implies consent by successor states and devolves all  treaty obli-
gations  upon  them ipso jure unless  the new state  opts out  by  denunciation  should  the
treaty seem  incompatible with  its basic  interests. See C. JENKS,  supra note 22, at  94;  2
D. O'CONNELL,  supra note  22,  at  23-24.
83.  See supra note  78; I. BROWNLIE,  supra note  I, at 53  ("the  term  [self-execut-
ing]  is also  used  to describe  the character  of the rules themselves");  see also Foster v.
Neilson,  27  U.S.  (2  Pet.)  253,  314  (1829)  (developing  objective  approach  to  self-
execution).
84.  See sources  quoted  supra note  23.
85.  Although  most classic  commentators argue against the "unequal  treaty"  excep-
tion  on the basis  of hard arguments  (see supra note  22),  they  base their opposition  to
the tabula rasa theory of state succession  in soft  arguments. See Waldock, supra note
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Nevertheless,  discourse about  these  doctrines  is  also  animated  by  a
harder  emphasis  on consent.  Sometimes  this  rhetorical  change  in  em-
phasis  is  expressed  by countervailing  doctrines.  Successor  states,  new
states and extra-regional  states should only  be bound, in  this version,  to
customs which they accept or helped  (perhaps as colonies)  to develop."'
The  soft  doctrines,  however,  are  also  interpreted  to  express  consent
rather  than  justice.  New  states  should  be  bound  by  custom  because
they consent to it by participating in  the international  system to whose
nature  they consent  and from  which,  in  exchange  for their consent  to
consensual  norms,  they  have received  the "advantages"  of statehood. 7
Doctrines  which have been rhetorically  characterized  as consensual  are
also  often reinterpreted  as  expressions  of a concern  for  objectivity and
justice.  For  example,  successor  states  and  ex-colonies  should  only  be
1, at 52  (emphasizing  reciprocity):
[Tihe  fundamental  objection  to  it  [the  tabula  rasa approach]  is that  it  really
denies  the existence  of a general  international  legal  order  and  the  new States
have  at  least  as  much  to  lose  as  anyone  else  from  a  denial  of the  validity  of
existing international  law. If consent  is so far the  basis of customary  law that a
new State may  reject any customary  rule it  chooses,  how can  it be said  that an
older State is not free, vis-A-vis  the new State,  to reject  any customary  rule that
it  may choose.  Either  there is an international  legal  order or  there  is not.
Id.; see also Virally, supra note  1, at  138  (emphasizing  equity):
This is beyond  dispute:  nothing else  would be acceptable either  to the new state
concerned  or to the other states. As a result,  the new state becomes  bound  by all
those rules  of international  customary  law which  are  applicable  indifferently  to
all  independent  states.  By  its  entry  into  the  international  community  the  new
State acquires  the status of an  independent state, with  all the rights and obliga-
tions which are  attached  to that Status  by general  international  law.
Id.; cf. Sorensen,  Principes  de droit international  public, 101  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  I,
45-46  (emphasizing  basic norms of international  system):
A l'encontre de cette opinion  on  pourrait opposer l'argument suivant. D'apras  la
doctrine classique, les r6gles coutumires ne se limitent  pas d,  imposer des obliga-
tions aux  6tats nouveaux.  Elles crient 6galement des droits  en  leur faveur ct a la
charge des 6tats anciens, par exemple le  respect de leur souverainet6  territoriale.
Id.
86.  See supra note 23.  This is  the position of voluntarist socialist  doctrine. See G.
TUNKIN,  supra note  23,  at  129.
87.  See supra  note  23; see also G. TUNKIN,  supra note 23,  at  179. "If  however, a
new  State enters  without  reservations  into  official  relations  with  other  countries,  this
signifies that it accepts the specific complex  of principles  and norms of prevailing inter-
national  law as being the basic principles of relations among states."  Id.; see also DDR
LEHRBUCH,  supra note  10,  at  264  (emphasizing  both  hard  and  soft  bases  for
implication):
Da  [die  neuen  Staaten]  diese  Beziehungen  zu  den  schon  bestchcnden  Staaten
aufnehmen  und  entwickeln  wollen,  ergibt  sich  daraus,  dass  es  ihren  Interessen
und  ihrem  Willen  entsprechen  wird,  solche  Normen  des  Volkergewohnheit-
srechts,  die fur  die Entwicklung  derartiger Beziehungen  wesentlich  und interna-
tional  weitgehend  anerkannt sind,  als  auch f1r sich bindend  anzusehen  . . . sic
stimmen  damit diesen  Normen  zu.
Id. (emphasis  added).
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bound  by those customs  which they helped to create because  this is the
only  way  to  ensure that  the  system  of norms  reflects  the  interests  of
states  which  it binds,  itself a  condition  of justice.88
Taken  as  a  group,  doctrines  about  treaties  and  custom  also  blend
hard  and  soft  in a  repetitive  fashion.  Just  as  treaty  and  custom  seem
differentially  hard and soft, doctrines limiting the extent of the force  of
treaty  or  customary  law  have  a  similar  but inverse  structure.  If  doc-
trines  of  treaty  creation  seem  consensual  (ratification,  for  example),
they are tempered  by exceptions which  are  based  in justice  (like rebus
sic stantibus). If doctrines of custom creation seem  based  on a concep-
tion  of the good,  they  are tempered  by doctrines  providing  for consen-
sual  opting out  (persistent  opposer,  etc.).  These  subordinate  doctrines,
moreover,  are  inferior  "exceptions"  to  doctrines  about  the creation  of
treaty  or  custom.
The  presence of these  two  streams  in  treaty  law  is easy  to uncover.
Throughout the  Vienna Convention  on the Law of Treaties  consent vies
with  justice  and  subjective  consent  vies  with  objective  consent  for
supremacy  as  the source of obligation  to abide  by  treaty  law.89  Some-
88.  See  supra notes  22-24.  These  considerations  are  blended  by  M.  BEDJAOUI,
supra note  52. Cf. Anand,  Riole of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present
International Legal Order, 56  AM.  J.  INT'L. L.  383,  388  (1962):
International  law  has  in  fact  come  to  be  accepted  by  these  countries  except
where  it  is  still  found  to  support  past  colonial  rights.  . . . There  is  never  any
plea  for its over-all  rejection.  The "new"  countries  have come  to accept interna-
tional law  as such and  they always  plead their cases  according  to its rules.  They
in fact claim to  be "scrupulous"  adherents  to it. They believe it acts as a protec-
tion  for  them  because  they  are the  weaker  members of international  society.
Id.
89.  The Vienna  Convention, supra note 5, contains  four major substantive  sections,
which  consider  treaty  formation  (conclusion  and entry  into  force),  treaty  compliance
(application,  observation,  and  interpretation),  treaty modification  or  amendment,  and
treaty lapse (invalidity,  termination, and suspension).  In the first instance, it seems that
the  first  two  parts  are  in  some  tension  with  the  latter  pair.  The  first  deal  with  the
binding force of treaties, the latter  with derogations  from that  force. Moreover, the  first
two  are primarily cast in terms of consent, the latter in terms of justice. Thus, the first
contain  primarily  doctrines  about  registering  and  understanding  consent,  while  doc-
trines  of duress  or changed  circumstances  form  the  main body  of  the  latter  two  sec-
tions.  This potential  tension  is  avoided  throughout  the document  by  adoption  of what
might  be thought  of as a  principle-exception  framework.  Consent  operates  as the pri-
mary source of obligation  until it is trumped  by an exception  in situations  of injustice.
The treatment of consent as primary  is reinforced  by the characterization  of the justice
component  as an  exception. Yet  the very  nature of an  exception,  of course,  is that it
overrules  the principle, and is in that sense primary. This framework  is repeated within
each  of the sections,  a  repetition  which  reduces  sensitivity to the  polarity  of principle
and  exception.  Thus,  for  example,  the  fundamental  rule of consent  is  coupled  with a
"good  faith"  requirement  and  the  section  about  treaty  formation  is  littered  with  the
unresolved  invocations  of an  objective  approach  to consent.  See  Vienna  Convention,
supra note 5,  at art. 26.  This objective approach,  coupled with  the good  faith require-
ment,  allows justification  of the  consensual  aspects  of the  first  two major  sections  in
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times  these  two  strands  are  kept  apart.  Modern  hornbooks  consider
separately  the  formal  pacta sunt servanda rule  and  the  obligation  of
good  faith  governing  treaty  obligations."  Sometimes  they are blended
together.  Article  26  of  the  Vienna  Convention  incorporates  both:
"every  treaty  in  force  is  binding  upon  the  parties  to  it  and  must  be
performed  by them in good  faith."'" Throughout  the Convention,  abso-
lute duty is coupled  with a good faith lubricant, and  the formal triggers
for duty or  release from  duty to perform  are paired  with an exception
for  unjust results,  or implied  contravention  of intended  results.
Emphasis  on  the pacta sunt servanda rule  is often  supported  by ar-
guments  about consent,  while good faith obligations  and exceptions  for
duress  or rebus sic stantibus are  usually  associated with  the view that
treaties  are  binding  as  expressions  of justice. 2  These  associations  are
also  familiar when reversed.  The pacta sunt servanda rule seems a con-
terms of social justice.  In part 11I,  justice  concerns are fundamental,  yet are introduced
as exceptions,  or limits on consent.  Thus,  for example,  Article 31  reads: "a  treaty shall
be interpreted  in good faith in accordance  with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms ...  in the light of  [the treaty's]  object and purpose,"  thus introducing  noncon-
sensual  elements  as  additions to  the  basic  intentional  basis  which  are understood  to
supplement  or  explicate the subjective  intent.  Id. at art.  31.  Thus, those soft elements
which  are introduced  in this section of the treaty  are  cast in  terms of consent, just as
the consensual  elements of the earlier sections  were cast in terms of social justice. Like-
wise,  the  basic provision  for jus cogens (Article  53)  which  sets limits  on  the scope  of
the freedom  to make  treaties  is stated as an  exception to general  freedom  and  cast in
terms of consent, defining jus cogens thus: "for  the purposes of the present Convention,
a preemptory norm  of general  international  law is a  norm  accepted and recognized by
the  international  community  of States  as  a  whole.  . . . "  Id. at  art.  53  (emphasis
added).
90.  See,  e.g.,  I C. ROUSSEAU,  supra note 6,  at  53; W.  HOLDER  & G. BRENNAN,
THE  INTERNATIONAL  LEGAL  SYSTEM  (1972);  M.  McDOUGAL  &  W.  REISMAN,  supra
note 67.
91.  Vienna  Convention,  supra note 5, at art.  26.
92.  See supra note 89; infra note 94; see also I. BROWNUE,  supra note  1,  at 595,
599; E.  MENZEL  & K.  IPSEN, supra note 25,  at 329-30.  The principle of good  faith is
connected  to  the idea of justice  in the jurisprudence  of the Permanent  Court of Inter-
national  Justice and  International  Court  of Justice.  Waldock  observes  that  the "good
faith"  idea has  been regarded  as a "general  principle of law"  in the sense of Article 38
of the  Statute  of the  Court.  Waldock, supra note  1,  at  58-59; see  Certain  German
Interests in Polish  Upper Silesia  (Ger.  v.  Pol.),  1926 P.C.I.J.  (ser. A) No. 7,  at 30, 37-
39 (Judgment of May 25); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Second
Phase)  (Fr. v.  Switz.),  1930  P.C.I.J.  (ser. A)  No. 24,  at  12  (Order of Dec. 6); Condi-
tions of Admission  of a State  to Membership  in  the  United  Nations,  1948  1.C.J.  57,
79-80  (Advisory  Opinion  of May 28).  When  expressed  in  this  way,  the two  principles
seem at odds with  one another,  a contradiction  which most  commentators seem  to ac-
knowledge with such  observations as "[tireaties  are  inviolable, but not forever"  (Inter-
national  Law Commission,  Summary Records  of the Fifteenth Session, 694th meeting,
remarks  by Anado, [1963]  1  Y.B.  INT'L  L.  COMMNI'N  135,  142)  or "[tihe  principle of a
respect for treaty obligations  is one of the pillars of international law..  . . At the same
time, the pacta sunt servanda rule cannot be  fetishized"  (Haraszti,  Treaties and Fun-
damental Change of Circumstances, 146  RECUEIL  DES  COURS 1, 59  (1975)).
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dition of justice,93 while the good faith or rebus sic stantibus rules seem
restatements  of the consensual  force  of norms.94
The interesting  point, however,  is not this duality, apparent  through-
out  the  doctrines  of both  treaty  and  custom,  but  the  various  ways  in
which  this  polarity  can  be  rhetorically  managed.  Sometimes  this  is
achieved  by  reference  to an  interpretive method  which  "complements"
the  rhetorical  emphasis  of the doctrine  in  question.  Arguments  for  an
intent-based  interpretation  of soft norms and a justice-based  interpreta-
tion  of hard doctrines  have  been analyzed  elsewhere.95 Despite  the ap-
pearance  of resolution  which  such  an  approach  gives  these  doctrines,
however,  once  an  intent-based  approach  is chosen,  it remains  difficult
93.  See supra  note 29; see also A. VERDROSS  & B. SIMMA,  supra note 4, at 295-96.
94.  The  treatment  of good  faith  or rebus sic stantibus as  "implied"  terms  in  the
treaty is standard  in most texts, just as it is standard  to justify pacta sunt servanda as
a  matter  of social  justice. See  J.  MOLLER,  supra note  17  (rebus sic stantibus is an
implied  term  in all treaties);  see also C.  FENWICK,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  454 (4th  ed.
1965).  Fenwick  posits  that  all  international  contracts  are  entered  into  under  certain
implied  conditions,  which  accompany  the  express  conditions  of  the  treaty  and  are
equally  part  of  the "valuable  consideration"  which  forms  the  essence  of the contract.
This  view  is criticized  strongly  by  the  International  Law  Commission  as "a  fiction  by
which  it  was attempted  to  reconcile  the dissolution of treaties  in the  consequence  of a
fundamental  change  of  circumstance  with  the  rule pacta sunt servanda." Reports  of
the Commission,  supra note  11,  at  258. Many  commentators  are now forthright  about
this contradiction.  See C.  FENWICK,  supra at 458.
[I]nternational  law must continue  to witness  the struggle of two conflicting  prin-
ciples: on the one hand  the necessity of stability in international  relations and on
the  other  hand  the  demand  for  such  changes  in  the  legal  situation  created  by
past  treaties  as  will  meet  the  requirements  of  present justice.  . . [I]n  interna-
tional  relations  a  way  must  be  found  to  make  obligation  and justice  coincide,
with  perhaps  a  margin  on  the side of obligation  in  the interest  of that  law  and
order which  is the primary  condition  of justice.
Id. Many  continue to blend  the two strands by treating  them as matters of "interpreta-
tion"  which  must  be carried  out so as to  reflect both. See, e.g., Lissitzyn,  Treaties and
Changed Circumstances, 61  AM.  J.  INT'L.  L.  895,  896  (1967).
Thus  viewed,  the  problem  of the  effect  of a change  of circumstances  on  treaty
relationships  becomes  in  principle  one  of  interpretation--of  establishing  the
shared  intentions  and  expectations  of  the  parties.  This  approach  is  consistent
with  . . . the principle of pacta sunt servanda  . . . A treaty is  not breached  if it
is not applied in circumstances  in  which the parties did  not intend or expect it to
be  applied.  Indeed,  to  expect  performance  contrary  to  shared  expectations  not
only could  be  regarded  as  inconsistent  with  good  faith,  but could  also  produce
resentment  which  would  undermine  rather  than  promote  stability.
Id.  For  a  discussion  on  the  history of  the  clause,  see  Haraszti,  supra note  92,  at  46
passim.
95.  See supra note  94;  see also Gross,  Treaty Interpretation. The Proper Role of
an Impartial Tribunal, AM.  Soc'Y  INT'L.  L.  PROC.  108  (1969);  Larson,  Between
Scylla and Charybdis in  Treaty Interpretation,  63  AM.  J.  INT'L.  L.  108  (1969)  (con-
trasting  the extreme  positions  of  Falk,  On  Treaty Interpretation  and the New  Haven
Approach: Achievements  and Prospects, 8 VA.  J.  INT'L  L.  323  (1968)  and  Metzger,
Treaty Interpretation  and the United States-Italy Air  Transport Arbitration, 61  AM.
J.  INT'L.  L.  1007  (1967)).
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to stabilize  whether  one should concentrate  upon formal  expressions of
intent or supply  what must  have  been  the  parties'  intention,  or  what
would have been a reasonable state's intention under the circumstances
had the  problem been  foreseen.
I  am  more  interested  in  rhetorical  strategies  of  closure  which  rely
upon  the relationships  among  doctrinal  strands  and characterizations.
For these  strategies,  the important thing  to understand  about these va-
rious  doctrinal  discussions  is  not  only  the  recurring  applicability  of
hard arguments  in soft contexts  and vice versa. Far more crucial is the
potential  these  sub-doctrines  offer, because  they  are differentiated  and
defined by the same tendencies  which differentiated  custom and treaty,
to support the sense that the overall  doctrinal structure has this tension
under control.  For example,  each  doctrine  about the creation of treaty
or custom can be set off against an exception which expresses  the oppo-
site tendency. By setting the rule against the exception,  tempering  it by
its rhetorical  opposite, sources argument can appear to have taken both
hard and  soft considerations  "into  account"  and thereby  reach closure
in particular  cases.  This  combination  of differentiation  and  hierarchi-
cally organized  recharacterization  through proliferation  suits doctrines
about treaty and custom  to rhetorical strategies  which will  sustain  the
hard and  soft images  of international  law  as  a  whole.
To develop  argumentative  strategies  for  embracing  and  containing
these  tensions,  I  explore  discourse  about  four  doctrines:  one  creating
binding obligations  and one ending  obligation  for both  treaty and cus-
tom.  Treaty obligations  seem consensually  created.  Dropping  a  treaty
obligation  before its fulfillment  seems appropriate  only  when some  ex-
traconsensual  standard  provides  an alternative  to the  harsh  fulfillment
of the original  intent.  Of course,  it would  also  be  possible  to  examine
pacta sunt servanda from  the perspective  of its "good  faith"  softener
and  think  of rebus sic stantibus as  an  implied  term  of  the  original
treaty. To investigate  the rhetorical possibilities  opened up by these as-
sociations,  I consider  a series  of doctrinal  arguments  about "unilateral
declarations"  and rebus sic stantibus. I then consider arguments about
custom  creation  and  termination  which  utilize  similar, if often  oppos-
ing,  rhetorical  strategies.
A.  THE  CASE  OF  UNILATERAL  DECLARATIONS
Argument about the binding  force of unilateral declarations at inter-
national law takes  place  in  what might be thought  of as the most con-
sensual  corner  of  sources  discourse.  As  such  it  seems  exemplary  of
treaty doctrine  as  a whole,  and  the techniques  for managing  the rela-
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tionship between  hard  and soft strands of sources  rhetoric seem  partic-
ularly  vivid. The  relationship  between  unilateral  declarations  and trea-
ties  is  difficult  to grasp.  From  one  perspective,  all  legally  binding  acts
are  unilateral,  to  the  extent  that  bilateral  and  multilateral  acts  are
composed  of separately  binding  unilateral  promises. 96 From  another
perspective,  however,  even  acts which seem  unilaterally  binding  are bi-
lateral  in  the sense that they can  only  be  binding  if another party  can
call  upon  the  obligation.  These  two  visions  of the  distinctiveness  of
unilateral  acts  seem  differentially  hard  and  soft.  Those  who  imagine
unilateral  acts to have a separate  legal  significance  might seem  to  rely
upon  a  consent-based  approach  to legal obligations.  In  this  view,  even
multilateral  treaties are composed of individual  obligations, binding  be-
cause  of the consent  of the state agreeing  to be  bound.  Analysts  char-
acterize  multilateral  treaties  as  unilateral  obligations  by  relying  upon
this  consensual  element.  In this  extreme  hard  view,  other  systemic  or
relational  considerations  distinguishing  multilateral  arrangements
would  not affect to the authoritative  nature of the obligation.  Similarly,
those who  emphasize  the systemic or bilateral  nature of unilateral  acts
might  rely  upon  a  soft vision  of obligation.  States  might  seem  bound,
even  by a unilateral act, because of the expectations  which it has raised
in  others.
These  associations  might be  reversed.  We might focus  on the  unilat-
eral nature  of all acts in  an objective way, seeing  their binding  charac-
ter in communal  acceptance.  Alternatively,  we  might suppose  that it is
the unilateral components  of multilateral acts which bind because these
reflect  the  systemic  conditions  applicable  to  each  sovereign.  An  ap-
proach  emphasizing  the  multilateral  nature  of  unilateral  acts,  more-
96.  See  Rubin,  The  International Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71  AM.  J.
INT'L  L.  1, 8 (1977).
97.  See, e.g.,  Franck,  World Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear
Test  Cases, 69  AM.  J.  INT'L  L. 612,  617  (1975):
"[C]ommon  lawyers,  reared  in the culture of "consideration,"  have difficulty  ac-
cepting  as truly binding  a  unilateral commitment  wholly  devoid of anything  like
a  grain  of mutuality....
At common  law,  reliance  is  a  necessary  ingredient:  acts or  abstentions  based
on  the assumptions  that  the unilateral  promisor  will  keep  his  word."
Id.; see also E.  Suy, supra note  1, at  11:  "La  detection  de ces  promesses  purement
unilat~rales  exige  un  effort  de  recherche  minutieux  afin  de  d6terminer  si,  derriere  Ia
faqade  de  l'unilat~ralit6  formelle  d'une  d6claration  de  volunt6,  ne  se  cache  pas  une
bilat6ralit6 de fond."  Id. American  scholars  in particular  have little enthusiasm  for the
idea,  advanced  by  Suy,  Reuter,  Rousseau,  and  other  French  and  Italian  writers  that
some unilateral  acts alone are binding.  In modern texts, the term "unilateral  acts"  does
not appear  in  the  index.  See, e.g.,  B.  WESTON,  R.  FALK  & A.  D'AMATO,  INTERNA-
TIONAL  LAW  AND  WORLD  ORDER;  L.  HENKIN,  R.  PUGH,  0.  SCHACHTER  & H.  SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  (1980).
[VOL.  2:1SOURCES OF INT'L LAW
over,  might rely  on hard  arguments.  An objective  approach  to unilat-
eral  declarations  might  seem  appropriate  because  it  protects  the
subjective  will  of  the other  states.  Consequently,  even  in  what  might
seem  the hardest corner of sources doctrine  we find both  hard and soft
arguments  available.
Although it has often been recognized that unilateral  acts and decla-
rations sometimes  create international  legal  obligations,  it is clear that
not all such  declarations  do so.98  A  number of criteria  have been sug-
gested  for  distinguishing  the  binding  from  the  nonbinding  unilateral
declaration.  Some  rely  strictly  upon  the  declarant's  intention  to  be
bound,  and  some supplement  their  reliance  upon  intention  with  some
more systemic factor, such  as  reliance, raised  expectations,  or the exis-
tence of another state which could  reasonably  have had its expectations
raised  and  thus  has  standing  to hold  the  declarant  to  its word.9  The
98.  Pfluger  was  one  of the  first to dedicate  a treatise  to  the subject  of unilateral
acts  and  declarations.  See  E.  PFLUGER,  DIE  EINSEITIGEN  RECHTSGESCHXFTE  IN
VOLKERRECHT  (1936).  An  important  monograph  is  E.  Suy, supra note  1. See also
sources cited supra note 97.  Rubin, supra note 96, at 28 questions: "Whence  came the
Court's  conviction  that  such  unilateral  declarations  are binding?"  and concludes  that
the pronouncement  of the Court  appears to  have  been  ultra vires because  it  comes:
Not  from any  treaty . . .,  thus  not from  Article 38(l)(a)  of the Statute of the
Court;  not  from any  known  international  custom  as  evidence  of a  practice  ac-
cepted as law, thus not from  Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute; not from any princi-
ple  accepted  by  Anglo-American  courts  or commentators  or  from  "any  general
principles of law," thus not from Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute;  and indeed,  not
from the  unequivocal  writings  of  any  publicists  or judicial  decisions  that  have
focused  squarely on  the question,  thus not  from Article 38(l)(d) of the Statute.
Id. (footnote  omitted).
99.  Several  theories  have  been  advanced  to justify the  binding  force  of unilateral
declarations.  Some  rely  upon  "good  faith"  or  principles  of community justice; others
upon  the "intention"  of  the declarant  or  the reasonable  intention  of the  listener,  and
still others on some formulaic blend of the two like "pacta  sunt servanda." For the first
type,  see  Schwarzenberger,  The  Fundamental Principles of International Law,  87
RECUEIL  DES  COURS  195,  312  (1955):
If a  subject  of international  law  chooses  to  take  up  a  position  in  relation  to a
matter  which  is  legally  relevant  and  communicates  this  intent  to  others  it  is
bound within such limits to accept the legal implications of such a unilateral act.
.. . No  doubt,  in  the  formative stage  of  this  rule,  the  obnoxiousness  of self-
contradictory  behavior  and  venire contra  factum  proprium assisted  in  creating
the  opinio iuris sive necessitatis which  marks  the border-line  between  interna-
tional  comity and  international  customary law.
Id.; see also Jacqu6, A Propos de la Promesse Unilat~rale,  in MfLANGES  A  PAUL  REu-
TER  326  (1981).  For texts of the second sort, see  Fitzmaurice, supra note  17,  at 230:
Such a [unilateral]  Declaration  may or  may not create binding  legal obligations
• . . it seems fairly well settled that it can  and will do so only if clearly  intended
to have that effect,  and held  out, so to  speak, as an  instrument  on which  others
may  rely and  under  which  the declarant  purports  to  assume such  obligations.
Id. For  texts  which  combine  these two  approaches,  see P.  REUTER,  DROIT  INTERNA-
TIONAL  PUBLIC  142  (5th  ed.  1976):
Une promesse,  faite unilaterale en  faveur d'un, de  plusieurs ou de  tous les  Etats
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apparently  harder  of  these  two  positions,  in  which  an  intentional  de-
clarant  is bound,  may  rely on the actual subjective intent of the declar-
ant, or  may  imply that intent  from  the circumstances.  In  the  extreme,
the subjective intention of the declarant  may only be  known  from what
the  declarant  claims  to  have  been  his  subjective  intent.  This  very  ex-
treme  approach  removes  softer  considerations  to  rhetoric  about  evi-
dence and the nature of proof. Argument  about unilateral  declarations,
like  the  doctrines  of  treaty  law  generally,  thus  seems  continually  to
complement  its  primarily hard  rhetoric  with a  softer  alternative.
The classic unilateral  declarations case  exemplifies  various strategies
for  managing  the  relationship  between  these  two  strands  of  sources
rhetoric.  The  1974  Nuclear  Tests  case  between  Australia  and  France
arose  out  of objections  by  Australia  to  French  nuclear  testing  in  the
South  Pacific.1 00  During  1974,  the  President  of  the  French  Republic
made  a  series  of  public  statements  to  the  effect  that  since  advancing
technology  would  permit  future  testing  to  be  conducted  underground,
France  would  cease  atmospheric  nuclear  testing.1 0 1 The  International
Court  of Justice  sought  to determine  whether  these statements  legally
bound  France  to  refrain  from  further  atmospheric  tests.
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A  number  of rhetorical  strategies  were  available  to  Australia  and
France.  One  way  of  structuring  the  possibilities  in  accordance  with
their relative  reliance  upon  consent  might  be the  following:
(ou  d'une organisation)  peut-elle  engager  son  auteur  a  l'6gard  de  cet  Etat  (ou
organisation)  de ces  Etats?  I1 n'y a aucune raison  de ne pas  i'admettre lorsque  la
promesse est manifestement  faite avec cette intention.  Cette affirmation  est bas6e
sur  le  principe de  la  bonne  foi  et  plus  sp~cialement  sur l'obligation  de respecter
les  convictions  que  l'on  fait naitre  par  son comportement.
Id.; see also A.  VERDROSS  & B.  SIMMA,  supra note 4,  at 344:
Die  tiberwiegende  Lehre  anerkennt  die  Verbindlichkeit  eines  Versprechens,
wenn  der  versprechende  Staat  eine  solche  begriinden  wollte  und die  anderen
Staaten ihr Verhalten nach  diese Erkl~rung  orientiert haben. Die Verbindlichkeit
des  Versprechens  besteht  also,  urn  das  Vertrauen,  das  andere  Staaten  einer
solchen  Erkl~irung  entgegenbringen,  zu  schfitzen.
Id. (emphasis  added).  For  a text of the third  type,  see  E.  Suy, supra note  1, at  45.
100.  Nuclear  Tests Case  (Austr. v.  Fr.),  1974  I.C.J.  253  (Judgment  of  Dec.  20).
101.  Parts  of these  statements  are  quoted  by  the Court  itself. Id. at 265,  266.
102.  The issue was  not originally  presented  to  the Court in  this way.  Rather, Aus-
tralia  complained  that  the  tests  violated  substantive  international  law  and  sought  a
judgment  to  that  effect.  During  the  proceedings,  various  French  government  officials
made  public  statements  to  the effect  that  the testing  program  was  to  be  terminated.
The Court, taking cognizance of these statements, declined to  reach  the merits of Aus-
tralia's  claim,  holding  instead  that  France  was  bound  by  its unilateral  statements  to
discontinue  testing.  Ironically,  Australia  had  actually  stressed  in  urging  the  Court  to
reach  the merits  their sense that France was not bound by these statements. France  did
not  appear.  The  judgment  considered  the  claim  that  France  was  bound  as  though
France  would  oppose  and Australia  support  that  ruling.
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Australia:  (Hard) Intent to be bound alone binds. The unilateral  decla-
ration  is binding.
France:  (Hard)  Intent  binds, but we did not  intend to be  bound. These
were merely "policy  statements."  Moreover,  if intent binds only we can
know our  intent.
Australia:  (Softening)  Intent  binds,  but  must  be  judged  by  the
evidence.
France:  (Hard)  If intent  binds,  we now  change  our  intent:  all  state-
ments of intent must  reserve the  possibility of changing  our mind.
Australia:  (Soft)  This  is not  possible  because  it would  upset systemic
values like  the  fairness  of fulfilling  reasonable  expectations  or reliance
or  of keeping  one's  promises.
France: (Soft)  We accept those systemic values, but no one should  have
relied  since  we were  not  bound and  it was not a  promise.
Australia:  (Hard)  I  have  ten  states  here  who  did  rely,  including  our-
selves  and only I can  interpret my reliance.  You  must  keep your word
regardless of whether you thought it was a promise so that I might rely
and be able  to consent informedly.
France:  (Soft)  Our  approach  to  the  systemic  values  which  are  impli-
cated  here  is  different.  It  seems  equitable  or  fair  to  let  us  remain
unbound.
Australia:  (Hard)  Accepted  and  recognized  norms are otherwise.
In this  hypothetical  oral  argument,  France  is  able  repeatedly  to  in-
voke Australia's  principle against her, forcing  her to switch from  hard
to soft arguments.  Were the argument to continue, each  party would be
driven through incompatible positions. Of course, it would  be surprising
if any or even most of these arguments were to be found in the Interna-
tional Court  of Justice opinion,  or,  for  that  matter,  in the  pleadings.
The  aim  of the  argument  is  to terminate  this  potentially  endless  dia-
logue  in  a  persuasive  fashion.  In  the  International  Court  of  Justice
opinion,  this  was  accomplished  by  switching  repeatedly  between  two
incompatible perspectives. The Court's opinion considers whether a uni-
lateral declaration  can be binding,  under  what  conditions  this may  be
true, and who  may decide these questions. At each  stage the judgment
embraces  the  contradictory  tendencies  illustrated  by  the hypothetical
debate.
The substantive portion of the Court's judgment  begins  with a  state-
ment of what it takes  to be the rule of applicable law:  "It is  well recog-
nized that declarations  made  by way  of unilateral  acts, concerning  le-
gal  or  factual  situations,  may  have  the  effect  of  creating  legal
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obligations." '  This conclusion  is supported  by two different  principles.
First, the Court argues  that unilateral declarations  are binding  because
and  to  the extent that they  express the intention  of the  declarant  to be
bound.  This  classic  hard  argument  is  expressed  as  follows:
When  it  is  the  intention  of the State  making  the  declaration  that  it should  be-
come bound according  to  its terms,  that  intention confers  on the declaration  the
character  of a  legal  undertaking,  the State being  thenceforth  legally  required  to
follow  a  course  of conduct  consistent  with  the  declaration.
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This  approach  is picked  up  in  the  dissenting  opinion  of Judge  de
Castro,  who  uses  it  to support  the  conclusion  that  France  cannot  be
bound  by  these  "policy  statements."
For a promise  to be legally binding on  a State,  it is  necessary  that the authorities
from  which  it emanates should  be competent  so to bind  the State  (a  question  of
internal  constitutional  law and  international  law)  and that  they should  manifest
the  intention and  will  to  bind  the State  (a  question  of  interpretation).'
On the  other hand,  the  Court justifies  the conclusion  that unilateral
declarations  are  binding  with  soft  arguments  about  the  systemic  re-
quirements  of good  faith:
One of the basic principles governing the creation  and performance  of legal obli-
gations,  whatever  their  source,  is  the  principle  of  good  faith.  Trust  and  confi-
dence are inherent in international co-operation,  in particular  in an age when  this
co-operation  in  many  fields  is  becoming  increasingly  essential.  Just  as  the very
rule of pacta  sunt servanda in the law of treaties  is based on  good faith,  so also is
the binding character of an international  obligation  assumed  by unilateral  decla-
ration.  Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral  declarations
and place confidence in them, and are entitled to  require that the obligation  thus
created  be respected.'
Commentators  reflect this dual basis for the binding nature of unilat-
eral declarations.  Macdonald  and  Hough,  for example,  summarize  the
holding  of the  Nuclear  Test  case  as  follows:  "In  order  to  find  that a
statement  imposes  a  binding  obligation,  it  is  essential  to  find  that the
person  making  the  statement  intended  it  to  do  so.  The  issue  is  not
whether  in  the  circumstances  the  person  should  be  bound  but  rather
whether  he  intended  to  be  bound." 07  Eric  Suy  restates  the view  that
binding  acts  are  "une  manifestation  de  volont6  . . . d. laquelle  une
norme  de  cet  ordre  juridique  rattache  des  consequences  cor-
103.  Id. at 267.
104.  Id.
105.  Id. at  374.
106.  Id. at  268  (emphasis  added).
107.  Macdonald  &  Hough,  The  Nuclear Tests  Case  Revisited,  20  GER.  Y.B.
INT'L.  L.  338,  352  (1977).
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respondantes  A la  volont6."'0 1 8  On  the  other  hand,  Macdonald  and
Hough  conclude:  "The  binding  character  of unilateral  declarations  is
based on the need for good faith  (trust and confidence)  in international
relations."'1 0 9
Invoking  both theories  presents the Court  with a rhetorical  problem,
for  these two  approaches  could  as easily  appear  incompatible  as com-
plementary and might each as easily support the conclusion  that unilat-
eral  declarations  should  not  be  binding.  This  potential  for  rhetorical
contradiction  and  indeterminacy  needs  to  be appreciated  in  order  to
understand  the delicacy of the Court's resolution.
Although the Court argues that the binding nature of unilateral dec-
larations  can be grounded  in the intent of the declarant,  reliance upon
the  subjective intentions  of the declarant  opens  up  the possibility  that
France  should  be allowed  to  change  its  mind.  Commentators  seem  to
recognize  this  point  when  they  suggest  that  if the  declaration  were
binding, it must not have been truly unilateral. Intent alone cannot sup-
port the idea of obligation.
Also, it seems questionable that, if the  French  declaration  was  bind-
ing,  it  was  unilateral.  As  Suy  points  out,  "La  d6tection  de  ces
promesses purement unilat6rales  exige un effort de recherche minutieux
afin  de  d6terminer  si,  derriere  la  fagade  de  l'unilat6ralit6,  formelle
d'une d6claration  de volunt6, ne se cache  pas une bilat6ralit6 de fond."
If a declaration is made in  response to a request for such a declaration,
it is bilateral. And if France's statements constituted an undertaking,  it
is plausible  to view  them as  a  response  to Australia's  request  for such
an  undertaking. 1°
The  hard  intent-based  approach  seems  to  preclude  the  binding  na-
ture of purely  unilateral obligations,  requiring what at first seemed  the
softer  rule;  that purely  unilateral obligations  are not binding:
The ICJ's  logic seems odd in positing  a system  in which states  are not  conceived
as constantly negotiating  with each other,  but in which  unilateral acts have legal
results identical to  the results  they would have  if states were constantly  negotiat-
ing with  each other. Those problems  cannot wholly  be avoided,  but they  can  be
minimized  by confining the discussion  to  a more superficial  level  by avoiding  the
discussion of the theory that underlies the conception of the legal  effects of "uni-
lateral"  acts  that the Court seems  to have  had  in mind."'
108.  E.  Suy,  supra note  1, at  22.  On  unilateral  acts,  see  supra notes  96-97;
Schwarzenberger,  supra note 99, at 548-61;  M.  HUDSON,  THE  PERMtANENT  COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL  JUSTICE,  1920-42,  631-36  (1943).
109.  Macdonald  & Hough,  supra note  107,  at 341.
110.  Id. at 354;  E.  Suy, supra note  I, at  Ill.
111.  Rubin,  supra note  96,  at 9.
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To  this  commentator,  the  hard  consent-based  approach  which  the
Court  seemed  to  adopt  appeared  to  require  a  community  which  the
Court precluded.
Thus, analyses  that  reflect a  view of the international  order  as emphasizing  sov-
ereign  equality  and  independence,  as  regarding  all  acts  by  states  as  essentially
"unilateral"  but  part of a system of constant adjustment of rights and obligations
in  which  legal  significance  is  given to each  of those  acts, are simply  inconsistent
with  the  ICJ's  basic  approach.'12
Although the  Court argues  that the systemic interests  in  predictabil-
ity and  good  faith  require  that  unilateral  obligations  be  binding,  one
might as  easily imagine  a world  in  which the  expectation  of obligation
arose only when registered  by the community by acceptance,  considera-
tion, or  exchange.  The  principle  of good  faith  could  be thought  to  re-
quire  only that bilateral, or  systemicly  implicated obligations  are  bind-
ing.  Good  faith  would  then  seem  incompatible  with  the  unilateral
nature  of a  unilateral  declaration.  Perhaps  this  is  what  commentators
mean when  they argue that "if France's  statements constituted  an un-
dertaking,"  it  might  better be  seen  to be  bilateral.  One  commentator
pointed to the incompatibility of the soft "good  faith" approach  and the
unilateral aspects  of the  norm  which the  Court  invoked:
But  since  no  concept  of  "good  faith"  can  make  binding  a  policy  declaration  or
other pronouncement  that is not binding  because not conceived as binding by any
party  concerned,  to  argue  that "good  faith"  alone  creates  the  obligation  is  to
argue  in  support  of an  obvious  absurdity."
3
This same  commentator  noted  that from a  hard  approach,  all  binding
acts  are  unilateral.
Every  legally  significant act in  a legal  system  that  posits individual  legal person-
ality is,  in a  sense, unilateral.  Thus,  in  most  if not all  legal  systems  that  have a
concept of contract,  the contractual  tie  is created  by the law giving legal  value to
various acts  of the several  parties  to  the transaction.'
4
Despite  the  ambiguity  of each  principle's  meaning  for  the  binding
nature  of unilateral  declarations,  moreover,  each  of these  two  princi-
ples,  seems  to  require  the  abandonment  of the  other.  If states  are  to
remain free and if the independence of intent  means anything, the state
ought  to  be  able to decide  when it  is  bound-free  of external require-
ments  of good  faith.  If any  system  of good  faith  is  to  endure,  on  the
other hand,  states cannot  remain  free to change their  minds once hav-
ing given  their word. This  problem  might  be thought  of as  the tension
112.  Id.
113.  Id.
114.  Id. at 8 (footnote  omitted).
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between the extreme forms of positions which  when limited might coex-
ist. To  test  that  vision,  we  must  examine  how  the  Court  was  able  to
make these  two justifications  seem  compatible.
The opinion  rendered  these two  principles  compatible  in part  by ex-
pressing  each  in  a  way  which  affirmed  its opposite  and  denied  itself.
We have seen that each  principle has two elements,  one which supports
and one which opposes unilateral declarations. The Court exploited this
rhetorical diversity  to blend both approaches  in a  way which seemed  to
support  the binding  nature  of unilateral  declarations.  The  soft  argu-
ment of good faith was made  to seem  compatible with the intent-based
hard argument  by  emphasizing  the  manifestation  of each  which  sup-
ported the bindingness of unilateral declarations.  For example, the sys-
temic  conditions  of justice  were  understood  to  mean  protecting  the
freedom  of each  sovereign.
In  the  Court's opinion,  the  soft  principle  of  good  faith  was  made
compatible with the seemingly intent-based  rule in  two ways. First,  the
Court emphasized that good  faith protects  the ability of other states to
"place  confidence in"  and "rely  upon"  unilateral statements in  making
their  own  subjective  calculations.  The  good  faith  argument,  then,  is
able to remain consistent  with a hard intent-based  approach  because  it
associates itself with Australia's  interests,  not those of France. Second,
the soft argument simply embraces  the content of intent. The ability of
France  to  bind  itself depends  upon  the  systemic  value  of  good  faith.
Thus, the hard intent-based  norm, like the rule of pacta sunt servanda,
is seen to be based on good  faith because  those intending to bind them-
selves  must "assume"  they can  do so. The Court was able  to make the
two strands of its justification  seem  consistent  in  part because the soft
alternative  is  presented  in a hard  manifestation.
As we have seen, however,  a  purely hard position could  as easily de-
vour the bindingness of undertakings.  The Court, in  arguing that bind-
ingness  is  in  fact an  intent-favoring  norm,  must elaborate  this  hard,
intent-based  argument  so  as  to  prevent  its  association  with  France's
ability to  redefine the terms  of its own  obligations.  This the Court ac-
complishes  in  two  ways.  First,  the  Court  emphasizes  the  subjective
freedom of other states who must  be able to rely on French good faith.
Second, and more importantly, the Court elaborates the meaning of an
intent-based  system of unilateral declarations in such a way  as to deny
France  the  freedom  to define  its  own  intent.
This the Court  accomplishes  in  two  steps.  First,  it suggests  that in-
tent  is  to be objectively  measured  by  the way  in  which  another  state
could  be expected  to view  French statements. This objective approach,
in turn, is justified by both hard and soft arguments.  Second,  the Court
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switches  discussion  from  the  choice  between  French  and  Australian
consent  to an issue of the Court's  appropriate  role. The  arguments  for
the  Court's role in  assessing evidence  operate like arguments  about ob-
jective  measurement  of consent  to  prevent  the  intent  argument  from
precluding  a finding  of obligation.
These  arguments  occur  in  the  context  of the  Court's  discussions  of
the conditions  under which a state is  bound by its unilateral  statement.
Although  dissenting  Judge  de  Castro  argues  that  only  unilateral  acts
which are accepted  can bind;  "[h]ence-and  this should  not be  forgot-
ten-any promise  (with the exception of pollicitatio)  can  be withdrawn
at any  time  before  its  regular  acceptance  by the  person  to whom  it is
made  (ante acceptationem, quippe iure nondum  translatum, revocari
posse sine injustitia)."115 By contrast, the  Court holds "that  the unilat-
eral undertaking  resulting  from these statements  cannot  be  interpreted
as  having  been  made  in  implicit  reliance  on  an  arbitrary  power  of re-
consideration." 11 6  The Court  also holds:
An  undertaking  of this  kind,  if given  publicly,  and  with  an  intent  to  be  bound,
even  though not made within  the context of international  negotiations,  is binding.
In  these circumstances,  nothing  in the  nature of a  quid pro quo nor any subse-
quent  acceptance  of the  declaration,  nor even  any  reply or  reaction  from  other
States,  is  required  for  the  declaration  to  take  effect,  since  such  a  requirement
would  be  inconsistent  with  the strictly  unilateral  nature  of the juridical  act  by
which  the  pronouncement  by  the State  was  made.'
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This softening  of the emphasis  on France's  intent is justified  because
France so intended. The question before the  Court is  how to distinguish
instances of such binding  intention  from other statements.  In one  view,
the only  consistent  method  is  to  let France  decide.  De  Castro  writes:
[l1n  my view the attitude of the  French Government  warrants  . . . the inference
that it considers  its statements  on nuclear  tests to  belong  to  the political domain
and  to concern  a question  which,  inasmuch  as  it relates to  national defence,  lies
within the domain  reserved  to  a State's  domestic jurisdiction. 18
The Court  picks  up  this approach  in holding  that the  obligation  is co-
terminous with French intent: "The Court finds  further that the French
Government  has undertaken  an obligation  the precise nature and  limits
of which  must  be  understood  in  accordance  with  the  actual  terms  in
which  they  have  been publicly  expressed.""' 9
115.  Nuclear  Tests  Case  (Austr.  v.  Fr.),  1974  I.C.J.  253,  374  (Judgment  of Dec.
20).
116.  Id. at  270.
117.  Id. at  267.
118.  Id. at  375.
119.  Id. at 270.
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Indeed,  they go  so  far as  to indicate  that  no  requirements  about the
form which an intentional  statement can or should take could  be  com-
patible  with the notion  of the obligation  being  based  in  consent.
With  regard  to  the question  of form,  it  should  be observed  that  this  is  not  a
domain  in  which  international  law  imposes  any special  or  strict  requirements.
...Thus the question of form is not decisive. As  the Court said in its Judgment
on  the  preliminary  objections  in  the  case  concerning  the  Temple  of Preah
Vihear
"Where.  . .as is generally  the case in international  law, which  places
the  principle  emphasis  on  the  intentions  of  the  parties,  the  law
prescribes no particular form, parties  are free to choose what form they
please provided  their intention  clearly  results  from  it."  (LC.J. Reports
1961,  p.  21)
The Court further  stated  in the same  case:  "...  the sole  relevant
question  is  whether  the  language  employed  in  any  given  declaration
does  reveal  a clear  intention ...  .
Nevertheless,  the Court recognizes  that a purely subjective approach
is not compatible with the notion of obligation: "Of course, not all uni-
lateral acts imply obligation;  but a State may  choose to take up a cer-
tain  position  in  relation  to  a  particular  matter  with  the  intention  of
being bound-the intention  is to be ascertained  by interpretation of the
act."'121  This  is  immediately  limited  to  reflect  the hard  nature  of this
basic  argument  by  the  sentence  which  follows:  "When  States  make
statements by which  their freedom  of action  is  to be limited, a  restric-
tive interpretation  is called  for."'122
The  Court  squares  this  objective  approach  with  the  consent  based
argumentation  in two  ways.  First,  it interprets  the objective  approach
to reflect the true subjective  intention  of the declarant.
In announcing  that  the  1974  series  of atmospheric  tests  would  be  the last,  the
French Government  conveyed  to  the world  at large, including the  Applicant,  its
intention  effectively  to terminate  these  tests.  It was bound  to assume that other
States might  take note  of these statements  and  rely  on their  being  effective.'3
120.  Id. at 267-68.
121.  Id. at 267.
122.  Id.
123.  Id. at 269. Thomas  Franck  describes  this approach  to  intentionality:
Intentionality,  as  the Court said,  must  be  the test.  But the  intention  cannot  be
determined  solely  by reference  to the speakers'  state of mind but  must also take
into account  that of the  listeners. A spokesman  for state policy-like the  Presi-
dent  of  France,  who  speaks  with  the  solemn  voice  of  "acts  of  the  French
state,"-must  be  taken  to  intend  the  natural  consequences of his words just  as
actors  are assumed,  in law,  to intend  the natural consequences of their acts. If a
state speaks, though  an  ostensible agent, and  the statement  contains an express
commitment to a course of future conduct  by  that state, it should  not be neces-
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Second,  the  Court  squares  the  objective  test  with  a  consent-based
approach  by  suggesting  that  objective  interpretation  is  the  Court's
function,  as a way of protecting  France from the willfulness  of Austra-
lia's  interpretation.
It  will  be  observed  that  Australia  has  recognized  the possibility  of  the  dispute
being resolved  by  a unilateral  declaration,  of the kind specified above,  on the part
of France, and its conclusion that in fact  no "commitment"  or "firm,  explicit and
binding  undertaking"  had been  given is  based on  the view  that the  assurance  is
not  absolute  in  its terms,  that there  is  a  "distinction  between  an  assertion  that
tests  will go underground  and  an assurance that no further atmospheric tests will
take place,"  that "the  possibility of further atmospheric testing taking place after
the commencement  of underground  tests cannot  be excluded"  and that  thus "the
Government  of  France  is  still  reserving  to  itself  the  right  to  carry  out  atmo-
spheric  nuclear  tests."  The Court must  however  form  its own  view of the mean-
ing and scope  intended  by the author of a unilateral  declaration  which  may  cre-
ate a legal  obligation,  and cannot  in this respect  be bound  by the view  expressed
by  another  State  which  is  in  no  way a  party to  the  text.
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Having thus blended these two strands, the Court  describes its interpre-
tive  process  so  as  to juxtapose  the  hard  and  soft elements  of its  argu-
ment in  adjoining  sentences:
The validity of these statements and their legal  consequences  must  be considered
within the general  framework  of the security of international intercourse,  and the
confidence  and  trust which  are  so  essential  in  the  relations  among  States.  It  is
from  the actual  substance  of these  statements,  and  from  the  circumstances  at-
tending  their  making,  that  the legal  implications  of  the  unilateral  act  must  be
deduced.  The objects  of  these statements  are  clear  and  they  were  addressed  to
the international  community as a whole, and the Court holds that  they constitute
an  undertaking  possessing  legal  effect. 2'
Judge Barwick,  in  his dissent,  after reference  to a similar confluence
of hard  and  soft  factors  concludes:
There seems to be nothing,  either in the language used or in the circumstances of
its  employment,  which  in  my  opinion  would  warrant,  and  certainly  nothing  to
complete,  the  conclusion  that  those  making  the  statements  were  intending  to
enter  into a  solemn and  far-reaching  international obligation.  . . . I  would  have
sary  to  inquire  whether  the state  intends  to  be bound,  but  merely  whether  the
states  with an  interest at  stake could  reasonably  assume that  the statement  con-
stituted  a commitment.
Franck, supra note  97,  at  616-17  (footnote  omitted).  Macdonald  &  Hough  take  the
opposite  view:  "To  'assume'  that  a  state  'intends'  to  be  bound  if other  states  'could
reasonably assume that the statement constituted a commitment'  is to express this  view
in  terms  of  a  convenient,  but  misleading  fiction."  Macdonald  &  Hough,  supra note
107,  at  354.
124.  Nuclear  Tests  Case  (Austr.  v.  Fr.),  1974  I.C.J.  253,  268-69  (Judgment  of
Dec.  20).
125.  Id. at  269.SOURCES OF INT'L LAW
thought myself that the more  natural conclusion  to draw  from the various state-
ments  was  that they  were statements  of policy ....  120
To  summarize,  the Court made  the hard  argument  for  the binding
nature  of unilateral  declarations  seem  compatible  with the good  faith
strand of its argument and  with the idea  of obligation  by reinterpreting
intentionality in soft terms.  In the course of elaborating  the meaning of
an intent-based  approach to unilateral declaration,  the Court was again
faced with a choice between  two alternatives: an objective and a subjec-
tive  one. The Court  chose  the  objective  one, thereby  downplaying  the
subjective nature of its initial intent  based approach.  This was revealed
in the arguments which the court made to defend  this choice. First, the
Court reinterpreted  the subjective  approach which  it rejected  to be in-
compatible  with  true  intent-based  subjectivism:  if France could  inter-
pret its own consent it could not bind itself. Second, it reinterpreted  the
objective alternative to be truly reflective of the subjective approach,  in
terms,  paradoxically,  first of Australia's  interests, then  of those  which
France  must  have  had.  Any  tension  between  these  two  positions  is  fi-
nessed  by focusing  on  the court's  role.
Argument about the application of doctrine about unilateral  declara-
tions  illustrates  one way in  which the hard and soft strands of sources
argumentation  can  be  blended  and  stabilized.  The  elegance  of  the
Court's opinion  resides  in  its  management  of the  relationship  between
two  approaches  to  unilateral  declarations  which  have  the potential  to
contradict  each  other and  themselves  in  important  ways.
B.  THE  CASE  OF Rebus sic Stantibus
Doctrines governing  release from consensual obligations  (e.g.,  denun-
ciation, termination,  impossibility,  or the emergence  of a new  peremp-
tory  norm  of jus cogens),27  like those governing  entry into  consensual
obligations  are  discussed  in  the  rhetorics  of both  consent  and justice.
Although  some of these doctrines  (particularly denunciation  and termi-
nation)  seem  primarily consensual,  most  seem  to  temper a  consensual
obligation with more systemic considerations.  The doctrine of "changed
circumstances"  or "rebus sic stantibus" is exemplary in its rhetoric and
structure.
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The doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus has been  discussed  in  both hard
and soft terms. Some commentators  emphasize that a state may  be re-
leased  from its consensual  obligations  when the  parties  would have  in-
126.  Id. at 448-49.
127.  See supra notes  14-16,  89-92 and  accompanying  text.
128.  See supra notes  15,  89-92 and  accompanying  text.
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tended release had they considered  the potential for circumstances  to so
evolve. 129  Indeed,  the  doctrine is  often referred  to as  the "clausula re-
bus sic stantibus" to emphasize  the implication  of a release clause  into
the treaty obligations which it modifies.  The Permanent  Court of Inter-
national Justice,  in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of
Gex expressed  this  consensual  approach  to rebus sic stantibus:
1
3
0
The argument in  favor of the view that the stipulations  establishing  the zones
have  lapsed  is  that  these zones  were created  in view  of and because  of the  exis-
tence  of  a  particular  state  of  facts,  [and]  this  state  of  facts  has  now
disappeared ...
To  establish  this  position  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  prove  that  it  was  in
consideration  of the  absence  of  customs  duties  at  Geneva  that  the  Powers  de-
cided, in  1815,  in favour of the creation  of the zones. There  is nothing  in the text
of the treaties  to support this, and the only occasion  on which the Swiss represen-
tative at the Allied  gathering in  1815  is  shown  to  have  relied on  the absence  of
customs  at  Geneva  was  when  he  endeavored  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of  the
French  customs  along  the  whole  frontier  from  Basle  to  Geneva-an  effort  in
which  he was  not successful  ....
As  the  French  argument  fails  on  the  facts,  it  becomes  unnecessary  for  the
Court  to consider any of the questions of principle which  arise in connection with
the theory of the lapse of treaties  by reason  of change of circumstances ....  31
Others,  however,  have understood the  doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
to  be primarily  designed  to rectify  extraordinary, if also unanticipated,
harshness.' 32  Both  of these strands  find  expression  in  most analyses  of
129.  See  C.  FENWICK,  supra note  94;  C.  HILL,  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  "REnus  SIc
STANTIBUS"  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (1934):
The definition of the doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus generally  given  by the older
writers  on  international  law  and accepted  by  many writers  today states  that the
obligations  of  a treaty  terminate  when  a  change  occurs  in  those  circumstances
which  existed  at  the  time  of  conclusion  of  the  treaty  and  whose  continuance
formed,  according  to the  intention or wills of the parties, a condition  of the con-
tinuing  validity  of the treaty ...
This definition  of the doctrine  is  merely  a  principle for carrying out  the inten-
tion of the parties to  the treaty and  is  not at all  an objective rule of international
law  which  operates  to  terminate  the obligations of the  treaty  irrespective of  the
original  will  of the  parties.
Id. at 8-9  (footnote  omitted);  see also Lissitzyn, supra note  94, at  889-92  (giving  ex-
amples of similar  statements  by  other commentators).
130.  Free  Zones  of  Upper  Savoy  and  the  District  of  Gex  (Fr.  v.  Switz.),  1932
P.C.I.J.  (ser. A/B)  No.  46  (Judgment  of June  7).
131.  Id. at  156,  158.
132.  See supra  note 94  (discussing views on  implied  terms of treaties). See, e.g.,  A.
VERDROSS  & B. SIMMA,  supra note  4, at  420:
Nach der richtig verstandenen  objektiven theorie handelt es sich bei der clausula
rebus sic stantibus weder  um  eine  tats~chliche  noch  um  eine  subintellegierte
Vertragsklausel,  sondern  um  einen  objektiven  vr  [v6lkerrechtlichen]  Grundsatz
...  . Die entscheidende  Frage geht also dahin, ob sich  die  Umstinde nach  Ver-
tragsschluss  so  wesentlich  geiindert  haben,  dass  den  Parteien  die  Erfillung  des
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the  doctrine.  In  the  following  passage,  for  example,  Wharton  begins
with a  hard description  of the consensual  basis of the doctrine,  softens
this  by suggesting  that the changed  elements  need  not  have been  spe-
cifically intended  to lead to lapse of duties (this would collapse the doc-
trine of rebus sic stantibus into that of material  conditions)  but  need
have  been  merely  a  "strong  inducement"  to  the  adversely  affected
party, and  concludes  with a  soft standard  limiting rebus sic stantibus
to situations  of "unreasonable  sacrifice."
A  treaty  may be modified  or abrogated  under  the following  circumstances:
(7) When  a state of things  which was  the  basis of the treaty, and  one  of its
tacit  conditions,  no longer  exists.
In most of the old treaties were inserted the "clausula rebus sic stantibus",  by
which  the  treaty might  be construed  as  abrogated  when  material  circumstances
on  which  it rested changed.  To work this effect  it  is not essential  that  the facts
alleged  to  have changed  should  be material conditions.  It is enough  if they were
strong  inducements  to  the party asking  abrogation.
The maxim  "Conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus" is held  to apply
to all  cases in which  the reason  for a treaty has  failed, or  there has  been such  a
change of circumstances  as to  make  its performance  impracticable except  at an
unreasonable sacrifice.1"
Article 62 of the Vienna  Convention  of the Law of Treaties  restates
this dual  approach.
1. A fundamental change  of circumstances  which has occurred  with regard  to
those  existing  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of the  treaty  and  which  was  not
foreseen  by the parties,  may not be invoked as a  ground for terminating or with-
drawing  from  the treaty  unless:
(a)  the existence of those  circumstances constituted  an essential basis
of the consent of the  parties  to be  bound by  the  treaty and
(b)  the  effect  of the change  is  radically  to  transform  the  extent  of
obligations  still to be performed  under the treaty."'
Vertrages  bona  fide nicht mehr  zugemutet  werden  kann.
Id.; see also Haraszti, supra note  92,  at 47:
[T]here  is in  international  law a  rule of general  validity and  operating indepen-
dently of the agreement of the parties at treaty-making,  which in  the event of a
fundamental change of the circumstances  existing at the conclusion  of the treaty
authorizes either party  to terminate  the treaty  .. . .This,  in our opinion,  [the]
solely  acceptable  doctrine,  rejecting  all  fictions,  best  suits  conditions.
Id.
133.  2 F.  WHARTON,  A  DIGEsT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  OF THE UNITED  STATES,
§ 137a,  at  161  (1886).
134.  Vienna  Convention,  supra note  5,  at  art.  62.  Lissitzyn,  summarizing  state
practice  with  regard  to rebus sic stantibus, emphasized  these two  elements.  Lissitzyn,
supra note  94, at  911.  The  hard  consent  based  approach  is  cast  here  as  a  "general
community  policy."
In the several  instances of state action just reviewed,  which are illustrative rather
than exhaustive  of recent  practice, the governments  invoking  the changes of cir-
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Presenting  these  two  dimensions  of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine
side  by  side  is  shrewd,  for either  alone seems  incapable  of supporting
an escape  from consensual  obligations.  If the  true intent of the parties
is thought  the  exclusive  basis for  extinguishing  a  consensual  duty,  the
doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus seems  indistinguishable  from the  norm
pacta sunt servanda and  can  mean  no more  than  that  express  condi-
tions  must  be  met  and  termination  clauses  honored.  If, on  the  other
hand,  the  doctrine  is  to  look  beyond  what  the  parties  specifically  in-
tended, it seems  that the  doctrine  becomes a  substantive set of notions
about justice  or equity  unconnected  to the  treaty itself-disconnecting
cumstance  can  all  be regarded  as maintaining  in  effect  that  their actions  were
not inconsistent with the general community policy of protecting and effectuating
ascertained  or  reasonably  imputable  shared  expectations  of  parties  to interna-
tional agreements.  In short,  these instances support  the view  that the problem  of
the legal  effect of changes  of circumstances  on treaty  relationships  is  one  of de-
termining  the  parties'  shared  intentions,  expectations  and  objectives,  that  is,  a
problem  of interpretation.
Id. at  911  (footnote  omitted). The Harvard  Research  in International  Law  restates this
hard vision  of rebus sic stantibus, but describes  the two  alternate, soft approaches.  It
identifies,  moreover,  both  a  subjective  and an  objective  stand  to  the hard  approach.
The  idea common  to  most concepts  of the doctrine  is that  a  treaty  becomes  le-
gally void  in case there occurs  a change  in the state of facts which  existed at the
time  the parties  entered  into  the treaty.  It  is  generally  admitted,  however,  that
not  every change  in  those  facts  terminates  the  binding  force  of a  treaty  ....
Many writers  affirm  that  a  change  in  the state  of  facts  terminates  the  binding
force  of a  treaty only  when  the parties  entered  into the treaty  with  reference  to
this  state  of  facts  and  envisaged  its  continuance  unchanged  as  a  determining
factor  which  moved  them  to undertake  the obligations  stipulated.
Although  the doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus as conceived  . . . above  is  based
upon the idea of a  relation between  the binding force of the treaty and a continu-
ance of a state of facts  essentially  unchanged,  because  the parties  intended  that
the continuance of the state of facts should  be a  condition of the binding force of
the treaty, two variations of this concept may be distinguished.  In the one case,  a
tacit  clause rebus sic stantibus is  presumed  to  be contained  in every  treaty.  In
the  second  case,  no  such  tacit  clause  is  presumed  for  all  treaties;  but  if, upon
examination,  it  is clear that a particular treaty  was entered  into with reference  to
the existence of a particular  state of facts, the continued  existence  of which  was
envisaged  by the  parties  as a determining  factor  moving  them  to  undertake  the
obligations  stipulated,  then  the  rule of rebus sic stantibus applies  ....
There  is  a second  concept of the doctrine which adopts  as a test  for determin-
ing whether  a given change  in the state of facts shall render  the treaty  no longer
binding,  not the intention of the parties,  but a test  of quite a  different  nature.  It
is that  the changes  shall  be  "essential,"  fundamental  or "vital"  ....
A  third  concept  of  the  doctrine  of  rebus sic  stantibus makes  the  test  of
whether or not  a change  in  the state  of facts causes termination  of a  treaty, the
fact  that  fulfillment  of the  treaty  after  occurrence  of a  change  in  the state  of
facts would  be so injurious to one of the parties that such party has  a right under
the law  or right  of necessity  to  terminate  the  treaty.
Harvard  Research  in  International  Law,  The  Law  of Treaties, 29  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.
Supp.  657,  1097-98,  1100-01  (1935).
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consensual sources  from  their mooring  in  consent.
Despite  the  strong  motive  these  difficulties  provide  for  a  combined
rhetorical  presentation  of  the  rebus sic stantibus doctrine,  however,
getting the hard to  lie down  with the  soft  is  no  easier  here than  else-
where. Hard justifications for rebus sic stantibus  seem to deny the doc-
trine's  aspiration  to temper  or depart  from  treaty law-from  the con-
sensual source of the obligation which the doctrine will extinguish. Soft
arguments  for rebus sic stantibus,  however,  seem to  take the doctrine
out  of sources  law  altogether,  transforming  it into  a  doctrine  of sub-
stantive  international  law.
One rather  simple  strategy  used  to  manage  this  tension  articulates
each  approach to rebus sic stantibus in a way  which transforms  it into
its opposite.  For  example, intent remains  the basis  upon which  equita-
ble standards  can be applied if the parties  can  be assumed  to have  in-
tended  this  derogation  from  their intent.  In this  image,  the doctrine  is
not displaced by its hard justification  because  the intent  upon which  it
is thought to rely is given soft content. Similarly,  the soft rhetoric does
not displace the doctrine from the field of treaty law because  those con-
ditions  of justice  which  interrupt  the  consensual  obligation  such  as
"fundamental,"  "vital, .... necessary,"  and  so forth, are themselves  situ-
ated, perhaps by implication,  in  the intent of the states parties.  Equity
is  treated  to  mean  enforcement  of  the fundamental nature  of  the
treaty.
This  rather  elementary  rhetorical  strategy  takes  a  characteristic
form  in  argument  about  the  application  of the  doctrine  of rebus sic
stantibus. A legal dispute over  the doctrine  normally  arises  only  when
there is disagreement about whether  rebus sic stantibus  indeed  excuses
failure  to  perform  some  particular  treaty  obligation.  Typically,  one
state claims to  be  excused  from its obligations  over the objection  of a
state,  a  court  or a  commentator.  Each  position  advanced  in  such  an
argument  is  typically  associated  with  one or  the  other strands  of  the
rebus sic stantibus doctrine. For example,  the  state claiming to be  ex-
cused  might  argue that rebus sic stantibus leaves  it able  to determine
when circumstances  have changed  sufficiently  to have been outside the
contemplation  of its consent.  This subjectivist position seems associated
with the hard strand of the rebus sic stantibus  doctrine: that its justifi-
cation  lies  in  its  fulfillment  of  consent.  Those  opposing  release  from
duty might respond by interpreting  rebus sic stantibus so as to impose
an external  standard  on the subjective consent  of the state seeking  re-
lease. This response  would rely  upon  the soft strand of rebus sic stan-
tibus: that its justification  lies outside consent.  As  the debate develops,
each  side might seek to augment its  position  by reference  to the alter-
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native  rhetorical  strand.  The  trick,  for  advocates  as  for  tribunals  or
commentators  who  seek  to sort  out these  claims,  is  to blend  these ele-
ments  into  an  argument  which  supports  either  release  from  or  fulfill-
ment  of the  initial  obligation.
Various  approaches  to this problem  are  illustrated  by  the arguments
made  in  regard  to  the  1941  United  States  suspension  of its participa-
tion  in  the  International  Load  Line  Convention  regulating  certain  as-
pects  of maritime  shipping.135  Claiming  that  the  Convention  had  pre-
sumed  a  situation  of peaceful  commerce,  President  Roosevelt,  relying
on  an opinion  by Acting Attorney General  Francis  Biddle, declared  the
Convention  "suspended  and inoperative."  The President's  proclamation
suggests  that  the rebus sic stantibus doctrine  gives  the  United  States
the  "right"  unilaterally  to suspend  the  Convention.
WHEREAS  the  conditions  envisaged  by  the  Convention  have  been,  for  the
time being,  almost  wholly  destroyed,  and the  partial  and  imperfect  enforcement
of the Convention  can operate  only  to prejudice  the victims of aggression,  whom
it  is the  avowed  purpose  of the United  States  of America  to  aid; and
WHEREAS  it  is  an implicit condition  to  the binding effect  of the Convention
that  those  conditions  envisaged  by  it  should  continue  without  such  material
change  as has  in  fact  occurred;  and
WHEREAS  under approved  principles  of international  law  it has  become,  by
reason of such changed  conditions, the  right of the United  States of America  to
declare  the Convention  suspended  and  inoperative:
NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  President  of  the  United
States of America,  exercising  on behalf of the United States  of America  an  un-
questioned right and privilege  under approved principles  of international  law,  do
proclaim  and  declare  the  aforesaid  International  Load  Line  Convention  sus-
pended  and inoperative  in the ports and waters  of the United States of America,
and in so  far as the  United  States  of America  is  concerned,  for  the duration  of
the present  emergency.136
The position that rebus sic stantibus  gives  states a unilateral right of
revocation  is supported  by  some  international  law  commentators.  Lis-
sitzyn's commentary  on  the  draft articles  of the Vienna  Convention  is
exemplary:
Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  requirement  in  all  cases  that  nonperformance  be
preceded  or accompanied  by a  formal notice  to  the other  parties, although  con-
cern for orderliness,  prudence and courtesy  make the giving of such notice gener-
ally desirable.  If the  treaty  operates  as  municipal  law,  a  formal  enactment  or
proclamation  may be  necessary.
The exercise of the right to cease or limit performance  does  not depend  on the
135.  The  text  of the Convention  appears at 47  Stat. 2228  (1933).
136.  Proclamation  No.  2500,  Aug.  9,  1941,  6  Fed.  Reg.  3,999  (1941);  revoked  as
of Jan.  1, 1946  by Proclamation  No. 2675,  Dec. 21,  1945,  10  Fed.  Reg.  15,365  (1945).
[VOL.  2:1SOURCES OF INT'L LAW
specific  consent of  the other party or  upon a third-party  decision.1 7
The opposing  view, that unilateral suspension is not compatible with
rebus sic stantibus, is advocated  by other commentators-generally  by
those  who  emphasize  that  a  purely  consensual  approach  to  rebus sic
stantibus would  either  collapse the doctrine  into treaty  law  or lead  to
an unqualified  ability to  avoid treaty  obligations.  Hyde's  1945  treatise
is exemplary: "It requires  . . . something more than the sheer power of
a  contracting  State  to  disregard  with  impunity  the  terms  of  a  valid
treaty, in order  to establish  a  legal  right  to do so." ' ' 3
Of course, neither of these two  positions can be fully supported using
only  a  hard  or  a  soft  rhetoric.  Although  unilateral  suspension  seems
associated  with  a  hard  consensual  rhetoric,  if the  United  States  were
allowed  unilaterally  to suspend its treaty obligations,  the subjective  in-
tent of the other signatories  would seem threatened. Moreover,  if a uni-
lateral  capacity to  suspend  were  within  their contemplation,  it would
seem to  limit America's  ability  to  bind itself  in  such a  way  that  per-
formance could  not be suspended  in this way. The unilateral suspension
position seems  to demand  a  soft as  well  as  a  hard defense.
Similarly, although the position that the United States should not be
permitted unilaterally  to suspend the Convention seems associated with
some  extra-consensual  or  systemic  justification,  it also  seems  that  if
America  is unable  to determine  the limits  of its own  obligations  when
circumstances  change,  an important  systemic  interest in  sovereign  au-
tonomy  would  be threatened.  Moreover,  such  an  extra-consensual  ap-
proach  threatens  the norm of pacta sunt servanda to which  rebus sic
stantibus is  merely an  exception.  Consequently,  opposition  to  the uni-
lateral  suspension  position  seems  to demand  a  hard  as  well  as  a  soft
rhetoric.
In  light  of these  rhetorical  demands,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the
President's  declaration  cited  the  likelihood  of "prejudice"  to the  "vic-
tims of aggression, whom  it is the avowed purpose of the United States
of America  to  aid." 13 9  Since  both  rhetorical  styles  seem  compatible
with and indeed  demanded by both positions, the rhetorical  challenge is
137.  Lissitzyn,  supra note  94; at 911-12.
138.  2 C. HYDE,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  1523 (2d  rev.  ed.  1945). The Swiss  Federal
Court  followed  this  approach  in  its  1923  decision,  In  re  Lepeschkin,  49(1)  Ent-
scheidungen  des Schweizerischen  Bundesgerichtes  188,  194-97  (1923),  1951  JOURNAL
DU  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  (Clunet)  1135,  1137-38  (1924),  2  ANN.  DIG.  323,  334-35
(1923-24).
139.  Similarly, the systemic interest  invoked  by the Swiss Federal  Court as it lim-
ited the unilateral right to suspend is  one of notice "through  the usual international law
channels."  See In  re Lepeschkin,  2  ANN.  DIG.  323,  325  (1923-24).
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to express  them in such  a way  as to seem  compatible  with  one another
and  with  the  position  being  advocated.  Both  those  opposing  and  those
supporting  Roosevelt's  proclamation  did  this quite  elegantly  by elabo-
rating  a  form of each  strand which  embraced  the  other.
The President's assertion of a unilateral right to suspend the Conven-
tion was  defended  by  Acting Attorney  General  Francis  Biddle.1"  Bid-
dle manages  the rhetorical  difficulties  generated  by  his position  in  two
moves.  First, he treats the unilateral suspension  right as  a mere matter
of "procedure"  which reflects a preexisting lapse in the obligation. As a
procedural  matter, unilateral suspension  does not  seem  to threaten  the
idea  of international  obligation.  Instead  it  is  a  mere expression  of the
(absent)  obligation.
As to the procedure to be adopted  by the Government that relies  on the princi-
ple of rebus sic stantibus,  it may well be that ordinarily the procedure  would call
for the government  to  inform  the other parties  to  the  treaty with  respect  to the
matter and  request  agreement  for  termination  or  suspension  of the  treaty. The
matter of procedure,  however, does  not affect  the right  of termination  or suspen-
sion.  . . . The fundamental character of the change in conditions underlying the
treaty  . . . leaves  the Government  of the  United States  entirely  free  to  declare
the  treaty  inoperative  or  to  suspend  it  for  the  duration  of  the  present
emergency. " '
Biddle then  turns  to  the  obligation  itself. As  indicated  in  this  short
passage  from  his  argument,  that  obligation  depends  upon  the  charac-
terization  of the  changes  which  have  occurred  as  "fundamental"  in
some sense. Biddle's second  move  is  to a soft  rhetoric  of "emergencies"
and  "fundamentality."  This  move allows  Biddle  to sidestep  the sugges-
tion that a unilateral suspension  would contravene the obligation's basis
in the consent  of other states by grounding  both  the obligation and  the
suspension  in  a  set of general  systemic  considerations.  The  problem  is
that  a  soft  rhetoric  threatens  either  America's  unilateral  right  or  the
treaty context of the claim for rebus sic stantibus.  Biddle avoids  this by
elaborating  the  extra-consensual  conditions  which  govern  the  proce-
dural  right to suspend  in  terms  of the intention  of the  parties.  Funda-
mental,  to  Biddle,  means  fundamental  to the  treaty. Rebus sic stan-
tibus is triggered  when there has been  "essential"  change in  the "basic
conditions"  upon  which  the treaty "was  founded."
It  is  a  well-established  principle  of international  law, rebus sic stantibus, that a
treaty ceases to be binding  when the basic conditions  upon which  it was  founded
have essentially changed.  Suspension  of the convention  in such  circumstances  is
the unquestioned  right  of a state adversely  affected  by such  essential  change.
140.  40  Op.  Att'y Gen'l  119  (1941).
141.  Id. at  123.
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It  is sometimes said  that the change  which brings  the principle into operation
must  be essential or  fundamental.  But whether or  not this  is an integral  part  of
the principle itself, there  can  be no doubt that  the changed  conditions affecting
the  Load Line  Convention  are most essential  and  most fundamental.""
Biddle  argues  that  obligations  lapse  with  change  in  the  "assump-
tions" upon which the treaty was based.  He does not suggest that these
assumptions  are  within the  unilateral  authority  of one  party  to  inter-
pret. He treats their lapse as a matter of fact which remains only to be
procedurally  registered.
It is clear  from its general  nature that  the convention was a peacetime  agree-
ment. As stated  in  its preamble the contracting  governments entered  into it "to
promote safety  of life and property at sea by establishing  in common agreement
uniform principles  and rules with  regard to  the limits to which  ships on interna-
tional voyages  may be loaded  . . . ."  This general  purpose,  as the  terms of the
convention demonstrate, was to  be achieved by limiting  international competition
in the loading  of cargo vessels.  That peacetime commerce  and voyages  were as-
sumed as  the  basis of  the convention  is also demonstrated  by  the  nature of its
detailed  provisions  and  regulations.  A  perusal  of  them  leaves  no  doubt  that
peacetime commerce was a  basic assumption of the treaty. The present situation
with  respect  to shipping  is a  wholly  different  one.  Conditions  essential  to  the
operation of the convention, and assumed  as a basis for it, are in almost complete
abeyance. . . .International shipping  is not being carried  on under normal  con-
ditions  subject  to  agreements  arrived  at for  the  purpose  of regulating  interna-
tional voyages freely  undertaken  and completed.  On the contrary, the actual de-
struction  of vessels  engaged  in  such  commerce,  however  loaded,  is  one  of the
principal means  by which  the war is  now being conducted  among various of the
contracting parties.  . . .It is well known that the international sea lanes are the
rendezvous  for  varied  instrumentalities  of  war  set  loose  for  the destruction  of
shipping.  It is equally well known that a serious shortage exists in shipping in the
case of numerous,  if not all, signatories  to the convention,  including those whose
defense  the Congress  has  declared  essential  to the  defense of the  United States
. . . .In short the implicit assumption  of normal  peacetime international trade,
which  is at the foundation  of the  Load  Line Convention,  no  longer  exists.
Under  these  circumstances  there  is no doubt in  my mind  that the convention
has  ceased  to  be binding  upon  the United States.'
4
Biddle  thus  develops  his argument  for  the American  suspension  of
the Convention  in  two  steps.  He  begins  with  a  hard  assertion  of the
American  right, but casts  it as a  matter of procedure,  dependent  upon
the lapse of an acknowledged international  obligation.  He then grounds
this lapse  in general  notions  about what  is  "fundamental"  to a  treaty,
understood  to have been  in  the contemplation  of the Convention  signa-
tories.  His  unilateral  interpretation  of  these systemic  notions,  even  of
142.  Id. at 121-23.
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the  consent  of other  signatories,  is  treated  as  a  matter  of fact  rather
than of unilateral assertion.  Biddle's argument  is interesting because  he
blends  hard and soft rhetorics  by allowing  each to deny itself. The uni-
lateral  right  to terminate  is  a  procedural  dependent  of the  obligation
and  the  general  obligation  is  an  expression  of collective  intent  which
can  be unilaterally  noticed.
Interestingly,  commentators  attacking  the  American  position
deployed  similar  rhetorical  strategies.  Professor  Briggs  developed  a
strong  opposition to  Roosevelt  and Biddle  in  a  commentary  which  ap-
peared  in  the  American  Journal  of  International  Law  in  1942.144
Briggs  identifies  a  contradiction  within  Biddle's  argument  between  his
reliance  upon  consent and  obligation.  To  the extent  Biddle  relies upon
arguments  about  the  general  nature of the  treaty,  the  rebus sic stan-
tibus doctrine which  Biddle  invokes should  be unnecessary.  To  the  ex-
tent Biddle  relies upon  the consent  of treaty  signatories,  the  unilateral
aspect  of his argument  seems undercut.
The necessity  for suspending a  convention which  has assertedly  already ceased
to be  binding through  the operation of an alleged  principle of international  law is
not  clear  to the writer.  Nor  is  it clear  why  circumstances of admittedly  general
application  should  lead  to  the  suspension  of  the  treaty  only  by  the  United
States.
1 "
Briggs  argues  that the doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus does  not  con-
template  unilateral  suspension  of  treaty  obligations,  citing  Professor
Chesney Hill  and  the Harvard  Research  Draft on the  Law of Treaties,
itself also  cited  for  the opposite  proposition  by  Biddle.
Indeed, Mr.  Biddle, if interested in one of the most able and comprehensive anal-
yses  of state  practice  on  the subject,  might  well  have  consulted  Chesney  Hill's
The Doctrine of "Rebus Sic Stantibus" in International  Law, which  states:
Despite  any  theoretical  objections  to  the  contrary,  it  remains  true
that  customary  international  law  lays down  the  rule that  a  party  who
seeks  release  from  a  treaty on the ground  of a  change of circumstances
has  no  right  to  terminate  the treaty  unilaterally,  and  that  recognition
that the doctrine  is  applicable must  be obtained either  from the parties
to the  treaty  or from  some competent  international  authority.4
Briggs  criticizes  Biddle's  suggestion  that  the  United  States  has  an
absolute  right  to  control  the  ambit  of its  own  obligations,  a  position
which  seems  to  Briggs  to  be  incompatible  with  the  possibility  of sys-
temic obligation.
144.  Briggs,  The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36  Am.  J.  INT'L
L.  89  (1942).
145.  Id. at  93.
146.  Id. at 94.
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This surprising,  and, indeed,  reckless and  unnecessary, espousal  by the United
States of a  much  questioned  doctrine  by which  Germany,  Italy, Japan,  and So-
viet Russia  might equally  well justify the suspension,  termination,  or even  viola-
tion,  of inconvenient treaties  renders  desirable  an  examination of the  conditions
and  legal  principles  set forth  by the Attorney  General  in his  opinion.47
Briggs returns to this theme later  in  his commentary,  criticizing the
unilateral  approach  for  reading any  systemic element  out of the rebus
sic stantibus doctrine.  His opposition  to the  unilateral  position  blends
hard and soft considerations.  To a certain  extent,  he fears that reliance
upon  unilateral  action  by  the  United  States  will  devour  the systemic
elements  of justice  encapsuled  in  the  idea  of "extraordinary  circum-
stances."  He also recognizes  that the unilateral approach,  by allowing a
single state to impose its conception of "necessity"  upon its treaty part-
ners, might derogate from the ability of other states freely to enter into
treaties. His critique of unilateralism,  then,  is not  merely a  critique of
the hard institutionalization of consent which it seems to represent. It is
simultaneously a  suggestion  that subjective  notions of necessity are in-
compatible with the consensual  rights of the community. Unilateralism
threatens  consent  as well  as justice.
The Attorney  General  concedes  that  "ordinarily"  a state which  relies on  the
principle  of rebus sic stantibus should  "request  agreement"  of the other parties
for termination  or suspension  of  a treaty, but believes  this a  mere matter of pro-
cedure which does  not affect  the right of termination.  This arbitrary  rejection of
one of the essential  elements  of the concept  of rebus sic stantibus suggests  that
the suspension of the International  Load Lines  Convention is not so much based
on the principle of rebus sic stantibus as upon some vague and slippery doctrine
of state necessity. One is reminded of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's assertion
that certain rules of Hague  Convention  XIII,  which  he admitted  are declaratory
of international  law  in  "ordinary"  circumstances,  cease  to  be  binding  in  situa-
tions  "extraordinary  in  character."  One recalls  also  the statement  of Professor
Josef  L.  Kunz  that  there  are  "the  politicians-often,  consciously  or  uncon-
sciously,  also among men  who  want  to  be considered  as scholars-who  have al-
ways  so conveniently  two  international  laws  . . . one  for one's  own nation  and
those  we  like,  the other against  the nations  we  do  not like.""14
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This double strategy  is a difficult one to sustain.  In  arguing that uni-
lateral suspension  renders the obligation system hostage  to the whim of
a  single  state,  Briggs  threatens  his  image  of  the rebus sic stantibus
doctrine, for it is precisely  to protect the system of obligations  that Bid-
dle interprets  rebus sic stantibus in terms  of the "necessary"  and "fun-
damental."  To the extent Briggs  relies  upon soft rhetoric,  he threatens
to reduce his image  of rebus sic stantibus  doctrine  into  either  Biddle's
147.  Id. at 90.
148.  Id. at 94-95  (footnotes  omitted).
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necessity approach  or to expand  it into  a  rule of substantive  public in-
ternational  law.  Briggs  thus  faces  exactly  the  inverse  of the  contradic-
tion  which  he  identifies  in  Biddle's  argument.
To  reduce this threat,  Briggs introduces  consensual  elements into  his
argument.  Indeed,  his soft approach seems to imply nothing  beyond the
consent  of the  parties themselves.  His text  investigates at  great length
the  extent  to which the parties  intended  that the  United  States  would
be  free of its obligations  should  war  arise.
Moreover,  the evidence presented  by the Attorney  General fails to establish  that
the  parties  to  the convention-the  purpose  of which  was  to  establish  minimum
safety  regulations-intended  that the occurrence  of war  should  release  the par-
ties from the obligations assumed. The fact that safety of life and property at sea
is  noticeably  less evident  in time of war  than in time of peace proves  neither  the
desirability of relaxing those  safety regulations  which continue  to be possible nor
that  the  parties  to the  convention  in question  so  intended. 4"
His  soft  rhetoric  about  the  rebus  sic  stantibus  doctrine  is  not
grounded  in  what  seems  to  have  been  fundamental  to  the  treaty,  but
rather  in  what  the  parties seem  actually  to  have contemplated.
Nevertheless,  the  few  states  which  have  invoked  [the  rebus  sic stantibus doc-
trine]  have been in agreement  on one point:  the doctrine has  been "clearly  based
juridically  upon  the intention  of the  parties  at the  time of the conclusion  of the
treaty."
To  what  extent  was  a  unilateral  right  to  terminate  the  International  Load
Lines  Convention  because  of "changed  conditions"  envisaged  by  the  parties  to
that  treaty?'" 0
Two  difficulties  arise  from  Briggs's  development  of  soft  rhetoric.
First,  he  is  confronted  with  the  same  choice  between  subjective  and
objective  notions  of intent  which  he criticizes  Biddle  for failing  to re-
solve.151 Second,  this  consensual  interpretation  of systemic  obligation
149.  Id. at 93.
150.  Id. at 90  (footnote omitted). This  is the  approach  used  by Brierly  in his short
treatise  on  international  law.
Neither  a  treaty  in international  law  nor  a  contract  in  English  law  is dissolved
merely by a change  in circumstances;  they are only  dissolved if a  term can  fairly
be read  into them providing  that in the event which  has happened  they are to be
dissolved.  Both  doctrines attempt  not to  defeat  but  to fulfil  the  intention  . . . of
the  parties.
J.  BRIERLY,  supra  note  1, at 262.
151.  Both  views are  expressed  by commentators  who  follow  Briggs's interpretation
of justice  in terms  of intent.  Hyde  expresses  these  two  prongs as  follows:
If changed  conditions  ever  serve in  principle  to confer  upon  a contracting State
the  right to  free itself from  obligations  laid down  in a  treaty,  it  is because  those
conditions  mark  the existence  of  a  new  order  of  things  which  in  a  broad  sense
were not contemplated  by the parties at the time of the conclusion  of their agree-
ment and  which  render  highly  unreasonable  a  demand  for  performance  . ...
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could  reduce  the doctrine  of rebus sic stantibus to  that of pacta sunt
servanda, negating  the soft  perspective  it was designed  to rescue.
Briggs does not resolve this difficulty.  Perhaps  because his argument,
unlike that of Biddle,  is  less  a defense  of some  action  than  a critique,
he never reintegrates  his reliance  upon  the  treaty  language into  a soft
rhetoric of justice. Like Biddle, Briggs could  have utilized a distinction
between  procedure  and  substance,  or  fact  and  law  to do  so,  perhaps
arguing that the treaty language was merely one procedural  manifesta-
tion of the systemic requirements of obligation.  Instead, he edges quite
close to the abyss  of an absolute  hard rhetoric-ironically  exactly  the
abyss  he  felt  the  right  to  unilateral  suspension  would  open  up.  As
Briggs  sees it, there seem no circumstances  except those enumerated  by
the parties  and  hence  covered  by other  release  doctrines  which  could
safely  trigger the rebus sic stantibus  doctrine  under  this  approach.
In  1930 maritime experts representing thirty states drafted and signed at London
the  International  Load  Lines  Convention  in  order,  as  the preamble  states,  "to
promote safety  of life and  property at sea by establishing  in common agreement
uniform principles and rules with  regard  to the limits to  which ships on interna-
tional voyages  may be loaded."  The treaty came into force between fifteen of the
signatories, including the  United States,  on January  1, 1933,  and by September
1, 1935,  had been  ratified  or acceded  to  by  36  "governments."  The  convention
contains  no provision  permitting its suspension  in  time of war  by either belliger-
ents or neutrals, but Article  25 stipulates that the convention may be denounced
at any time after it has been in force for five years, such denunciation not to take
effect  until  twelve months  after  it has been  received.  Article  20 states, in  part,
that "modifications  of this Convention which  may be deemed  useful or necessary
improvements  may  at  any  time  be  proposed  by  any  Contracting  Government
. . . and  if any  such modifications  are  accepted  by  all  the Contracting Govern-
ments  . this  Convention  shall  be modified  accordingly."  It  is  clear  that  no
provision of the treaty authorizes  the action taken  by the United  States Govern-
ment, which  was neither  a  denunciation subject  to one  year's  notice,  nor a  pro-
posed  modification  in the line of improvement,  subject to  unanimous acceptance,
That  which  causes  a demand  for  performance  to  be  unreasonable,  and  which,
conversely, clothes  a party with  freedom  to rid  itself of the obligation  to perform
is  the coming  into  being  of a  new condition  of affairs  which  was  not  only  not
brought to the attention of the parties  when they concluded  their agreement, but
also one which,  if it had then been  brought  to their attention,  would  have neces-
sarily produced common  acknowledgement  that  the agreement  would be inappli-
cable, and  hence  permit a  party  to  regard  it as  no  longer  binding  in  case  that
condition or  situation should  subsequently  arise.
2 C.  HYDE,  supra note  138, at  1524-27.  Chesney  Hill  comments  similarly:
A change  of circumstances  becomes  relevant  to the  obligatory force of a  treaty
only in so far as it is related  to the wills of the parties to the treaty at the time of
the conclusion  of the treaty. It is not an objective  rule of international  law which
is imposed upon the parties, but is a rule for carrying the intention of the parties
into  effect.
C.  HILL,  supra note  129,  at 77.
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but was a unilateral  declaration  that the treaty was immediately  "suspended  and
inoperative"  in  so far  as the  United States is concerned.1
2
Although quite different  in  their conclusions,  Briggs and  Biddle have
quite similar  rhetorical  styles.  Each  blends  consensual  and  extra-con-
sensual  considerations  by interpreting  each  to embrace  its opposite.  In
this,  their  arguments  about  rebus sic  stantibus are  similar  to  argu-
ments  about  unilateral  declarations.  Although  these  two  doctrines  of
treaty law  (one about beginning  and  the other about terminating  a  con-
sensual  obligation)  present these  rhetorics  in different  ways, they  share
a  set of rhetorical  strategies  for  mixing  the  hard with  the  soft. Taken
together,  these two doctrines introduce a similar blend of hard and  soft
to treaty doctrine as a whole. Although  both are doctrines  about treaty
law  a seemingly consensual  source of international  law, treaties,  unilat-
eral declaration  doctrine, because it concerns  the creation of consensual
obligations,  seems  to  concern  the binding  nature  of consent  most  di-
rectly.  Rebus sic stantibus, on  the other  hand,  seems to  be about  the
soft  conditions  under  which  consent-based  obligations  fall.  Taken  to-
gether  the  rule  (unilateral  declaration)  and  the  exception  (rebus sic
stantibus) allow treaty  law itself to embrace  the tension  between  hard
and  soft  rhetoric.  Although  these  two  doctrines  were  thus  defined  by
this initial  differentiation,  each in turn  embraced and  managed the ten-
sion within itself. As a whole we see within treaty law  a rhetorical  pat-
tern  of proliferating  differentiation  and  recombination  managing  what
might  otherwise  seem  a tense  relationship  between  an  absolute  sover-
eign  autonomy to  consent  and  a systemic  pattern  of legal  obligation.
C.  THE  CASE  OF  CUSTOM
Although both  the form and  the  authoritative  basis  for international
customary  law are  generally  considered  to be  less  consensual  than  the
form and basis for treaty law, the law of custom, like treaty law,  blends
consensual  and  non-consensual  rhetorics.  The  strategies  used  to  blend
these  elements  in  argument  about  custom  are similar  to  those  which
animated  argument  about  doctrines  of treaty  law.  Interestingly,  how-
ever,  arguments  about  custom  arrange  their  reliance  upon  hard  and
soft  rhetorics  differently  than  treaty  law  argument.  Indeed,  custom
seems  in  many  ways  the  rhetorical  mirror image  of treaty  law.
That the  law  of custom,  like treaty law,  should contain  both consen-
sual  and  non-consensual  doctrines  and  rhetorical  tendencies  is  unsur-
prising.  As  a  general  matter, international  custom  is  seen  both  as  an
152.  Briggs, supra  note  144,  at  91  (footnotes omitted).
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ersatz treaty,  raising the same  issues about  consent which  were  raised
by treaty  law,  and  as  an expression of the requirements  and equity  of
the interstate system.153 Just  as sovereign  consent was  predominant in
the  theory  and  doctrine  of treaty  law,  in  custom  the  non-consensual
element  is  generally  thought  to  predominate.1  Although  custom  is
generally  thought  to be  found  in repeated  state  behavior,  as  a  formal
matter  custom  might  be written  and  indeed  is  often  thought  to  have
been  expressed  in the form of a  multilateral  treaty. As  we  saw  in  the
case  of  unilateral  declarations,  moreover,  consensual  rhetoric  can
ground oral statements  and behavioral  practices  as  well as written  ex-
pressions  of sovereign  will.
As  was true of treaty  law,  some  doctrines  about custom  seem  hard
and others soft.  In particular, it seems that doctrines about the creation
of custom seem  to be  about  the conditions  of justice  or the nature  of
the system of international law,  while doctrines about the limits of cus-
tom seem  to be about the failure of consent  by the state to be  bound.
This doctrinal arrangement-exactly  the inverse of doctrines about cre-
ating  and  terminating  an  obligation  of  treaty  law-seems  to  follow
from  custom's  predominantly  non-consensual  nature.  For  example,
Waldock  begins his elaboration  of the doctrines of custom  formation in
a  way which  reflects  his soft view  of custom,  finding  it:
clear that, if a custom becomes established  as a general  rule of international law,
it  binds all  States  which  have  not  opposed  it,  whether  or  not  they  themselves
played  an active part in its formation. This means  that in order  to invoke a cus-
tom against a State it is  not necessary  to show specifically  the acceptance  of the
custom as  law  by  that State;  its acceptance  of the custom  will  be  presumed  so
that it will  be bound unless it can adduce evidence of its actual opposition  to the
practice in  question. The Court  in applying  a  general  custom may  well  refer to
the practice, if any, of the parties to the litigation  in regard to  the custom;  but it
has  never yet treated  evidence  of their acceptance of the  practice as a  sine qua
non  of applying  the custom to  them."'
Initially it seems that custom is  formed in a way which might render
state consent irrelevant-just  as treaty law  initially seemed oblivious  to
the systemic  implications  of its  consensually  generated  rules.  But  the
softness  of this  doctrine  is  tempered  in  several  ways.  It seems  that  a
153.  See supra notes 40-45  and  accompanying  text.
154.  Waldock's  summary  of these  two  dimensions of custom  is exemplary:
The view  of most  international  lawyers  is  that customary  law is  not  a  form  of
tacit treaty  but an independent  form of law;  and that, when a custom satisfying
the definition in Article 38 is established,  it constitutes a  general  rule of interna-
tional  law  which,  subject  to  one  reservation,  applies  to every  State.
Waldock,  supra note  1, at 49.
155.  Id. at 50  (footnote  omitted).
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customary  rule cannot form  against  the  opposition  of a  sovereign  and
will  lapse  when  confronted  with  a  later  consensually  adopted  doc-
trine-just  as  a  treaty  could  not  form  against  the  opposition  of some
systemic  norm  of jus cogens and  would  lapse  when  confronted  with
either  a  later  "peremptory  norm"  or  a  "fundamental"  change  of cir-
cumstances.  Waldock's  formulation  suggests  that  sovereign  consent  to
systemic  rules  is presumed,  not irrelevant. He extends this approach  in
developing  a  reservation  to  his  general  statement  about  custom
formation:
The reservation  concerns  the case  of a  State which,  while the  custom is in pro-
cess  of formation,  unambiguously  and  persistently  registers  its objection  to  the
recognition  of the practice  as law  . . . . [t]he  rule  so created  will  not  bind  the
objectors;  in other  words,  . . . in  international law there  is no majority rule  even
with  respect  to  the  formation  of customary  law.""'
Moreover,  it seems that although custom  is discovered  in practice,  that
practice  must  be  accompanied-even  motivated-by  a  sovereign  ac-
knowledgement  that the practice is norm-generating  or compliant. This
requirement  of  opinio juris is  reminiscent  of  the  requirement  that
treaty law, although  the expression of sovereign will,  be expressed in  an
appropriate,  communally  recognized  form.
At  the level  of doctrinal  structure,  custom and  treaty  law  differenti-
ate themselves  from one another  by reversing  the arrangement  of their
internal  components.  Custom  seems  softer  than  treaty  because  doc-
trines about  getting into  custom are  softer  - tempered  by  consent -
while  doctrines  about  initiating  treaty  obligations  are  harder  - tem-
pered  by systemic considerations.  Treaty seems harder than custom  be-
cause  it  confines  systemic  considerations  to  the  exceptional  doctrines
about  lapse  - tempered  by  consensual  implication  - while  custom
confines consensual  considerations  to exceptional  doctrines  about lapse
- tempered  by jus cogens.
Since custom doctrine  mixes consensual  and extra-consensual  consid-
erations,  argument  about  the  application  of these  doctrines  is  rhetori-
cally  quite  similar  to  argument  about  treaty  law  doctrine,  if  often
somewhat  inverted.  In  the  Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries  Case,  the
United  Kingdom  objected  to  the  method  by  which  Norway  delimited
its  territorial waters,  claiming  that Norway  thereby  violated  a  custom-
ary norm  of international  law.5 7  Norway responded  that such  a  norm
did not exist,  or, that if it did,  it did not apply to the Norwegian  coast.
156.  Id. at  49-50.
157.  Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries Case,  (U.K.  v.  Nor.)  1951  I.C.J.  116 (Judgment
of Dec.  18).
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Norway  defended  this  position  in  part  by  opposing  the  claim  that  a
general  norm  had  been  created,  relying  on  a  somewhat  more  consen-
sual  vision of customary  creation  than  had  the United  Kingdom.  Nor-
way claimed, moreover,  never to have consented to the general  rule and
to  have  consistently  and  successfully  opposed  its  application  to  the
rocky  and deeply  indented  Norwegian  coastline.  Norway  also claimed
that  the combination  of Norwegian  practice  and  the  acquiescence  of
other  sovereigns,  including  the United  Kingdom,  created  an  opposing
and  permissive  customary  norm  which  could  be  invoked  against  the
United Kingdom. Sometimes  they cast this opposing norm as an excep-
tion  for  such  peculiar  coastlines  and  sometimes  they  styled  it a  "his-
toric title." The United Kingdom opposed this  norm of custom  much as
Norway  had opposed  theirs.
Thus,  like  many custom  cases,  the Fisheries opinion  contains argu-
ments about  the creation  and limitation  of two  different  and  opposing
customary  norms.  Each  party  argued  for  and  against a  norm  of cus-
tom-and  did  so by  weaving  hard and soft  rhetorics  together  in  ways
familiar from argument about unilateral declarations or rebus sic stan-
tibus. As a result, what looks like a limit to one customary norm  is  also
the creation  of another  and  the opinion  must decide  between  two  cus-
tomary  norms,  each  both  justified  and  opposed  in  hard  and  soft
rhetorics.
The  Court  ruled  that  the  Norwegian  delimitation  method  did  not
contravene  international  law.158 In  reaching  this conclusion,  the Court
found both  that  the proposed  United  Kingdom  norm  was  not  binding
on Norway  and that the proposed  Norwegian  scheme  was  binding  on
the United  Kingdom. Initially, the Court supported the first proposition
with  consensual  and  the  second  with  non-consensual  rhetoric.  The
Court  rejected  the  United  Kingdom's  claim  that a  general  customary
norm bound Norway  in the  following  terms:
The claim of the United  Kingdom Government  is founded on  what  it regards
as the general  international  law applicable  to the delimitation  of the Norwegian
fisheries  zone
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In these circumstances  the Court deems  it necessary  to point out that although
the ten-mile rule  has  been  adopted  by  certain States  both  in  their  national  law
and  in  their  treaties  and  conventions,  and  although  certain  arbitral  decisions
have  applied  it as  between  these  States,  other States  have  adopted  a  different
limit. Consequently,  the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general
rule of international  law.
In any event the ten-mile rule would  appear to be inapplicable as against  Nor-
158.  Id. at  143.
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way inasmuch  as she  has always  opposed  any attempt  to apply  it to the Norwe-
gian coast.
The Court, having  thus established  the existence and  the constituent  elements
of the  Norwegian system  of delimitation,  further  finds that this system was  con-
sistently  applied by  Norwegian  authorities  and that it encountered  no opposition
on the  part  of other States.
The Court considers that too much  importance need not be attached  to the few
uncertainties  or  contradictions,  real  or  apparent,  which  the  United  Kingdom
Government claims  to have discovered  in Norwegian  practice. They  may be eas-
ily understood  in the light of the variety  of the  facts and conditions  prevailing  in
the long period  which has elapsed since  1812, and are not such  as to modify  the
conclusions  reached  by  the Court.
In the light  of these  considerations,  and  in the absence  of convincing  evidence
to  the contrary,  the  Court  is  bound  to hold  that  the  Norwegian  authorities  ap-
plied their system  of delimitation  consistently and uninterruptedly from  1869  un-
til the  time when  the  dispute  arose.'
On  first  reading,  it  seems  that  the Court  rejects  application  of  the
United  Kingdom  norm  to Norway  primarily  because  Norway  has  not
consented.  A  second  reading  complicates  the  image.  We  know  that
Norway  has  not  consented-has  opposed  the  United  Kingdom
norm-because  Norway has succeeded  in creating  a "system  of delimi-
tation"  which  has  been  "consistently"  applied  without  "opposi-
tion"-has, in other words,  generated  what might be  thought  of as  an
opposing  norm  of  customary  law  binding  upon  the  United  Kingdom
despite its apparent unwillingness  to comply. So long as both norms  (or
both the  United  Kingdom's norm and its exception)  are expressed  con-
sensually,  they  coexist  uneasily.  It  seems  difficult  to  explain  why  the
Court  should  conclude  that  "too  much  importance  need  not  be  at-
tached"  to "uncertainties  or  contradictions"  in  the Norwegian  practice
while finding the fact that "other  States have adopted a different limit"
dispositive  in  concluding  that the ten-mile  rule "has  not  acquired  the
authority  of a  general  rule  of international  law."
The Court  avoids  a direct clash  between  two consensually  supported
norms  by  moving  to  a  softer  defense  of  the  Norwegian  sys-
tem-emphasizing  practice  rather  than  opinio juris and  stressing  the
interests  of local  fishermen  who  have  traditionally  been  economically
dependent  upon fish caught in  the disputed  regions.  The Court  defends
the  Norwegian  system  in  the following  terms:
These  ancient  concessions  tend  to  confirm  the  Norwegian  Government's  con-
tention that the fisheries zone  reserved  before  1812 was in fact  much more exten-
159.  Id. at  126,  131,  136-37,  138.
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sive  than  the one  delimited  in  1935.  It is suggested  that  it included  all  fishing
banks from which  land was  visible, the range of vision  being,  as is recognized by
the  United  Kingdom  Government,  the  principle of delimitation  in force  at that
time.  The Court  considers  that, although  it  is not  always  clear  to  what  specific
areas  they apply, the historical data produced in support of this contention  by the
Norwegian  Government  lend  some  weight  to  the  idea  of the survival  of tradi-
tional  rights  reserved  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Kingdom  over  fishing  grounds
included  in  the  1935  delimitation,  particularly  in  the  case  of  Lopphavet.  Such
rights, founded  on the vital needs of the population and  attested  by very ancient
and  peaceful  usage,  may  legitimately  be  taken  into account  in  drawing  a  line
which,  moreover,  appears  to  the  Court to  have  been  kept  within the  bounds  of
what is moderate  and  reasonable.' 0
After reciting the geographic peculiarities of the northern Norwegian
coast, the Court  emphasizes  the soft  realism  of accepting  the  Norwe-
gian  position.
In these  barren  regions  the  inhabitants of the coastal  zone  derive their  liveli-
hood  essentially  from  fishing.
Such are  the realities  which must  be  borne  in mind  in appraising  the validity
of the United  Kingdom contention that the limits of the Norwegian  fisheries zone
laid down  in the  1935  Decree are  contrary to  international  law.' 0'
As  a  rhetorical  matter,  of  course,  an  extra-consensual  defense
stressing consistency  and  competitive  access  could  as  easily  have been
used to support the ten-mile rule. Moreover, such a defense of the Nor-
wegian  rule invites a consensual  response which  focuses  on gaps in the
Norwegian  practice  and in  the acquiescence  of foreign  states. Indeed,
the United Kingdom argued that its previous attitude had at most been
one of benign neglect rather than opinio juris,  in any case displaced  by
its current  opposition.
The key  rhetorical  moment,  however,  was  achieved  when  the dead-
lock  between  two  consensual  norms  was  broken.  Once  the Court  had
characterised  one rule in  consensual  terms  and the other  in  extra-con-
sensual terms, its argument took on a certain momentum.  The Norwe-
gian  rule became  "the"  rule which  needed  to be displaced.  The rest  of
the opinion was  a rhetorical mopping up operation,  deploying the strat-
egies  we  encountered  in  the  cases  of  unilateral  declarations  and
changed  circumstances  to make  the soft  lie down  with the hard.
This  mopping  up  operation  proceeded  by  exploiting  the  fact  that
both  a hard and a soft rhetoric  were  available both to support  and op-
pose  each  norm. The Court turned  from a  soft defense  of the Norwe-
gian  system to a hard offense  against the United  Kingdom's opposition
160.  Id. at  142.
161.  Id. at  128.
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to it,  arguing  that the absence  of opposition  indicated  that the United
Kingdom  had consented  to the Norwegian  system,  whatever  its  actual
intent.
From  the  standpoint  of  international  law,  it  is  now  necessary  to  consider
whether  the  application  of  the  Norwegian  system  encountered  any  opposition
from  foreign  States.
The general toleration  of foreign States  with regard  to the Norwegian  practice
is an  unchallenged  fact.  For a  period of more  than sixty years the United  King-
dom Government  itself in no way  contested it . . . . It would appear that  it was
only  in  its  Memorandum  of  July  27,  1933,  that  the United  Kingdom  made  a
formal  and  definite  protest on  this  point.
The Court is thus led to conclude that the method of straight  lines, established
in the Norwegian  system,  was imposed  by the peculiar  geography of the Norwe-
gian coast;  that even  before the dispute arose, this method had been  consolidated
by  a  constant  and sufficiently  long practice,  in  the face  of which  the attitude  of
governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary
to  international  law  ....  262
This  offensive  use  of hard  rhetoric  against  the United  Kingdom  is
tempered  in two ways  so as not to clash directly with the United King-
dom's consensual  claims. First, the Court tempers its hard opposition to
the United  Kingdom's  proposed  norm  by  suggesting  that  the ten-mile
rule-as  applied  to  Norway-is  incompatible  with  certain  systemic
considerations  "inherent  the nature  of the territorial  sea:"
In  this connection,  certain  basic  considerations  inherent  in  the  nature  of the
territorial  sea,  bring  to  light  certain  criteria  which,  though  not entirely  precise,
can  provide  courts  with  an  adequate  basis  for  their  decision,  which  can  be
adapted  to  the diverse  facts  in question.
Among  these considerations,  some reference  must  be made to  the close depen-
dence  of the  territorial  sea  upon  the land  domain.  It  is  the  land  which  confers
upon  the coastal  State  a  right  to  the waters  off its coasts.  It  follows  that  while
such a State must  be allowed  the  latitude necessary  in  order to be able to  adapt
its delimitation  to  practical  needs and  local  requirements,  the  drawing  of base-
lines must  not depart to any appreciable  extent  from the general  direction of the
coast.
Another  fundamental  consideration,  of  particular  importance  in  this  case,  is
the  more  or  less  close  relationship  existing  between  certain  sea  areas  and  the
land  formations  which  divide or surround  them.  The  real question  raised  in  the
choice of base-lines  is in effect whether  certain  sea areas lying within these  lines
are  sufficiently  closely  linked  to  the  land  domain  to be  subject  to  the  regime  of
internal  waters.  This idea,  which is at the basis of the determination  of the  rules
relating to  bays, should be liberally applied  in the case of a coast,  the geographi-
cal  configuration  of which  is as unusual  as  that of Norway.
Finally,  there  is one  consideration  not  to  be  overlooked,  the  scope  of  which
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extends  beyond  purely geographical  factors:  that  of certain  economic  interests
peculiar to a region,  the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced  by
a  long  usage." 83
Second, the United Kingdom's  acquiescence  is  implied objectively  from
its practice,  rather than found  subjectively  in opinio juris, in  contrast
to  the Court's  approach  in  evaluating  the  French  unilateral  declara-
tions  in the Nuclear Tests cases.
The  United  Kingdom  Government  has argued  that  the  Norwegian system  of
delimitation  was not known  to it and that the system therefore lacked  the notori-
ety essential  to  provide  the basis  of an  historic  title enforceable  against  it.  The
Court is unable to accept this view.  As a coastal State on the North Sea, greatly
interested  in  the  fisheries  in  this  area,  as  a  maritime  power  traditionally  con-
cerned  with  the law of the sea and concerned  particularly to defend  the freedom
of the seas,  the United  Kingdom could  not  have  been ignorant  of the  Decree of
1869  which had at once  provoked a request for explanations  by the French  Gov-
ernment  ....
.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  . . . ..  .
The notoriety  of the facts,  the general  toleration  of the international  commu-
nity, Great  Britain's position in the  North Sea, her own  interest in  the question,
and  her prolonged  abstention  would  in any  case warrant  Norway's  enforcement
of her  system  against the  United  Kingdom.' 0'
This  softer  assessment  of the  United  Kingdom's  rule might  need  to
confront  the  Court's soft  argument  favoring  the  Norwegian  practice,
forcing  the Court  to  choose  between  the  systemic  value  of open  seas
and the systemic value of "natural  prolongation"  as expressions  of sov-
ereignty just as it might have seemed necessary to choose between Nor-
wegian  and  United  Kingdom  fishermen  when  the  Court justified  the
Norwegian  rule  in soft terms.  The Court deploys a  number of rhetori-
cal strategies  to avoid  such a  direct  choice.
One strategy  is to  return  to  a  hard justification  for the  Norwegian
exception  to  the  United  Kingdom  rule-precisely  the  position  which
was downplayed when the Court was expressing  the United  Kingdom's
rule  in  hard  terms.  This  time,  however,  the Norwegian  opposition  is
tempered by soft considerations of systemic principle to which the Nor-
wegian delimitation  must, of course, comply.
The  Norwegian  Government  does  not  deny  that there  exist  rules of interna-
tional  law to which this delimitation  must conform.  It contends  that the proposi-
tions formulated  by the United  Kingdom  Government in  its "conclusions"  do not
possess  the character attributed  to them  by that government.  It further relies  on
its own system  of delimitation which  it asserts  to be in every respect in conform-
ity with  the requirements  of international  law.
163.  Id. at  133.
164.  Id. at  138-39.
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It  does  not  at  all  follow that,  in  the  absence of  rules  having  the  technically
precise  character alleged  by  the United  Kingdom  Government,  the  delimitation
undertaken  by the Norwegian  Government in  1935 is not subject to certain prin-
ciples  which  make  it possible  to judge as  to  its validity under  international  law.
The  delimitation  of sea  areas  has  always  an  international  aspect;  it cannot  be
dependent merely  upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal
law. Although it is  true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral  act,
because  only the  coastal  State  is competent  to  undertake  it,  the validity of the
delimitation with  regard  to other States  depends  upon  international  law.1 6'
Another  strategy  is  to express the systemic, softer  basis for the Nor-
wegian  rule  in  terms  of a customarily  accepted  scheme  of "historic  ti-
tle"  in  the  establishment  of  which  the  United  Kingdom,  like  other
states,  has participated.
By  "historic  waters"  are  usually  meant  waters  which  are  treated  as internal
waters  but which  would  not have  that character  were it not  for the  existence of
an historic title. The United  Kingdom Government refers  to the notion of historic
titles  both  in  respect  of territorial  waters  and  internal  waters,  considering  such
titles, in both  cases,  as derogations  from  general international law.  In its opinion
Norway  can justify the claim that  these  waters are  territorial  or internal  on  the
ground  that  she  has  exercised  the  necessary jurisdiction  over  them  for  a long
period  without  opposition  from  other states,  a kind of possessio longi temporis,
with  the  result  that  her jurisdiction  over  these  waters  must  now  be  recognized
although  it constitutes  a derogation  from  the  rules  in  force.  Norwegian  sover-
eignty  over  these  waters  would  constitute  an exception,  historic titles justifying
situations  which  would  otherwise  be in  conflict with international  law.
As  has  been  said,  the  United  Kingdom  Government  concedes  that  Norway  is
entitled  to claim  as internal  waters  all the waters of fjords and sunds which  fall
within the  conception of a bay as defined in international  law whether the  closing
line of the indentation  is more  or less  than  ten  sea  miles  long.",6
Although  the  Court's  opinion  has  not  directly  confronted  either  the
choice  between  Norwegian  and British  consent or  between  systemic in-
terests  in  Norwegian  and  British  fisheries  or  in  open  seas  and  historic
titles,  it has  produced  an elegant and  persuasive  account  of its decision
for Norway. One  might say that the decision  expresses  a preference  for
historic title, or Norwegian  fisheries or British consent, but the decision
does  not  rhetorically  present  these  choices.  Similarly,  one  might  say
that the opinion,  although  primarily  "about"  customary  law,  is impor-
tant primarily  for its doctrinal  expression of consensual  doctrines  of es-
toppel  and persistent  opposition which  here trump the customary  norm.
But the  opinion  itself weaves  an  elegant blend  of consensual  and  non-
165.  Id.  at  126,  132.
166.  Id. at 130-31.  Judge Hackworth concurs on the basis of this connection. Id. at
144.
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consensual  rhetoric  on behalf of one customary  norm  and against  an-
other. This blend is created much as  it was created  in the International
Load  Line  Convention  materials  and  in  the  Nuclear  Tests  opin-
ions-by interpreting  soft doctrines  in consensual  terms and supporting
consensual  norms with  systemic considerations.
The major difference  is that the opening moment, in which the Court
chooses  to consider  treating Norway's  system  as  the norm  which  will
lapse only in the face of persistent  opposition  by  the United  Kingdom,
is cast in soft rhetoric,  whereas  in the earlier cases  we considered,  the
norm was  established  in  hard  rhetoric  and  then  lapsed  in  the face  of
systemic  considerations,  however  consensually  expressed.  This  moment
reveals something about rhetorical strategies  of decision. These shifting
rhetorical  possibilities can  be mobilized  in a  way which  seems tilted in
favor  of Norway  by  exploiting  the  contrast  between  consensual  and
nonconsensual  norms  rather than  by expressing  a  direct choice  for the
Norwegian  system.  In  this,  the opinion  reaches  persuasive  closure  in
much  the  way  the  doctrinal  system  achieves  doctrinal  distinctive-
ness-by expressing  doctrines  in differentially  hard and  soft rhetoric.
In both  situations,  moreover,  extreme versions  of the two  rhetorical
strands  are  avoided  by  interpreting  each  in  terms  of the  other,  thus
allowing them to coexist easily. Thus,  the Court saves  the apparent ef-
fectiveness  of hard arguments  by treating them as  capable of objective
systemic  definition.  In  the  first  instance,  the  Court  uses  an  objective
practice-based approach to British consent,  finding in a benign  practice
a willingness to live with the Norwegian system. On the other hand, the
Norwegian will  is understood  to be bound by systematic considerations
of justice.  Both  consensual  strands  of  the Court's  argument  are  thus
given  soft  interpretations.  Similarly,  although  the  Norwegian  rule  is
supported and the United Kingdom norm  is opposed by soft arguments,
these  soft  arguments  are  defined  by  historically  acknowledged
practices.
The opinion  of the International  Court of Justice  in  the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases develops,  but never  quite  resolves,  similar ar-
guments about the creation and limitation of a special norm of custom-
ary  law. 67  Germany,  Denmark,  and  the  Netherlands,  having  agreed
that the boundaries  of their adjoining continental shelves should be de-
termined  by agreement, requested  the Court to state the rules of inter-
national  law,  if any,  which  should  be taken  into  account.  The judg-
ment,  confined  to  an  analysis  of  the  relative  authority  of alternative
legal  norms,  was  almost  exclusively  concerned  with  sources  doctrine.
167.  (W.  Ger. v. Den.,  W.  Ger. v. Neth.)  1969  I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb.  20).
1987]AM.  U.J. INT'L L.  &  POL'Y
As  it turned  out, moreover,  the  Court  did  not feel  it necessary  defini-
tively to choose among norms or  to specify in any detail how any  norm
should  be applied to the continental shelf in the North Sea:  "The Court
is  requested  ...to  decide  what  are  the  applicable  'principles'  and
rules  of international  law.  The  Court  is  not asked  actually  to  delimit
the further  boundaries  which  will  be  involved.  . ..",68
Denmark and  the  Netherlands  proposed  that the shelf be  delimited
in accordance  with  the principle  of "equidistance"  which  they  argued
was  binding  upon  the  Federal  Republic.  Because  the  German  North
Sea  coast  is  deeply  indented,  this rule  would  have  allocated  much  of
the oil  rich  outer shelf  to Denmark and  the Netherlands.  The  Federal
Republic proposed that the "just and equitable share"  rule bound Den-
mark and  the  Netherlands  to  allocate  Germany  a  portion  of the  shelf
proportional  to  the  relative  length  of Germany's  coastline,  despite  its
indented  shape.
The Court presented  the arguments  for both rules in  a similar order.
First,  the  Court treated  the  contentions  of both  sides  that  their  pro-
posed  norm  could  be  deduced  from  the  first  principle  of continental
shelf  doctrine:  that  the  right  to  continental  shelf  dominion  is  based
upon  the  "natural  prolongation"  of  the  sovereign's  coastal  territory.
The  Court  reaffirmed  the  principle  of "natural  prolongation"  but  re-
jected  both  of the interpretations  offered  by the parties.
Although  the  Court  rejected  the  two  interpretive  claims  in  slightly
differing  ways,  both  were  treated  as  insufficiently  consensual  expres-
sions  of a  systemic  norm.  As  a  result,  the second  half of the  Court's
opinion compared  hard justifications  for the two rules. This approach is
thus  quite  different  from  that  of the  Fisheries case  which  created  a
sense  of rhetorical  progression  by  contrasting  hard  and  soft justifica-
tions.  Here  the  Court  considers  both  proposed  rules  from  a  soft  per-
spective  and then from a  hard perspective.  This  approach  makes it far
more difficult for the Court to weave  a  persuasive  and continuous  rhe-
torical  fabric-and  it  is  perhaps  well  that  the  opinion  confronted  no
narrative  demand  for decisiveness.
Let  us  follow  these  two  argumentative  presentations  in  turn.  Al-
though  the  first  stage  of  the  opinion  treats  the  two  proposed  norms
from a soft perspective, this uniformity  is hardly necessary,  for the par-
ties  appear  to  have  presented  slightly  divergent  arguments  for  their
proposed interpretation  of the "natural  prolongation"  principle.  Indeed,
the Court seems  to have struggled to transform  each into  a springboard
for a  similar parallel  investigation  of consent.
168.  Id. at  13.
[VOL.  2:1SOURCES OF INT'L LAW
As presented  by the Court, the Germans  sought to interpret  the soft
standard  so  that it might depend  upon  their participation  in  delimita-
tion according  to its terms,  rendering the automatic and nonconsensual
"natural  prolongation"  principle  dependent  upon  actual  usage  and  a
consensual  settlement  of claims.  They  thus  seemed  to  be  grafting  a
consensual  requirement  onto  a  systemic  argument  of  principle.  The
Court rejected  this argument  by stressing  the  systemic  and principled
nature  of  "natural  prolongation"  as  an  extension  of  sover-
eignty-excluding  any  necessity  of  sovereign  participation  in  its
interpretation.
It will be convenient to consider first the contentions  put forward on behalf of the
Federal  Republic.  The  Court does  not  feel  able to  accept  them.  . . The  doc-
trine of the just and equitable share  appears  to be wholly at variance with  what
the  Court entertains  no  doubt  is the  most  fundamental  of all  the  rules  of law
relating to the continental  shelf, enshrined  in Article 2 of the  1958  Geneva Con-
vention,  though quite  independent  of it,-namely  that  the  rights of the coastal
State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural  prolon-
gation of its land territory  into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio,
by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise
of sovereign  rights  for  the  purpose  of exploring  the  seabed  and  exploiting  its
natural  resources.  In  short,  there  is  here  an  inherent  right  . . . .Furthermore,
the right  does not  depend  on  its being  exercised.  ....  0
By emphasizing  the inherency  of "natural  prolongation"  rather  than
"participation"  in  sovereignty,  the  Court  drove  a  wedge  between  the
two  halves  of the German  argument,  forcing  a  consensual  defense  of
the proportionality  approach.
The  Court  approaches  the  soft  argument  for  the  Danish-Dutch
norm quite differently. It presents arguments  for the equidistance prin-
ciple in exclusively  soft terms-precisely the terms in which it rejected
the proportionality  norm-and  rejects  them  as  insufficiently  grounded
in German consent. The opinion considers  and  rejects the view that the
equidistance  principle  is  implied  by  the  idea  of  natural  prolongation
and  is hence "a  rule that is  part of the corpus of general  international
law;-and, like other rules of general or customary international  law, is
binding  on  the  Federal  Republic  automatically  and  independently  of
any specific  assent,  direct  or indirect,  given  by  the latter." 110
The  Court  could  have  structured  its  rejection  of the Danish-Dutch
norm parallel to its rejection of the German norm, as incompatible with
the inherency  of  "natural  prolongation"  in  sovereignty.  Equidistance,
by tying the principle of "natural  prolongation"  to the formal  equality
169.  Id. at 21-22.
170.  Id. at 28.
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of sovereigns,  would  have  introduced  a  hard  element  into  a  principle
which  expresses  the  systemic  respect  for  territorial  configurations.  In-
stead, the  Court rejects  the Dutch-Danish norm for being insufficiently
grounded  in sovereign  consensual  autonomy.
The a priori argument starts from  the position.  . . according  to which  the right
of the coastal  State to its continental  shelf areas  is based  on its sovereignty  over
the  land  domain,  of which  the  shelf area  is  the  natural  prolongation  into  and
under the sea. From this notion of appurtenance is derived the view  which,  as has
already  been  indicated,  the  Court  accepts,  that  the  coastal  State's  rights  exist
ipsofacto and ab initio without there being  any question of having to make good
a  claim  to the areas  concerned,  or of any apportionment  of the  continental  shelf
between  different  states.  . . . Denmark  and  the  Netherlands,  for  their  part,
claim  that  the  test  of  appurtenance  must  be  "proximity,"  or  more  accurately
"closer  proximity:"  all  those parts of the shelf being considered as appurtenant  to
a  particular  coastal state  which  are (but  only if they  are)  closer to it than  they
are  to  any point on  the coast  of another  state  ....
The  conclusion  drawn  by  the  Court  from  the  foregoing  analysis  is  that  the
notion  of equidistance  as being  logically  necessary, in  the sense of being an  ines-
capable  a priori accompaniment  of  basic continental  shelf doctrine, is  incorrect
. ..  A  review  of the  genesis  and  development  of the  equidistance  method  of
delimitation  can  only  serve to  confirm  the foregoing  conclusion  ....
[A]t  no time was the  notion of equidistance  as an  inherent necessity  of conti-
nental  shelf  doctrine  entertained.  Quite  a  different  outlook  was  indeed  mani-
fested  from the start  in current  legal thinking."'
On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  seems  to  have  deployed  a  rhetorical
strategy  familiar  from  the  Fisheries case.  By  rejecting  the  two  pro-
posed  interpretations  of the  natural  prolongation  principle  with  argu-
ments  which differentially  emphasize  the hard  and  the  soft, the  Court
has generated  a sense of movement  forward,  placing a burden upon the
Dutch  to  prove  consent,  and eliminating  the  German  norm  from  fur-
ther  consensual  consideration.  On the other  hand,  however,  the  Court
has  created  a  difficulty  for  itself.  By  rejecting  the  German  norm  for
attempting  to introduce  consensual  elements  into natural  prolongation
and rejecting  the Dutch  argument  for  insufficiently  demonstrating  the
consensual  basis  for  their  interpretation  of  the  natural  prolongation
principle,  the  Court  has  preserved  the  soft  integrity  of  the  princi-
ple-without  creating a  preference  for either interpretation.  The Court
seems  confronted  with  an  awkward  choice.  Either  they  can  maintain
the  high  ground  and interpret  "natural  prolongation"  themselves-an
alternative  which  stands uneasily  with  the justification  for  their  rejec-
tion  of the  Danish-Dutch  interpretation-or  they  can  shift  to  a  more
purely consensual rhetoric-which  will  need to leave their purified  sys-
171.  Id. at 29,  32,  35.
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temic principle somewhat  behind. They  choose  the latter.
The  remainder  of the  opinion  is  devoted  to  the  Danish  and  Dutch
claim that Germany  is bound to the equidistance rule because it is part
of the body of consensual  custom  or treaty  law  which binds  Germany.
The trouble is that unmoored  from the discussion of systemic consider-
ations,  an  argument  cast  purely  in terms  of sovereign  autonomy  and
consent  seems  unable  to generate  any  particular  rule.  Although  Den-
mark  and  the  Netherlands  presented  consensual  arguments  of  both
treaty  and custom  for equidistance,  Germany  asserted  that it  had not
or did  not consent.
Limited to the idea that subjective  consent is to be the basis for cus-
tomary  norms,  the  Court  is  confronted  with  two  classically  polar
claims.  On the one hand,  it seems to  require  that Germany  be  bound
by whatever norm Denmark and the Netherlands  subjectively  claim  to
have consented  to on the  basis of their  objective  and reasonable  belief
that Germany had bound  itself thereto.  The idea that objective  or im-
plied consent  is to be the basis  of obligation seems  in Danish  hands  to
devour any subjectively  based German protest  to imposition  of the pro-
posed customary norm.  On the other hand, the idea of implied consent
seems  incompatible  with  the  notion  that  Germany  is  bound  by  its
consent.
Having  rejected  the  soft  arguments  attributed  to  the  Netherlands
and Denmark,  the Court  examines  what  it treats  as fallback positions
which justify binding the Federal  Republic by its consent. The equidis-
tance  principle was alternatively  to be considered  binding because Ger-
many  had  signed  a  treaty  (Geneva  Convention)  containing  it,  or  had
assented  to the treaty's contents,  or because  the  treaty declared  preex-
isting  positive  customary  law,  or crystallized  new  law,  or because  the
treaty  rule had since  become  a customary  norm through  the assent  of
the  international  community.
As presented  by the Court,  Germany responds  to each of these hard
arguments  in  consensual  terms,  terms  which  would  ordinarily  compel
the Danish  and Dutch  to abandon their consensual justification for the
rule and return to the soft argumentation  which the Court had already
rejected.  Germany  was  not  bound  by  the  treaty  because  it  never  in-
tended to be bound,  and had not ratified, despite  its signature and uni-
lateral declarations  assuming  the treaty's obligations.  Germany argued
further that it did not accept either  a  prior customary  law  declared  or
an  emergent  law  crystallized.  Moreover,  Germany  rejected  the  view
that  new custom  had been created  because  the requisite subjective  in-
tent was missing.
The Dutch and Danish responded to each of these objections by mov-
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ing to implication:  German  consent could be implied even absent  ratifi-
cation,  or,  supported by  Judge  Lachs  in dissent,  opinio juris must  be
implied  from conduct. 72  Germany  countered  that it had been a consis-
tent dissenter to precisely  this rule, whatever  the norm's customary  sta-
tus  elsewhere.
The  Court  adopts  the  German  point  of view  at  each  stage  in  this
exchange.  Germany is  not bound  by the Convention which contains the
equidistance  rule. Germany  is not bound by its unilateral  acceptance  of
the  Convention  because it did  not intend to be  bound.1 73 The  Conven-
tion  did  not  "crystallize"  the  equidistance  principle  as  a  customary
norm because it was proposed  "by  the  [International Law]  Commission
with  considerable  hesitation,  somewhat  on  an  experimental  basis,4
with  insufficient  consensus  to  produce  custom.  Even  when  the  Court
considers somewhat softer, more systemic responses to Germany's argu-
ments,  it  rejects  them.  Thus,  the  equidistance  rule  is  not  binding  as
custom  because  not  sufficiently  consciously  accepted  by  states  over  a
long  enough  period  of time to have  registered  sufficient  consent.
With  respect  to  the other elements  usually  regarded  as  necessary before a  con-
ventional  rule can  be considered  to  have  become  a  general  rule of international
law,  it  might  be  that,  even  without  the  passage  of  any  considerable  period  of
time, a very widespread and representative  participation in the Convention might
suffice of itself, provided it included that of States  whose  interests were specially
affected.  In the  present case,  however, the Court  notes  that, even  if allowance  is
made  for the existence  of a number of States  to whom  participation  in the  Ge-
neva  Convention  is  not  open,  or  which,  by  reason  for  instance  of  being  land-
locked  States,  would  have  no  interest  in  becoming  parties  to  it,  the number  of
ratifications and accessions  so far secured  is, though respectable,  hardly sufficient
As regards the time element,  the Court notes that it is over ten years since the
convention  was signed,  but that  it is even  now  less  than  five  since  it came  into
force .. . .Although  the  passage of only a short  period  of time is not  necessa-
rily, or of itself, a bar  to the formation of a  new rule of customary international
law on the basis  of what was originally a  purely conventional  rule, an indispensa-
ble  requirement  would  be  that  within  the  period  in  question,  short  though  it
might  be,  State  practice,  including  that  of States  whose  interests  are  specially
affected,  should  have  been  both  extensive  and  virtually  uniform  in  the sense  of
the provision invoked;-and  should  moreover  have occurred  in such  a  way  as to
show a  general  recognition that a  rule of law  or legal  obligation  is  involved.
172.  Id. at 231.  Judge Lachs  stated: "it  is surely over-exacting  to  require proof that
every state having  applied a  given rule did so because  it was conscious  of an  obligation
to  do  so."  Id.
173.  "The  Federal  Republic  was  one  of the signatories  of the  convention,  but  has
never  ratified  it, and  is consequently  not a party.  ....  Id. at 25.
174.  Id. at 38.
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The  essential  point  in  this  connection-and  it  seems  necessary  to  stress it-is
that even if these instances of action by non-parties to the Convention were much
more  numerous  than  they  in  fact are,  they  would  not,  even  in  the  aggregate,
suffice  in themselves to constitute the  opinio juris;-for, in  order to achieve  this
result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned  amount
to a settled  practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such  a way,
as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered  obligatory by the exis-
tence of a rule of law  requiring it.'
The dissenting opinions differed  with the majority on one or another
of these  points,  preferring  a  somewhat  softer  approach.  Judge  Lachs
was willing to imply opinio juris, which  he regarded as merely a  mat-
ter of "evidence,"  and to do  so on  the basis  of fewer  instances  over a
shorter  period  so that  the  law  could  remain  "commensurate  with  the
rate  of movement of events  which  require  legal  regulation.1 70  In the
end,  Judge Lachs  takes  a softer  approach:
For  to become  binding,  a rule or  principle of international  law  need  not pass
the  test  of universal  acceptance.  This  is  reflected  in  several  statements  of the
Court,  e.g.: "generally  ...  adopted  in the  practice of States" (Fisheries, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1951,  p.  128).  Not  all States  have.  . . an opportunity  or
possibility of applying a given rule.  The evidence should  be sought  in  the beha-
viour of a great number of States, possibly the majority of States, in any case the
great majority of the  interested  States ....  1
Judge Tanaka, in his dissent, is willing to eliminate reliance upon the
subjective  consent altogether.
Next, so  far as.  . .opinio juris sive necessitatis is concerned,  it is extremely
difficult  to get evidence of its existence in concrete  cases.  This factor, relating  to
internal  motivation  and  being  of a  psychological  nature,  cannot  be ascertained
very  easily,  particularly  when  diverse  legislative  and executive organs  of a gov-
ernment participate  in an internal process of decision-making  in respect of ratifi-
cation or other State acts. There  is no other way than to  ascertain the existence
of opiniojuris  from the fact of the external existence of a certain custom and its
necessity  felt in the international  community,  rather than  to seek evidence  as to
the  subjective  motives  for  each  example  of State  practice,  which  is  something
which is  impossible of achievement.
17
8
Judge  Sorensen  is  willing  to  take  an  objective  approach  to  opinio
juris, citing Sir Hersch  Lauterpacht.
Unless  judicial  activity  is  to  result  in  reducing  the  legal  significance  of the
most potent source of rules of international  law, namely,  the conduct of States, it
would appear that the accurate  principle on the subject consists in  regarding all
175.  Id. at 42-43,  44.
176.  Id. at 230.
177.  Id. at 229.
178.  Id. at  176.
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uniform conduct of Governments  (or, in appropriate  cases, abstention  therefrom)
as evidencing  the opinio necessitatis juris except  when  it  is shown  that  the con-
duct  in question  was not accompanied  by any such intention (Sir Hersch  Lauter-
pacht:  The  Development  of International Law  by  the  International  Court,
London  1958,  p.  380).
Applying  these  considerations  to  the  circumstances  of  the  present  cases,  I
think  that  the  practice  of States  referred  to  above  may  be  taken  as  sufficient
evidence  of the existence  of any necessary  opinio juris.'"9
Rather  than  blending  the  hard  with  the  soft,  the  Court  simply
stresses  the hard,  leaving the soft to the dissenting opinions.  In this, the
majority  and  the  dissent  have  differentiated  themselves  from  one  an-
other by monopolizing  the rhetorical  tendencies which also differentiate
doctrines from one another.  This rhetorical strategy,  while it effectively
banishes  the  proposed  Danish-Netherlands  rule,  has  a  difficult  time
coming  up  with  an  alternative.  In  rejecting  the  soft  Danish-Nether-
lands argument,  the  Court indicated  the  dependence  of soft  argument
on  hard  consensus  for  which  it  had  criticized  the  German  position.
Having  completed  its rejection  of the Danish  position,  the  Court  never
considers  the  hard  arguments which  Germany  may  have  advanced  for
the  proportionality  rule.
The Court was perhaps  fortunate,  given its rhetorical approach,  that
the  parties  had  agreed  not  to  save  it  from  the  task  of knitting,  from
opposed  protestations  about  lack of consent,  a  coherent  norm to  apply
to the delimitation.  Having  considered  both sets of soft arguments  and
rejecting  them  with  a  rather  hard  analysis,  not  much  was  left  out  of
which to fashion a decision.  The parties were content  to have the  equi-
distance rule eliminated and the  Court did not actively  defend an alter-
native  rule, or even the absence  of that rule. The result was the anticli-
mactic  conclusion  that the  parties  must "agree"  to an  apportionment
which must  be in accord  with "equitable  principles"  including  equidis-
tance  and  "a  reasonable  degree  of  proportionality."  At  the  last  mo-
ment, the Court returns  to  a  more  persuasive combination  strategy:
It was,  and it really remained  to the end, governed  by two beliefs;-namely, first,
that  no  one single  method of delimitation  was likely  to  prove satisfactory  in  all
circumstances,  and  that delimitation  should, therefore,  be carried  out  by  agree-
ment (or by reference  to  arbitration); and secondly, that  it should  be effected  on
equitable  principles.18
The  Court  suggests  that  this  combination  is  what  most  people  mean
[hard]  by the  idea of natural  prolongation  [soft].  This  consensus  leads
to the  conclusion  that:
179.  Id. at 247.
180.  Id. at  43.
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On a  foundation  of very  general  precepts of justice  and good  faith, actual  rules
of  law  are here  involved  which  govern  the delimitation  of adjacent  continental
shelves  . . .,  namely:
(a) the parties are under an obligation  to enter into negotiations with a
view to arriving at an  agreement  . .. ;
(b)  the parties are under an obligation  to act in such a  way that,  in the
particular case, and taking all the circumstances into account, equitable
principles  are  applied,-for  this  purpose  the  equidistance  method  can
be  used,  but  other  methods  exist and  may  be  employed,  alone  or in
combination,  according  to  the areas  involved;
(c)  for the reasons given.  . . the continental shelf of any state must  be
the  natural  prolongation  of  its  land  territory  and  must  not  encroach
upon what  is the natural  prolongation of the territory of another State.
...  ...........  ..........  ...  ..  . . . . .
[I]n  the course  of the negotiations,  the factors  to  be  taken into ac-
count are to include:
(1) the general  configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special  or unusual  features;
(2)  so far as known  or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological
structure, and natural resources,  of the continental shelf areas involved;
(3)  the element  of a reasonable  degree of proportionality,  which  a  de-
limitation carried  out  in  accordance  with  equitable  principles  ought  to
bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertain-
ing to the coastal state and the length  of its coast  measured  in the gen-
eral direction  of the coastline,  account  being  taken for  this purpose of
the effects,  actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimi-
tations  between  adjacent states  in  the same region.' 8'
III.  CONCLUSIONS  ABOUT  SOURCES  DISCOURSE
The elaborately articulated  modern doctrine and argument about the
sources of international  law are strikingly abstract  and independent  of
the  specific  norms  of  process  or  substance  whose  authority  it  estab-
lishes.1 82 The authority of various  sources, their limitations, and the hi-
erarchical  relationship  among  sources do  not depend  upon  the content
of norms.  Argument  about the authority  of various  norms,  when  con-
ducted  in the  rhetoric  of sources  doctrine,  proceeds  independently  of
the norm's  particular  content  or  application.  At the same  time,  how-
ever,  modern  sources  discourse  is  a  distinctly  doctrinal  affair.  Argu-
181.  Id. at 46-47,  53-54.
182.  Not only are "sources of law"  perceived  to be a  topic sufficiently unified to be
the subject  of separate  monographs  and  books,  see supra note  1, they  are generally
treated  separately  in  casebooks  and  treatises. See,  e.g.,  W.  BISHOP,  INTERNATIONAL
LAWv  (3d  ed.  1971); J. BRIERLY,  supra  note  1;  I. BROWNUIE,  supra note  1; L. HENKIN,
R.  PUGH,  0.  SCHACHTER  &  H.  SmiT,  supra note  97;  A.  VERDROSS,  supra note  1;
Waldock, supra note  1.
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ment  about the  binding  nature  of particular  international  legal  norms
may  be  abstract,  but  it  is  neither  theoretical  nor  political.  Norms  are
legally binding which fit within one of a series of doctrinally  elaborated
categories,  not  when  a  persuasive  argument  about political  interest  or
theoretical  coherence  can  be made  for their  observance.
In  establishing,  delimiting,  and  hierarchically  arranging  the  catego-
ries  of authoritative  norms  in  a  way  which  is  both  doctrinal  and  yet
independent  of particular  legal  doctrines,  sources  discourse  has  devel-
oped  a variety of puzzling  rhetorical  patterns. Throughout  sources  dis-
course,  doctrines  and  arguments  repeatedly  invoke  a  distinction  be-
tween  consensually  and  non-consensually  based  norms.  Most  of  the
rhetorical  strategies  developed  by  sources  discourse  can be understood
to recapitulate  in  one  form or another  this basic distinction.  It is  used
to  distinguish  treaties  from  custom,  to  contrast  various  schools  of
thought  about  the  nature  of  custom,  to  divide  arguments  for  and
against  the  application  of specific  norms  in  various  situations,  and  in
dozens  of other  ways  throughout the materials  on sources.
For  all  this  repetition,  however,  the  distinction  between  consensual
and  non-consensual  sources  or  doctrines  or positions  remains  frustrat-
ingly  fluid.  These  two  opposed  themes  present  rhetorical  possibilities
and  strategies  more  than  decisive  identifications  and  differentiations.
The important  point is  that using these rhetorical  themes  to articulate
and  distinguish  the  sources  of law  gives  sources  discourse  a  doctrinal
feel  without  presenting  the choice  between  two  norms  as a  substantive
clash  between  two  substantive  doctrinal  schemes  or  two  sovereigns.
Although  a  sources  discourse  which  operated  completely  within  the
rhetoric  of either  consent  or  systemic  considerations  would  also  seem
doctrinal,  it would  not be  able to  avoid  presenting  a  more  substantive
face.  A  consensual  rhetoric  could  certainly  differentiate  and  prioritize
norms in an abstract way, but in choosing  among  two norms one would
need to choose between the claims of two  sovereigns  about their auton-
omous consent.  A purely extra-consensual  rhetoric,  while it would obvi-
ously  avoid  this  problem,  would  have  a  difficult  time avoiding  a  more
substantive  seeming  choice  among  various  systemically  grounded
norms.  By combining  these two  rhetorics,  sources  discourse can defend
its  independence  from  sovereign  autonomy  and  substantive  legal
regulation.
In  this  survey  of  sources  discourse  I  have  presented  a  few  of  the
more  obvious  strategies  for  combining  these  incompatible  rhetorics.
The  most apparent  rhetorical strategy  of combination  is  simply repeti-
tion-differentiating  various  doctrines  from  one  another  as  hard  and
soft  and  then  repeating  the distinction  in distinguishing  each  doctrine
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from  its  exception  or  interpreting  doctrinal  strands  which  have  once
been  characterized  and  perhaps  adopted  as  hard  in  soft terms.  Argu-
ments  about  the  fluid  and  proliferating  doctrinal  field  which  results
from this repeating  practice of distinction and recombination  are often
able  to  combine  both  rhetorics  by  careful  management  of  an  argu-
ment's order-establishing  a  disjuncture  between  hard  and soft  argu-
ments in order  to create  a  sense of decisive  forward  movement,  much
as  the  doctrinal  corpus  used  notions  of  hierarchy  to  accommodate
sources  which  were  characterized  as  both  hard and soft.
If we think of these  various  strategies  together,  the rhetorical  pat-
terns seem less  fluid. Taken  as a whole, sources doctrine seems  to favor
consensual  rhetoric.  Consensual  doctrines  seem  to dominate,  and con-
sensual  interpretations  of softer  doctrines  seem  most compelling.  The
doctrinal  hierarchy  seems  tilted  in  favor  of  a  rhetoric  of  consent.
Sources  argument  as  a  whole,  however,  seems  tilted  towards  the sys-
temic  authority  of legal  norms.  Indeed,  sources  rhetoric  as  a  whole
seems to move toward law and away from sovereign  autonomy. A cer-
tain systemic authority seems  to be taken for granted in  rhetoric which
is most emphatic  about its consensual  foundation.  In this  way, sources
discourse  seems  to combine both  rhetorics.  That sources  discourse can
be  doctrinal  indicates  its  systemic  basis.  That  it  speaks  incessantly
about  consent  insulates  it  from a  substantive  legal regime.  The argu-
ment and doctrine taken together  seem to move from sovereign  auton-
omy  toward  systemic authority.
So long as consensual rhetoric seems associable with sovereign auton-
omy  and extra-consensual  rhetoric with sovereign  cooperation  or inter-
national  solidarity,  these  patterns suggest something about  the goal  or
project  of  sources  discourse.  Sources  discourse,  so  long  as  it  seems
hard,  guarantees  that  the legal  order  will  not derogate  from-indeed
will  express-sovereign  authority  and  autonomy.  So  long  as  it seems
soft,  sources rhetoric guarantees  that the international  legal order will
not be hostage  to sovereign  whim. So long as hard sources rhetoric re-
mains  different  from  soft  rhetoric,  can  seem superior  to soft  rhetoric
and  is  able  to coexist  with  soft  rhetoric,  the  international  legal  order
can  seem  to express and  transcend sovereign  power.
The important  point, however,  is not simply the coexistence  of these
two rhetorics.  Each must also  temper the other in important ways  and
the discourse as a whole must seem to move forward  from autonomy to
community.  Let me  take up  these  two  additional  dimensions  in  turn.
Although it is difficult  to see  exactly  why,  it seems  that contemporary
sources  discourse  is uncomfortable  with  both  hard and soft rhetoric in
their extreme  forms. One could  imagine  a sources  discourse which  was
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dependent  either upon sovereign  will or upon the content of the individ-
ual norms  which made up the international  legal order. Imagining such
systems  suggests  something  about  the  motivation  for  the  elaborately
hybrid  contemporary  doctrine  and argument  about international  legal
sources.
Were  sources  discourse  completely  derivative  of other  doctrines,  it
might simply describe  the places  where  one might look to find descrip-
tions  of state  behavior  or  elaborations  of norms  whose  authority  was
derived  from  someplace  else.  Interestingly,  international  law  scholars
writing  before  1648  characteristically  spoke  of sources  in  this  way.18 3
Their  derivative  approach  to sources  was  indicated  in part by  the  dis-
persal  of sources  doctrine  throughout other  doctrinal  discourse.
A  scholar who  imagined that the authority of norms  was well  estab-
lished  elsewhere  and  who  wanted  only  to  describe  the  ways  in  which
these  rules were  manifested,  could  have  had  a  much  smaller  abstract
discussion.  He  would not be  concerned  about abstractly  identifying  the
relative  hierarchy  of his sources.  The norms  themselves  would  do  that
for  him.  More  powerful  norms  would  simply  be  more  powerful,  or
would  say they were  more  powerful,  and there  would  be  no  particular
reason to suspect that this hierarchy  depended upon the way in which a
norm  was  made  known.  Moreover,  such  a  scholar  would  not  need  to
delimit  the  boundaries  of his sources  very  clearly in an  abstract  fash-
ion.  The  boundaries  of the body  of norms  would  be  logically  indepen-
dent of the form of their manifestation. The norms would  be limited by
their  content, not the particular catalog in which they were  found. Pre-
1648  discussions of the sources of international  law  did not consistently
establish  a  hierarchy  among  sources,  but  suggested  that  norms  from
each  catalog might,  depending upon  their content, overrule those  of an-
other.  Likewise,  they did  not  abstractly  delimit  their  various  catalogs.
Instead, they suggested that each was limited by the norms which filled
it. For example,  natural law  was defined  by the norms which were nat-
ural  and  necessary.  These  were  then  elaborated.  The  category  or
"source"  ended  when  norms  of this sort  ran  out.
We might also  imagine a  sources discourse which  simply catalogued
norms  which  comported  with  sovereign  will.  Such  an approach  would
threaten other doctrinal fields. As the articulation of the content  as well
as the form of power, sources  discourse would no longer  simply ground
doctrines  of process  and substance.  A  scholar  who  imagined  discourse
183.  For a  discussion  of the  concepts of the sources  of legal authority  in  the work
of primitive scholars Vitoria,  Suarez, Gentili,  and Grotius,  see  Kennedy, Primitive Le-
gal Scholarship, 27  HARV.  INT'L L.J.  1 (1986).
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about the "sources"  of international law  to be descriptive of catalogs of
state interests  would have  a different  sense of what  needed  explaining
in doctrines  about the sources of international  law.  He  would not need
to establish a hierarchy  among the sources he considered.  When norms
conflicted,  the  norm  expressing  the more  important  sovereign  interest
or the more forceful sovereign will would predominate. There would  be
no  reason to  assume that the form  of their  manifestation  could  be an
accurate  guide  to  their  relative  strength.  Likewise,  such  a  scholar
would not be particularly interested  in abstractly defining  and limiting
the various  catalogs  he felt one  could  refer to for  the  content of state
interest. The state interests or patterns of authority which were sources
would  limit the body  of norms,  and  the catalogs  would  be defined  by
the norms  which filled  them, rather  than vice versa.'"
Contemporary  people who talk about sources  are not content  to say
that states obey rules because it is in their interest to do so and that we
look to custom, treaty, etc. to discover what is in their interest. Rather,
these  people  accept  that  the  state is  best  situated  to understand  and
follow its  own interests.  They want to know the source of norms  which
bind  sovereigns  who  do not perceive  the obligation  to  be in their  own
immediate  interests.  They  are  looking  for  the  source  of norms  which
can bind the dissident,  the nonconformist,  the state which wants  to  do
something  else.  There would  be  no  legal dispute in  need of normative
resolution  unless  there  was  a  conflict  of  interest,  unless  two  states
thought  their interests could  best be served  by acting  in different  fash-
ions.  To resolve that dispute by looking  for the source  of norms only in
state interest would  lead us  only  to the  conflict.
Likewise,  people who talk about sources  are not content  to say that
they  are discussing  only  the ways  in which  a  higher  order which  ani-
mates  and  therefore binds the state system is  made known.  They want
to acknowledge  the  authority  of states  to  differ  about  the content  of
such  a higher order and seek  in  their discourse about  sources  to deter-
184.  During  the extreme period of positivism in the mid-nineteenth century, when a
view  of  international  law  quite  similar  to  this  dominated,  the  writing  of  abstract
casebooks  fell  out of fashion in  the Anglo-Saxon  world,  to  be replaced  by  catalogs  of
state behavior  and  exercises  of sovereign  will.  See,  e.g.,  H.  WHEATON,  HISTORY  OF
THE  LAW  OF NATIONS  IN  EUROPE  AND  AMERICA  (1845);  H.  WHEATON,  ELEzMENTs  OF
INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (1866)  (containing  a short  non-abstract  list  of sources  of the
practices guiding international  life as indicated  by prior  publicists).  Although  this was
not  true  in  continental  Europe  during this  period,  the  treatises  produced  there  often
lacked  an  abstract  discussion  of  the  validity  of  various  sources.  See,  e.g.,  F.
HOLTZENDORF,  HANDBUCH  DES  VOLKERRECHTS  (1887);  F. VON  LISZT,  DAS  VOLKER-
RECHT  (1898)  (stating  "nur  die  Rechtsflberzeugung  der  Staaten  vermag  Recht  zu
schaffen");  H.  HALLECK,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW,  OR  RULES  REGULATING  THE  INTER-
COURSE  OF  STATES  IN  PEACE  AND  WAR  (1861).
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mine which  of several  possible  manifestations  of such a  higher order is
authoritative.  Indeed,  the contemporary  scholar discussing  the  sources
of international  law  does so distinctly  from his elaborations  of the con-
tent of the norms  of international  law.  He tries to develop  an abstract
set of doctrines  about the  sources of international  law which  are  inde-
pendent  of the content of the norms which result and of the authorities
which  produce  them.  This  would  only  seem  worth  doing  if it seemed
that  something  about  the  content  of international  law  hinged  on  this
abstract  discussion;  if the  ensuing  catalogs  of norms  were  defined  by
the abstract  discussions  and not vice versa. This would seem  true if the
authority  of the  various  norms  depended  upon  their  inclusion  in  the
abstractly defined  categories; if sources discourse  was about the justifi-
cation  and  limitation  of normative  authority.
Paradoxically,  then,  the  hesitancy  to  adopt  either  extreme  position
about the  basis for  international  normative authority  preserves  the au-
thority of sources  discourse.  People who  discourse about the sources of
international  law  are  trying  to  do  two  things.  They  seek  the  norms
which  can  bind  states  against  their own  perception  of their  interests.
They  seek  to  elaborate  the  normative  order  in  a  way  which  does  not
presume away  the diversity of state interests.  Sources  discourse argues
about the normative  forms which  can bind states  without overthrowing
their  authority.  The discourse  is  not  about  the form  of the  catalog  of
norms.  It  is  about  the sources  of normative  authority  in  a  system  of
autonomous  sovereigns.'85
Thus it seems  that the rhetorical  tendency  to temper  hard with  soft
in sources  discourse  is more than a  persuasive technique. It expresses a
hesitancy  to  embrace  either  of the extremes  with  which  it  flirts.  We
might  think of sources  discourse as a whole  as sustaining  its distinctive
position of independence  and authority by invoking in a  hyperbolic way
185.  See 1 G. DAHM,  VOLKERRECHT  (1958)  (presenting  extensive doctrinal  discus-
sions): "Das  Problem  ist damit  in aller Scharfe gestellt: Wie kann  es in einer  nicht auf
ffber-und  Unterordnung,  sondern  auf  Gleichberechtigung  souveriner  Staaten
beruhenden  Gemeinschaft  V6lkerrecht geben?"  Id. at 8; see also Barile,  La Structure
de rordre  juridique international,  161  RECUEIL  DES  COURS  9  (1978):
La  r~gle  en  question  r6pond,  en  premier  lieu,  aux principes  de  souverainet6  et
d'ind6pendance  des 6tats,  membres fondamentaux  de la  communaut6  internatio-
nale. Le principe  de parit6 entre les 6tats,  6troitement  1i6  a celui  de leur souver-
ainet6  et  de leur ind6pendance,  qui,  du  reste,  est  i  la  base 6galement  de  toutes
les autres normes  du droit des trait6s (que l'on  pense aux r~gles  qui garantissent
d'une  certaine  fagon,  plut6t  limit6e  a  vrai  dire-voir  le  paragraphe  13  de  cc
chapitre,  la libert6 du  consentement et aux autres  qui d6terminent  les vices  et la
nullit6 des accords)  s'exprime,  dans  ia  r~gle pacta sunt servanda, dans la  valeur
inter partes des  trait6s . ...
Id. at 80.
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images  of sovereign  autonomy  and  systemic authority  which  it is  un-
willing to embrace. Rather than combining  hard and soft rhetorics,  we
should  think  of sources  discourse  as  excluding the  referents  of  both
hard and  soft rhetoric.  In one  way, this  exclusion  preserves  the auton-
omy and  authority of sources doctrine. But  in  another way, this  exclu-
sion refers us away from sources discourse and establishes a substantive
legal  fabric  which  remains  comfortable  with  sovereign  autonomy.
Thought of this  way,  a  sources  discourse which  deploys the rhetorical
strategies  which  I  have  outlined  seems  self-effacing  rather  than
assertive.
The rhetorical  proliferation  and continual  displacement  characteris-
tic of sources  discourse typifies  this self-effacing authority. The rhetori-
cal style and direction of sources  discourse, is thus related to its supple-
mental  position  within  doctrinal  discourse  as  a  whole.  Neither  itself
authoritative  nor descriptive  of an authority located  elsewhere,  sources
doctrine  maintains  an  uneasy  independence  from  other doctrine  while
leading  us towards the substantive legal order.  Paradoxically,  discourse
about  the authoritative  source  of international  legal  norms occupies  a
space  in  modern  doctrinal  work  at  once  fundamental  and  trivial.  Its
importance  has  a  logical  flavor.  In an  era  assuming  the centrality  of
origins, doctrines  about the authority of authoritative  norms seem logi-
cally  prior  to  doctrines  of  substance  or  process.  They  are  usually
presented first in international legal  treatises.  Moreover,  in  an era  dis-
tinguishing  theory  and  doctrine  by  their  relative  levels  of abstraction
from a  particular notion  of reality,  doctrines  about  the sources  of law
seem more intimately connected  to the structure of the systemic power
apparatus than do the individual and specific doctrines  whose authority
they  validate.  Sources  discourse  seems  theoretically  superior  to  doc-
trines of substance or process.  As we might expect from this viewpoint,
this discourse  is very closely  related  to much  theoretical work.  Sources
discourse  is  the  doctrinal  counterpart  to  the obsession  of theory  with
questions  of the  legitimacy,  strength,  and  authority  of  international
law.'
86
On the other  hand,  despite this  apparent  doctrinal  priority, sources
discourse  functions  as  the last  resort  of all doctrinal  argument.  Only
when  the  persuasive  power  of other  doctrines  is  diminished  are  advo-
cates forced  to say: "this  doctrine or outcome  may not  be persuasive or
coherent, but it is authoritative."  Consequently, one might only uncover
the structure of arguments  about the sources of international  law after
186.  See Kennedy,  Theses About International  Law Discourse,  23  GER. Y.B.  INT'L
L.  353  (1980).
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theoretical  and  other  doctrinal  argument  had  run  out.  Moreover,  de-
spite  the  theoretical  superiority  of sources  discourse,  doctrines  about
sources  seem  derivative  of a  systemic  vision  articulated  first  in  doc-
trines  of  process  or  substance-where,  for  example,  the  "sovereign"
whose  consent  will  ground  a  source  will  be  defined.  In  argument,
sources  discourse plays  a supplemental  role, validating and  supplanting
a  constellation  of sovereign  authorities  produced  by  doctrines  of sub-
stance  and  process.
The  key  to  understanding  the  structure  of  sources  doctrine  is  this
paradoxical  position anterior and inferior  to other doctrine. Sources dis-
course  is  distinct  from  other  doctrines,  allowing  space  for  theoretical
elaborations  of  authority  within  doctrine.  It  formally  precedes  other
doctrines  as  theory  formally  encompasses  doctrine,  yet it  supplements
other doctrinal discourse.  One way of thinking about the significance  of
the rhetorical strategies characteristic  of sources doctrine is  to see them
as  managers  of this  supplemental  separation  or  dependent  autonomy
from other doctrines. Another  way of approaching  the same issue, how-
ever, is to think of these  rhetorical maneuvers  as translations  into doc-
trine  of difficulties  encountered  by international  legal  theory.
At first,  the hard and soft rhetorics  characteristic  of sources  doctrine
seem  reminiscent  of  positivism  and  naturalism.  We  might  associate
positivism  with  the  view  that  sources  discourse  could  supplant  other
doctrines  by mapping  the  interests  of state authority.  Maintaining  the
supplemental  position of sources discourse  (its  dependence  upon an au-
thority  apparatus  articulated  elsewhere)  seems similar  to avoiding  the
pitfalls  of an extreme  positivism which postulates  an authority which  it
cannot  ground.  We  might  associate  naturalism  with  the  view  that
sources  discourse could be consumed  by doctrines of substance  and pro-
cess.  Maintaining  the  independent  position  of sources  discourse  (its
ability  to  validate  other  norms)  seems  similar  to  the  dilemma  of  an
extreme  naturalism which  posits an order  to which  it cannot  give  con-
tent. In this view, we would  equate the struggle to blend  hard and soft
rhetorics  with  the  dilemma  confronting  a  theory  of international  law
which  is  to be neither  naturalist  nor positivist.
Like  our  preliminary  associations  of  hard  and  soft  rhetorics  with
images  of an  independent  and  a dependent  discourse  of sources,  these
preliminary  associations  simplify  naturalism  and  positivism.  Each  of
these theoretical positions,  which developed  after the  collapse of primi-
tive  scholarship,  like  contemporary  sources  discourse,  were  aimed  at
resolving the division of authority  and  order. Although  they  tended  to-
wards  these  two extremes,  each  school  offered  a mediation  of the rela-
tion  between  order  and  autonomy.  Sources  discourse  likewise  situates
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itself  between  two  extremes  which  it  expresses  only  hyperboli-
cally-only  as it excludes  them. The problem of sources discourse,  like
the problem of international  legal theory,  is to achieve  a mediation-to
carve  out  an  independent  and  yet  supplemented  position  within  doc-
trine. But the  problem within  doctrinal  discourse of this  type is some-
what  different.
Perhaps  it is easiest to think of sources  discourse as a translation  of
these  theoretical  concerns  into  doctrine-as  the transposition  of theo-
retical  scepticism  into  doctrinal  proliferation.  In  theoretical  literature,
the problem of realism and idealism is presented directly.  International
legal  theory  argues  directly  on  behalf  of the international  legal  order
against  the  scepticism  of  either  the  political  realist  or  the  moralist.
Whether  positivist  or  naturalist, the  theoretician  must  respond  to  the
posited  or  hypothetical  absence  of an  international  legal  order.  As  a
result,  the  theoretician  must  posit  and  justify  the  authority  of  legal
norms-indeed  by arguing  their consensual  origin or justice.
In  sources  discourse,  by  contrast,  the legal  order  is  always  already
presumed  and  one  is  always  arguing  for  some  norms  against  others.
Sources  discourse  seems  to  argue  against  the  normative  or-
der-expressing  its authority  against the  substantive  regime on  behalf
of its origin--even  as  it establishes  that regime  by removing  us from
theoretical  scepticism  and opposition.  As  a  result,  the  management  of
hard  and  soft  rhetorics,  while  similar  to  the  management  of natural
and positive justifications  for an international  legal order, seems to re-
verse  their tone.  Here, for  example,  consensual  rhetoric seems to  reas-
sure the sovereign  while  critiquing  substantive  order  even  as  it estab-
lishes the authority  of the source.  In theoretical  literature,  by contrast,
positivism seems to respond to the realist with evidence of practice. The
net  result  of these  two  discoursive  enterprises  is  to sustain  a  sense  of
movement  towards and into doctrine.
Discourse  about  sources  searches  abstractly  to  delimit  the  norms
which bind sovereigns in a  way which  relies  neither on the interests of
sovereigns nor on some vision of the good which is independent  of state
interests.  The  search  is  for  a  decisive  discourse-not  for a  persuasive
justification-which  can continually  distinguish  binding  from nonbind-
ing  norms  while  remaining  open  to expressions  of sovereign  will.  The
argumentative  moves  made  by  those engaged  in  sources  discourse  re-
flects  this central  goal.
The result  is  a discourse  of evasion  which  constantly combines  that
which it cannot differentiate  and emphasizes  that which it can express
only  by hyperbolic  exclusion.  Pursued  in this  fashion,  sources  doctrine
moves  us forward  from theory towards other doctrines  which it supple-
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ments,  remaining  both  authoritatively  independent  and parasitic.  This
paradoxical  position  between  theoretical  discourse and the doctrines  of
substance and  process  is maintained  by endlessly  embracing  and man-
aging  a  set  of ephemeral  rhetorical  differences.  The  turn  to  sources
doctrine thus  seems  to  provide  an  escape  from  fruitless  theoretical  ar-
gument,  moving  us  towards  legal  order,  precisely  by  opening  up  an
endlessly  proliferating  field  of legal  argumentation.